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Top-level acquisition decisions are complex and multi-
objective. This implies difficulties in appropriately
accounting for all relevant factors to select the best
alternative. In addition, there are difficulties and defi-
ciencies in the actual implementation of the decision proc-
ess. The difficulties and deficiencies in the top-level
acquisition decision-making are explored by this thesis.
The thesis suggests improvements through intensive use of
a quantitative, judgment-based decision technique derived
from Multi-Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT) . Emphasis is
put on demonstrating MAUT ' s capability for incorporating
subjective judgment, in order to reduce the existing doubts
about its usefulness for top-level decision-making. The
thesis recommends use of the MAUT procedure as the central
tool for comprehensive evaluation of the decision alternatives
It argues that such use would solve some of the essential
decision-making problems and in addition contribute to the
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The acquisition of major systems by the Federal
Government constitutes one of the most crucial
and expensive activities performed to meet
national needs. Its impact is critical on tech-
nology, on the nation's economic and fiscal
policies, and on the accomplishment of Govern-
ment agency missions in such fields as defense,
space, energy and transportation. [Circular No.
A-109, p. 1]
The above quote clearly indicates how crucial, and complex
the major systems acquisition decisions are. The quality of
these decisions have long-run implications not only for the
national defense capabilities, but for political and socio-
economic issues as well.
The complexity of the major systems acquisition decisions
stems from the scope and substance of factors such as:
(1) The variety of organizations and personalities with
interests in the decision.
(2) The enormous resources committed to the decision.
(3) The technological and financial uncertainties involved
in programs whose acquisition life cycle stretches over 7, 10,
15 or more years, and which exploit the leading edge of the
technological state of the art.
(4) The large and complex organizations and management
involved in running the programs through their acquisition
life cycle.
During the acquisition life cycle there is a continuous
decision-making process, involving various echelons, up to

the top decision-maker, which, for major systems, is the
Secretary of Defense, or in some cases, even the President
himself
.
The decision-making process works in a hierarchical manner.
As a decision issue ascends the decision-making ladder, it
becomes more refined, the alternatives are better defined,
and their number is reduced. At the same time another develop-
ment takes place: As the decision moves up, emphasis changes,
new considerations are added, and in addition to the measurable
factors more and more intangible factors, which are subject
to judgment, become involved.
Thus, top-level acquisition decision-making is distin-
guished by the problem of facing a broad spectrum of decision
factors, of various scopes and natures, some of them technically
measurable, and some of them more judgmental. Top-level
decision-makers have the difficult task of intelligently con-
solidating all these factors and considerations into one final
decision. The difficulty of such consolidation is amplified
by the previously mentioned substantial implications of the
acquisition decisions.
Because of their complexity and crucial implications, major
systems acquisition decisions have always been subject to con-
troversy, criticism and concern. Circular No. A-109 [Execu-
tive Office of the President, 1976] stated several years ago
that "for a number of years there has been deep concern over
the effectiveness of the management of major system acquisition."
This thesis reveals that concerns and criticism about these
10

issues have continued to the present. In fact, there always
should be concern about acquisition decisions, and there are
no limits to striving for their improvement.
B. OBJECTIVES
The objectives of this study were to identify problems and
deficiencies in the current methodology by which acquisition
decision alternatives are evaluated, compared and presented
for top-level decision-making, and to suggest use of a decision
technique that should improve the way the ultimate decision
is made.
C. SCOPE
The scope of this thesis is limited to the search for an
evaluation framework or decision-making technique that can
best serve top-level acquisition decision-making. The thesis
does not directly address the major problems of acquisition
decisions such as how to translate threat assessment into
weapon systems terms, how to reliably predict cost, performance
and schedule, or how to measure the political and socio-economic
implications of the decision. These are beyond the scope of
the thesis. Rather, the thesis concentrates on the question
of how to best consolidate the above inputs to an ultimate
decision, under the assumption that they are already given.
The thesis does not attempt to recommend specific changes
in the formal acquisition decision process, the so-called
"DSARC Process" (which is actually in the process of change)
.
Rather, it does address the underlying approaches to
11

decision-making which are not necessarily attached to one
formal process or another.
The study refers mostly to top-level decision-making.
In this context, top-level acquisition decision-makers are
defined as the highest acquisition authorities, such as Source
Selection Board, (Service) SARC, (Service) Sec— at the Service
Department level; DSARC and SecDef—at the OSD level. 1 But
this definition is by no means strict. Any decision body
that meets the thesis
' principal assumptions may be considered




At the center of the research work done for the
thesis is a questionnaire which was distributed to a sample
of high-level officials in the U.S. DOD and in the Israeli
Air Force (IAF) . The purpose of the questionnaire was to ob-
tain inputs associated with the thesis theme from people who
are actually involved in major system acquisition decisions.
Addressing two different decision-making milieus— the American
and the Israeli
—
provided a base for comparison, in which
As one can notice, no distinction is made here between
decision authorities (such as SecDef or (S)Sec) and recommending
bodies (such as DSARC, (S)SARC). The reason is based upon the
assumption that in consolidating their recommendation, the
latter should reach, in a sense, some sort of decision. In
this respect the suggested technique may apply to them as
well as to the formal decision-makers.
12

the American setting is emphasized, and the Israeli serves
as a reference.
b. The Respondents Sample
The sample solicited was selected with reference
to positions and estimated involvement in the acquisition
decision process. The American sample consisted of 38 offi-
cials, of which 28 are military and 10 civilians. Those were
spread among the DOD components as follows: OSD— 13, Navy
Department— 16, Air-Force Department— 9. Their positions
distributed from medium-level staff, up to Under Secretary
of Defense (R&E)
.
The Israeli sample consisted of 11 IAF officers,
including two deputies to the IAF Chief of Staff, the IAF
Chief of Maintenance and Logistics, IAF HQs department heads
and staff members.
c. The Questionnaire As A Reference
The original questionnaire and its full analysis
and numerical summaries are located in Appendix A, which is
a complete and independent unit. Besides the direct analysis
of the questions, Appendix A presents a variety of comments
written by the respondents, some of which are unique. The
analysis and numerical data of Appendix A serves as a suppor-
tive reference to the basic analysis of the thesis. For deeper
insight into the respondents perceptions, reading of Appendix
A is recommended.
2 . Interviews
In order to obtain additional and better insight into
the acquisition decision-making issues than that permitted
13

by the questionnaire, several interviews took place. The
interviewees were:
(1) Dr. Walter B. LaBerge, Ex-Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense (R&E)
.
(2) Robert F. Trimble, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
(R&E) Acquisition Policy (acting)
.
(3) Dr. Robert J. Hermannn, Special Assistant for Intelli-
gence to the USD (R&E), and until a week before the inter-
view—Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Research,
Development and Logistics.
(4) BRIG. GEN Joseph H. Connolly, Director, Contracting
and Manufacturing Policy, DCS/Research, Development and
Acquisition, HQ USAF.
(5) Frederick G. Fellowes, Director, Tactical Air Surface
and EW Development Directorate.
In order to discuss Multi-Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT)
implementation in the acquisition decision-making process,
an additional interview took place. The interviewee was:
Prof. Ward Edwards, Director of the Social Science Research
Institute at uSC, Los Angeles, Ca. Prof. Edwards is one of
the leading theorists and practitioners of MAUT. His publica-
tions served as major references to this thesis.
In the literature, various names and acronyms applied to
similar ideas are found. The acronym MAUT may be an abbre-
viation for Multi-Attribute Utility Theory , or Technology ,
or Technique . In addition, there can be found: Multi-
Attribute Utility Measurement (MAUM) , Multi-Attribute Utility






The thesis also refers to various academic sources
as well as to official publications.
E. ORGANIZATION
This thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter II explores
the characteristics of the present acquisition decision-making
process, and reveals its problems and deficiencies as reflected
from the literature base, the official documentation and the
perceptions of the people involved. Special emphasis is put
on examining the attitudes toward usage of quantitative deci-
sion techniques, and the extent to which these techniques are
actually used. Chapter II concludes with a list of criteria
for a decision technique intended to improve the current
process
.
Chapter III examines the applicability of quantitative
decision techniques for top-level acquisition decision-making.
Emphasis is put on studying the capability of those techniques
of handling subjective judgment. Among the decision tech-
niques MAUT is found as most suitable for acquisition decisions,
Chapter IV provides the theoretical basis of MAUT, which
is required for further discussion about the implementation
aspects. The chapter also presents clarification of the
various terms used interchangeably in MAUT-related literature
and in this thesis as well.
Chapter V highlights the major issues associated in MAUT
implementation as a tool for top-level acquisition decision-
making. The chapter provides also a broader view on MAUT
15

procedure as a comprehensive, ongoing acquisition evaluation
framework. The chapter demonstrates to what extent MAUT
meets the criteria set in Chapter II.
Chapter VI gives the overall conclusions and general
recommendations of the thesis.






EXPLORATION OF THE PRESENT SITUATION
A. THE GENERAL NATURE OF THE ACQUISITION DECISION-MAKING
PROCESS AND ASSOCIATED PROBLEMS
1 . Formal and Informal Process
The formal acquisition process is well defined
in various directives and instructions, but in fact is
only a model from which individual programs deviate.
The process guidelines represent an idealized scheme
for selection development and procurement of products...
Along with the formal and obvious decision-makers
there are less conspicuous ones who are often more
influential. [Fellowes, 1981]
In this respect, the formal acquisition decision-making process
and documentation are those which are defined by DOD Directive
No. 5000.1 (19 80), DOD Instruction No. 5000.2 and the supple-
mentary regulations within the Department of Defense (DOD)
components. As an informal process are considered all meetings,
discussions, influence exertions, writings, etc., which are
not directly defined and required by the above mentioned docu-
ments .
Fellowes' perception is supported by several of the
questionnaire's respondents. Moreover, some of them even
doubt the value of the formal decision process and documenta-
tion in the "real world" decisions. Says one respondent:
Acquisition process documentation is of limited
value, if any. [Appendix A, p. 165]
This study addresses both the formal and informal
decision-making processes. The suggested decision-making
technique should serve not only as a decision tool for the
formal decision events, but also resolve some deficiencies
17

caused by the informal process, although by no means cure them
all. The informal process is considered as an inherent,
inevitable part of the acquisition decision-making process,
therefore no attempt is made to eliminate it, rather to better
control and take it into account according to the "rules of
the game.
"
Most of the references about the present situation
are taken from the formal process, which is easier to identi-
fy. But that does not mean the formal process is the only
one to be addressed. Nevertheless, in many cases the formal
process situation is a genuine representative of more essential
approaches to decision-making, which are not necessarily attached
to specific current procedures. These approaches are ad-
dressed in this thesis. This is the reason why the recommen-
dations for implementation of the suggested technique (see
Chapter V) are stated in general terms, and suggestions for
specific changes in the current directives and instructions
are avoided. It is true also, as mentioned by some of the
questionnaire's commentators [Appendix A, p. 164], that the
"DSARC Process" is subject to continuing revisions. But since
referring mainly to the underlying approaches, the conclusion
may be valid in a new acquisition decision process as well.
2 . Types of Major Systems Acquisition Decisions
The formal decision points in the acquisition life
cycle are identified as the four Milestones. These SecDef's
major decisions punctuate a continuous process of evaluations,
consolidation of sub-decisions and recommendations. At each
18

Milestone an authorization to proceed to the next phase is
approved or disapprove. At Milestones I and II, selection
of system alternatives is done as well [DOD Dir. 5000.1, 1980,
p. 4] . Although any decision is "selection of particular
alternative (s) from set of feasible alternative courses for
resolving a particular problem" [Krajewski, 1981, p. 5], the
alternatives of the Milestones decisions are of variable
nature. In Milestone I a selection should be made between
alternative design concepts for development, and in Milestone
II between contending specified systems . Since in most cases
system selection and contractor selection are equivalent, it
is Milestone II at which Source Selection is directed. Mile-
stone III decisions usually do not deal with alternative
concepts or systems, but rather with a single system. Here
the alternatives are mostly variations in the acquisition
strategy, i.e., trade-offs between performance, cost and
schedule. All other factors are in most cases already deter-
mined. Milestones I and II type of decisions, are those in
which selection between different system concepts (e.g., MX
missile vs. B-l bomber) or between different systems of the
same concept (e.g., F-16 vs. YF-17) is done, and a broad spec-
trum of factors may still affect the decision. These are the
decision types which the suggested technique (which is later
The word "type" is emphasized since the statement relates
to any decision at any level which meets the characteristics
of Milestones I and II decisions. (Recall the author's approach
to his analysis is not to relate it to any specific current
decision process, which is subject to change.)
19

introduced) focus on. But, of course, it is by no means
restrained only to this type of decision. Being a flexible
and adjustable device it can handle other decision types as
well
.
3. Acquisition Decisions As Multi-Objective Decisions
The previous section related mainly to the multiple
alternative nature of the acquisition decision. This section
highlights the multi -objective nature of those decisions. A
broad scope of objectives must be achieved by top-level
decision-makers. Some of the major objectives are:
(1) Maximize military effectiveness.
(2) Minimize costs.
(3) Maximize technical utility.
(4) Maximize internal and external political benefits.
(5) Maximize social and economic benefits.
These objectives are in fact subdivided through several levels
in an hierarchical order, as presented in more detail in Chap-
ter V. The complexity of the acquisition decisions is not
measured solely by counting its objectives. An examination
of the formal process reveals how many items, factors, and
criteria may be taken into account. For example:
(1) The Decision Coordinating Paper (DCP) which provides
the primary documentation for use by the DSARC in arriving
at the Milestone recommendation [DOD Inst. 5000.2, 1980, p. 6]
The term "objective" is referred here as the "direction"
in which one should strive to do better [Keeney and Raiffa,
1976, p. 34]. Consequently the words "maximize" and "mini-
mize" indicate direction , and not specific levels of minimum
or maximum as goals to achieve.
20

presents in its annexes a list of goals and threshold of 20
different items under categories such as cost, schedule, per-
formance, supportability and manpower. In addition it includes
a detailed table of different resources and life cycle cost
( LCC ) components
.
(2) The Integrated Program Summary (IPS) which summarizes
the implementation plan of the DOD component for the complete
acquisition cycle [DOD Inst. 5000.2, end. 4, p. 1] requires
5 mandatory annexes and 2 3 more issues to be addressed.
(3) A chart of major system acquisition life cycle
[C£C Associate Consultants, 19 80] counts 16 decision criteria
for Milestones I and II.
(4) The USAF requires about 35 data items for its Milestone
Reviews, consisting of a variety of areas (e.g., operational
performance, technology, cost, etc., [Department of the AF,
1979, pp. 37-39]). Even if we assume that the principle of
"management by exceptions" is valid here, as is the case in
most top-level decision-making, still the examination of the
various data items in light of the various criteria and objec-
tives in order to reach the ultimate decision, is a very
difficult task. The above examples relate to the formal inputs
only. The task is much more difficult when informal inputs,
influences, and pressures are taken into account.
The difficulties in top-level acquisition decision-
making is observed not only by analyzing the formal documenta-
tion for the decision; it is also spelled out by the comments




sometimes, when a program office comes in and gives
a briefing, it is very difficult to really grasp the
significant or distinguishing factors. You need
your staff to be involved, to look into that in
advance, to try to surface the discriminators.
But is not only a problem of grasping. It is in the first
place a problem of including the relevant inputs for the deci-
sion, and according to one of the questionnaire commentators,
"including all relevant decision factors is the tough part"
[Appendix A, p. 200] . Muddling through the large number of
pertinent factors leads to inefficiency in the DSARC process,
while on one hand the reviews are not limited to key issues
and many insignificant ones are raised. On the other hand,
some essential issues do not get enough attention [Rice, 1978,
pp. 33-34]. From the questionnaire we learn that although
the respondents are moderately satisfied with the manner in
which alternatives are represented and compared in the formal
documentation, they indicate to a considerable extent the
difficulty in making the final decision, despite the refining
process prior to the top-level decision-making. According
to Dr. LaBerge (1981)
,
. . .no serious comparison between alternatives can take ,
place for most programs under the existing methodology.
As a symptom of weakness in the decision-making, LaBerge
points out that,
In fact, the actual decision made by the senior de-
fense officials is to approve or disapprove the
To soften this statement LaBerge comments that "there
are exceptions for some major high visibility programs such
as MX missile where top management can obtain an independent
assessment from high level review groups such as the"Defense




alternative recommended by the Service, rather than
select between alternatives.
This tendency, which is supported by the questionnaire findings
[Appendix A, pp. 172-173] might be a wise decision tactic
unless, as in many cases, it is caused by the fact that
. . .most people in the decision process neither have
studied the problem in detail, nor had an easily




The Credibility of the Decision Alternatives
Presentation
Problems of the present acquisition decision-making
are not derived only from their complexity as being of a
multi-objective nature. A severe criticism about the deci-
sion presentation objectivity, the alternatives credibility
and the extent of the decision-maker real decision option
repeatedly appears in the comments of the people involved.
Some citations that illustrate the above mentioned notion
include:
...the selection is never less than clear-cut .. .The
Service assures this... The real alternatives
generally do not appear--only strawmen. . . . [Appendix
A, p. 170]
The arguments and evidence are usually structured
to support the Service selection and to present
the decision in the most "clearcut" form permitted
by the facts... By the time such reviews are held
at the highest levels for all practical purposes
the selection has been made and any other choice
or selection is very difficult to affect...
[Appendix A, p. 170]
Alternatives other than the preferred alternative
are evaluated to gain perspective on the preferred
one. There is virtually no probability any other
will be selected. [Appendix A, p. 17 2]
In many cases alternatives besides the recommended
one are presented to satisfy formality .. .The
23

process is too far committed to permit reversal
of the Service position. [LaBerge, 1981]
These quotes clearly speak for themselves and do not require
further interpretation. Even if we consider that they do not
apply to all cases, and do not represent all views, still they
are serious enough to be taken into account in searching im-
provement of the present situation.
B. THE DIAGNOSTIC APPROACH TO DECISION-MAKING: A DETAILED
PROCESS ANALYSIS
1 . The Diagnostic Approach—An Overview
The previous section examined the present acquisition
decision-making situation from general aspects. The rest of
the examination dealing with more detailed characteristics,
will be done through the diagnostic approach to decisions.
According to this approach, decisions are examined in terms
of their process and structure [Keen, 1978, p. 61]. The
examination of the decision process will be classified accord-
ing to five main schools of thought which are found in the
literature on decision-making. These are:
(1) The rationalistic view.
(2) The satisficing view.
(3) The organizational procedure view.
(4) The political view.
(5) The individual differences perspective. [Keen, 1978,
p. 63]
Each of these schools suggests that its view should be the
dominant aspect in examining a decision process, and any
24

suggested decision-making methodology should mainly apply to
this aspect, and concentrate on resolving problems derived
from it. But in fact, in complex decisions all those aspects
play a significant role, and any decision methodology aimed
to improve such complex decision processes should take into
account requirements derived from all those views. That is
the strategy to be used in our case as well. Thus, the coming
sections will analyze the present acquisition decision process
in light of the above mentioned five schools of thought.
2 . The Rationalistic View
a. The Theoretical Definition
This is a normative view in which the decision-
maker is assumed to select the most efficient alternative,
that is, to maximize the amount of output for a given input.
The decision criteria are predefined and the objective can be
formulated in a quantitative manner. The rationalistic methods
maximize the expected utility in situations where there is
uncertainty of events and outcomes. In both instances there
is an "objective" method of arriving at a solution: given
a set of consequences and one's utility function, the choice
is automatic. This approach assumes a rational, completely
informed single decision-maker [Keen, 1978, pp. 62, 64-65].
As evidenced by Keen, proponents of cost-benefit analysis
adopt this approach. The main shortcoming of this approach
is that once one defined the "rules of the game", he is bound
to their mechanical-computational results. Or as Simon (1957,
pp. 241-260) put it, the logic and results of the optimal
25

choice remain, even where they are descriptively unrealistic.
But even the opponents of this approach do admit that it is
of value in highlighting central variables in the decision-
making, and enabling good communication among the people
involved [Keen, 1978, p. 64].
b. Quantitative Techniques in Use for Assisting
Acquisition Decision-Making
At the foundation of the rationalistic approach
rests all sorts of quantitative models. The questionnaire
reveals relatively low propensity to use quantitative models,
or techniques to support top-level acquisition decisions. If
they are used, they are always severely limited, using very
few factors as the only basis for comparison [Appendix A,
pp. 174-177]. Quantitative techniques are hardly used as an
overall evaluation means in the support of high level decisions
But they are broadly used in lower levels to calculate various
complex but measurable unit-dimension factors, such as cost,
performance, reliability, maintainability, manpower and the
like. In his response to the questionnaire, a program manager
writes
:
At the program level we tend to do little modeling
outside the engineering domain, where we get good
correlation factors. Objective modeling forces
discipline but is not our tool in decision-making.
[Appendix A, p. 181]
Among others, the specific technique that lies
at the center of this thesis, the Multi-Attribute Utility
Theory (MAUT) , is used on some occasions in the acquisition
evaluation and decision process. Moreover, it handles not
26

only measurable dimensions, but also subjective ones—however
on a realtively narrow scope. It is used, for example, as
one of the cornerstones of the Mission Operability Assessment
Technique, (MOAT)
.
This technique is an evaluation methodology
that measures the operability of a system, or subsystem, in
terms of operator tasks performed during mission. It is
implemented in the test and evaluation of the F/A-18 [Pacific
Missile Test Center, 1979]. But the results of this technique
are obviously not an overall evaluation.
A broader scope of MAUT implementation is observed
in the Source Selection procedure. Here the proposals are
evaluated through a hierarchy of factors and subfactors, whose
top-level categories consist of:
(1) General quality and responsiveness of the proposal.
(2) Organization, personnel and facilities.
(3) Technical approach.
(4) Cost. [Procurement Associates, 1972, pp. XVIII-13— 30]
But this is also not comprehensive enough to base a major
system selection on, as mentioned by the above source itself
(p. XVIII-30)
:
For large programs, the final choice may be made at
the top of the agency level, or in the case of major
weapons systems at the Department of Defense level,
after evaluation by many subordinate groups. The
technical and cost evaluation is only part of the
consideration . The industrial mobilization require-
ments and the effect of the award of the contract
on the cost of related Government contracts are
only a few of the many factors that must be considered.
[The underlines made by the thesis author, R.G.]
Another version of evaluation procedure for Source
Selection is introduced in a newer source— the Navy Program
27

Manager Guide [Naval Material Command, 1980, pp. 2-27— 2-33].
Here the top-level categories are:
(1) Life Cycle Cost,
(2) Contractor evaluation,
(3) Effectiveness.
(See Figure II-l.) But again, the scope is still too narrow
for an overall evaluation since it excludes factors such as
political, economic, social, environmental, etc., which
undoubtedly have significant impact on major systems selection
(though the extent depends on the case) . The evaluation ap-
proach chosen by the Navy's Source Selection procedure fully
correlates with the basic premise of this thesis. Its only
"disadvantage" is that it is contract-oriented and not neces-
sarily ultimate "in-house" (within the DOD top-levels) selec-
tion-oriented. Hermann (1981) emphasizes this notion by
indicating that Source Selection evaluation procedure is
needed primarily to conduct the relationships between the
Government and potential contractors.
It is a requirement of the contractual world to
have a deterministic kind of means for choosing
between competitors. But high levels, who look
for the right thing to do, do not have this
constraint
.
Hermann means that top-level does not have to use the same
procedure in their decision-making (he advocates not to use
quantitative models at all) . But the ultimate decision,
using different evaluation procedures and more important,
based on significant considerations which are external to the





































































Figure II-l. Structuring and Weighting Evaluation Cri-
teria for Source Selection (taken from Navy




the Source Selection outcomes. That might be the case
especially with major systems selection, in which political
and similar factors play an important role. Since Source
Selection procedure can be a basis for a legal suit, the
possibility of conflicting ultimate decisions puts under ques-
tion the very usage of this formal procedure for major systems
selection. Thus, the existing Source Selection evaluation is
not only short of being a top-level decision-making tool, but
it also contains an inherent "catch," which questions its
usefulness even as a Source Selection tool for major systems
(at least for those which are politically or socio-economically
sensitive)
.
A view from another angle on the use of quantita-
tive decision techniques is noted by one of the questionnaire's
respondents, referring to the (S)SARC*s review sessions:
The AFSARC does not use models for decision-making
directly. We are, however, briefed on the use of
decision aids and quantitative methods used by the
staff in developing recommendations. [Appendix C,
p. 179]
It seems that this is the case in most top-level decision-making
occasions, in which no overall evaluation technique centers
the decision-making, not to speak of any kind of interaction
between the decision-maker and this assisting technique. In
spite of all that has been said above, there are some "candles
in the dark." One of them is found in the Navy Program Manager's
Guide [Naval Material Command, 1980, pp. 3-22— 3-25] . This
guide does not only present MAUT model for Source Selection,
but it also suggests using a similar model for risk management.
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This tool is supposed to be used by the program manager and
his staff in evaluating program alternatives which involve
limited information and uncertainties. The suggested model
includes a considerable element of subjective judgment. But
no word is said about using that model for the major deci-
sions, and no involvement of high-level decision-makers in
the model construction or its parameters elicitation is men-
tioned. It is perceived as sort of an "in-house" tool. If
one judges from the responses of the two program managers
from the questionnaire sample, the actual use of such a
mechanism in the program office is very limited [Appendix A,
p. 181]. Another example is presented in the technical report
"Decision Analysis of Advanced Scout Helicopter Candidates"
[Decisions and Designs, 1980], ordered by the U.S. Army Avia-
tion Research and Development Command to support its position
at ASARC. This report contains an analysis of thirteen Ad-
vanced Scout Helicopters (ASH) candidates and some mixture
of those candidates. The analysis evaluates the candidates
on the basis of a wide scope of factors of which the top
levels are: military worth; life cycle costs; attainability,
force structure and personnel impacts, and RSI impacts [Deci-
sions and Designs, 1980, p. 11]. This technical report uses
MAUT as its evaluation methodology. It is based heavily on
subjective judgments and refers sparingly to political and
economic considerations, as expected from a model being de-
veloped for the Service level. But the basic approach is
exactly the one this thesis advocates to be used also in
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decisions made above the Service level. There would be no
requirement for this thesis if such models were customarily
used for top-level decision-making. But research done for
this thesis indicates that they are not. Furthermore, there
is considerable reluctance towards using such models. At the
least, there is concern over improper implementation and biased
models* construction. The remainder of the Advanced Scout
Helicopter case illustrates the above statement. In a phone-
talk to Michael Donnell (1981) , one of the two authors of the
referred-to report, the following facts were acknowledged:
(1) The analysis team worked exclusively with the program
manager, a Colonel, and his staff, and did not interact with
other higher levels of participants or the actual decision-
making group members
.
(2) The Colonel "knew exactly what he and his boss wanted,
"
and, in some cases, determined the construct of the model that
was in conflict with the analysis team's opinion. That caused
some insignificant value-dimension to be located at the top
of the hierarchy, while others, perhaps much more important,
receive inappropriately low location. [The last comment is
not a quote, rather the thesis authors' interpretation. R.G.]
(3) Eventually the decision that has been made was other
than that recommended by the model "because of budget con-
straints that arose, and the 'politics' of the decision-makers
who had strong prior views about the selection, which could
hardly be affected by the model's analysis." In an answer to
a question, Donnell said that in theory both elements—cost
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changes and participants views—could be included in the model
but (a) The analysis has been kind of a "one shot" type, and
therefore, has not been up-dated according to, say, cost con-
straints that were not originally taken into account; (b) The
analysis team had not, in fact, access to the decision-group
members, and thus their views revealed only at late stages,
when the analysis and its use got out of the teams control;
(c) The analysis was supposed to be mainly cost-ef fectivess
related, and, thus, intentionally did not put great emphasis
on all kinds of politics-related aspects.
The deficiencies observed in this case can be
summarized as follows:
(1) Improper representation of participants involved in
the decision.
(2) Biased model structure.
(3) Although broader in scope than most models used, still
limited for presenting comprehensive evaluation for the final
selection.
(4) Discontinuity and lack of evaluation model updating.
These deficiencies are repeated in many examples through the
thesis. The conclusions of this case will be addressed among
the rest in implementation, analysis, and recommendations (see
Chapter V)
.
The questionnaire verifies the observation that
models or other sorts of quantitative techniques are used
only to a small extent to assist top-level acquisition decision-
making, and whenever they are used, they are of limited scope
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[Appendix A, pp. 174-178] . Furthermore, a considerable number
of the respondents admit that they have never used a quantita-
tive model for acquisition decisions of any kind at any level
[Appendix A, p. 184]
.
c. Reservations of Quantitative Techniques as a
Top-Level Acquisition Decision-Making Tool
The first and foremost reservation of quantita-
tive techniques as an overall evaluation and comparison means
for acquisition decisions, is the substantial doubt about
their ability to handle subjective, intuitive, judgmental
considerations. Trimble (1981) notes as an example the MX
missile case, in which he points out the political, environ-
mental and sociological impacts associated with its basing
concept, as such, "do not lend themselves to any type of
predictive quantitative model." But it is not only a matter
of the issues under question, it is also a matter of the
decision-makers themselves who, as described by Trimble, are
"very capable and experienced people, but usually unstructured
individuals, who do not follow 'a rule of book*. How would
they be willing to associate themselves with a structured
decision process?" he asks.
Even more extreme in his aversion toward quanti-
tative decision techniques is Hermann (1981) , who says that
a lot of subjective factors are not amenable to numerical
treatment. Hermann says:
I always found it difficult philosophically to under-
stand, how a decision-maker could submit himself to
a deterministic formula, in a decision which is
fundamentally imbeded in highly subjective factors.
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Part of this approach is supplemented in the literature.
For example, Quade (1979, p. 10) in his book, Policy Analysis
for Public Decisions
, which basically advocates quantitative
decision techniques, warns:
...there are always considerations that cannot be
handled quantitatively, maybe not analytically, or
even systematically, and there may be problems
with no solution. In the end, politics and intui-
tive judgment must rule.
Question 10 of the questionnaire addresses this
very issue, stating that "there is no use for a decision-making
model to support top-level decision-makers, because they base
their judgment mainly on subjective experience, perception and
intuition, which cannot be rationally "managed." The opinions
about this statement are split: 43% agree with the statement
and 51% disagree, and 5% have no definite idea [Appendix A, pp. ]81-184] .
Edwards (1981) agrees with the observation that
acquisition decisions are fundamentally subjective, but he
also thinks that there is a fundamental misconception with
respect to quantitative techniques, at least as far as MAUT
is concerned. His explanation of the deep reservations that
the above quoted people have towards those techniques is that
the standard kind of models they have been exposed to were
either performance models, or cost-benefit models. While
performance models deal with objective issues almost explicitly,
the traditional versions of the cost-benefit models reduce
everything to dollar units, which certainly takes the subjec-
tivity out. According to Edwards, the respondents are just
unfamiliar with techniques which are especially designed to
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handle subjective judgment and intuition (though by no means
to replace or generate them) . To conclude, it should be
stated that inspite of the reservations, all the interviewed
officials and the questionnaire's respondents do see some
degree of merit in a specified use of quantitative model as
a decision aid. This premise will be introduced in more de-
tail in the following chapters.
Another objection to quantitative techniques is
attributed to the previously mentioned biased alternatives
'
presentation. As it is put bitingly by one of the question-
naire's commentators,
...use of such a model is phony as a 'three dollar bill!
It's a travesty on honest quantification .. .The use of
a model by the Service makes everyone feel better and
maintain the area of 'objectivity'. It has nothing
to do with the Service choice. [Appendix A, p. 184]
Others warn against the possibility of a model structured
to support a previously selected alternative [Appendix A,
p. 184]
•
Another worry about usage of decision models is
expressed by the following quote:
...if a decision-maker embraced a model, but then
disagreed with the model outcome he may be baring
his belly to his foes. [Appendix A, p. 206]
But Edwards (19 81) observation that, in most cases, decision-
makers are not so insecure, is supported by the majority of
the questionnaire respondents, who do not view this possibility
severely enough to cause them to refrain from using decision
models [Appendix A, pp. 206-211]
•
Finally, it should be emphasized that the purpose
of this section has been to disclose problems, weaknesses and
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difficulties in quantitative decision techniques. Therefore
it addresses the criticism and apprehension towards them.
But there were also positive reactions which are introduced
later in this thesis.
3. The Satisficing View
a. The Theoretical Definition
This approach focuses on how a decision-maker can
most effectively use limited knowledge and skills [Simon, 1957.
pp. 241-260] . It highlights the constraints imposed by "bounded
rationality," the emphasis on heuristic "rules of thumb," and
searching for solutions that are "good enough." This approach
is based, in most cases, on a descriptive model of the decision
process. The goal is to improve the existing solution, "not
to vainly seek for an optimum."
b. Application in the Acquisition Decision-Making
It seems that in many of the present acquisition
decision-making the satisficing view is the prevailing ap-
proach. Connolly's (19 81) description of his own pattern of
thought during a decision event applies to a great extent to
this approach. Hermann's (19 81) clear preference of a descrip-
tive decision model, "a clear logic in our natural language,"
corresponds to the satisficing approach as well. But some
questions are raised: is the satisficing selection sufficient
for critical decisions? Do decision-makers really reach the
bounds of their "limited knowledge and skills"? The answer
of this thesis to both of these questions is "no". There
can be ways to achieve more than just "good enough" decisions.
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There can be a technique with which decision-makers would be
able to better exploit their own knowledge and skills to
reach a decision based on the data presented to them.
4
.
The Organizational Procedure View
a. The Theoretical Definition
This concept of decision-making seeks to under-
stand decisions as the output of standard operating procedures
invoked by organizational subunits. The emphasis is on the
formal and informal structure of the organization, its standard
operating procedures and channels of communication [Keen, 19 78,
pp. 63, 69-70]
.
b. Application in the Acquisition Decision-Making
It is clear that for major systems the final choice
made by the SecDef is based on evaluations made by many sub-
ordinate groups [Procurement Associates, 1972, p. XVIII-30].
LaBerge (19 81) says that,
...for most programs top-levels inevitably must rely
upon evaluations done by their subordinates, and
this is passed down to the middle levels of the
Services, where the motivations are influenced much
more by capability than by cost.
The reliance on lower levels mentioned by LaBerge,
is challenged by the questionnaire's respondents in Q7 [Appen-
dix A, p. 170] where 54% disagree with the statement that "the
less the selection is clearcut, the greater is the decision-
maker's tendency to rely on lower level analysis and recom-
mendations." But yet, a significant portion of 35% think to
the contrary. In any case, it is quite obvious that, as
noted by one of the questionnaire respondents,
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...staff members can be very influential in their
principal's ultimate decision by carefully structur-
ing and selectively presenting the alternatives.
[H-2]
This brings us back to the notion of biased presentations
and false alternatives ( "strawmen") mentioned at the beginning
of this chapter. This emphasizes a "fact of life," that
through the inevitable organizational-hierarchical pattern
of the decision process, interest groups may try to influence
the decision to their side. That can be done in the worst
case by "a hatchet job done on the alternatives" [Appendix A,
p. 170] / or by a genuine perception which does not necessarily
correlate with that of the decision-maker. As an example of
the latter can be taken LaBerge ' s observation that the ser-
vices attribute much more importance to capability (performance)
than to cost. This observation, although strongly rejected
by the Services (for example, by Fellowes (1981)), is supple-
mented by a Report To The Congress by the Comptroller General
(19 79), stating that,
. . .there are many programs where extraordinary perform-
ance requirements have been the driving force behind
high costs.
The controversy is further disclosed by a somewhat cynical
comment made by one of the questionnaire respondents:
. . .quantitative rationale for the decision could
be most useful in countering accountants budgeteers
and other non-operationally experienced, but none-
theless influential decision-makers. [H-2]
This presentation of the problematics in the real life deci-
sion process correlates to the "classical" deficiencies at-
tributed by the literature to decision procedures, as observed
39

through the organizational view. These deficiencies are:
(1) Parochial perceptions and group pressures.
(2) Inflexibility and adherence to routine procedures.
(3) Losing the overall picture by breaking decisions into
small pieces.
(4) Sequential attention to goals, according to the
organization's routine. [Keen, 1978, pp. 63,69-70]
These deficiencies should be addressed in any suggested improve-
ment to current decision practice.
5. The Political View
a. The Theoretical Definition
According to the political view, decision-making
is viewed as a bargaining process between the formal and in-
formal organizational units and personalities. A premium is
placed on understanding the realities of power and on the
compromises and strategies necessary to mesh the interest and
constraints of the "actors" in the decision process [Keen,
1978, p. 63]. Political aspects of a decision can be leveled
in three tiers:
(1) The personal tier, in which personalities affect the
decision. For example, a strong, charismatic person, equipped
with good bargaining skills, confidence, and quick reaction
may influence a decision towards his desired direction.
(2) The organizational tier, in which bargaining and power-
play take place between organizations or groups of partici-
pants (e.g., the Services, OSD, Industry, Congress and others).
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(3) The national tier, in which national political inter-
ests are involved.
b. Applications in the Acquisition Decision-Making
No doubt, all three tiers of the political view
apply to the acquisition decision-making process. The role
of the personalities involved is clearly described by one of
the questionnaire's respondents:
The personnel experience, and preferences of senior
officials in key positions, plays heavily in the
decision process .. .The skills of the program
sponsor to communicate the value of his program
has great impact on the decision. [Appendix A, p. 183]
Another respondent, referring the usage of models in review
sessions, states:
The review sessions are never so emotionless as to
deal with a dispassionate review of alternatives...
The model will be totally perverted. It is not an
issue of models— it's a matter of power and emotion !
[Appendix A, p. 177,183]
Fellowes ( 19 81) describes the frustration feeling
experienced sometimes at the Service level, while viewing a
"pure, " well-defined weapon system diverted from its original
requirements as a result of political pressures. But he also
agrees that there is no way to keep politics out, since it is
an inherent component of the decision process. Trimble (1981)
counts the politics as one of the three prominent considera-
tions in top-level acquisition decisions, together with the
need and the cost.
Hermann (1981) realizes the weight of the personal
politics relative to the direct elements of the decision by
defining the AFSec acquisition decision sessions as a "very
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complex social event, but a very simple information event.
The information conveys are very crude and primitive." The
questionnaire resondents estimate out of 57 systems acquisi-
tion cases that on the average, the political and socio-
economic issues weight about 50% of SecDef acquisition decision
considerations. This weight, though gradually reducing to
match the decision level, remains substantial even in lower
levels [Appendix A, pp. 231-236],
The previous paragraphs reflect the impact of
political considerations on the acquisition decision. These
considerations are an integral part of a democratic process,
and thus cannot and should not be taken out of it. The
decision-maker should strive for an objective decision in the
sense that it represents unbiased public values. A "public
value" is assigned to an outcome by a public, usually by means
of some public institution that does the evaluating. This
amounts to treating "a public" as a sort of organism whose
values can be elicited by some appropriate methods already in
use to elicit individual values. From this point of view,
the decision-making is associated with finding the appropriate
adaptation of those methods—an adaptation that will take
into account the individual (or grouped) disagreements, indi-
vidual (or grouped) differences in relevant expertise, and
the existing socio-political structures [Edwards, 1977, p. 248],
In other words, the political power play should affect the
decision in a balanced, objective and ordered manner as much
as possible. The various interests should be properly
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represented, and differences variation in resulting decisions
stemming from personalities should be reduced.
6
.
The Individual Differences Perspective
a. The Theoretical Definition
This perspective concentrates on the individual
decision-maker and his, or her, probelm solving and informa-
tion processing behavior [Keen, 1978, p. 63]. There have been
two broad approaches in the individual differences perspective:
(1) The cognitive complexity , which argues that there is an
optimal balance of information input for any one individual.
(2) The cognitive style , which emphasizes the style of the
information and the decision process. For example, "syste-
matic thinkers" tend to approach a problem by structuring it
in terms of some method which if followed through leads to a
likely solution (that corresponds to the previously mentioned
rationalistic view). On the other hand, "intuitive thinkers"
usually avoid committing themselves in this way; their strategy
is more one of hypothesis-testing and trial and error [McKenney,
1974, p. 81]
.
b. Applications in the Acquisition Decision-Making
The cognitive complexity approach suggests that
the amount of information presented is unique to any individual
decision-maker. But dealing with top-level decision-makers,
one basic need is almost common for all, and that is
—
simplicity .
Edwards, for example, through years of developing his MAUT
concepts puts a great emphasis on the simplicity of his tech-
nique (see for example Edwards (1971, pp. 119-129; 19 77, p. 250) and
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Edwards and Newman (1980, Executive Summary, p. 1)). While
it lacks the theoretical elegance of techniques proposed by,
for example, Raiffa (1968,1969) or Keeney (1972), it has the
great advantage of being easily learned and used by a busy
decision-maker or member of decision-making staff or organi-
zation. Keen (1978, p. 97) describes a desired managerial
decision model as being "very simple and crude, rather than
mathematically sophisticated. It is often based on heuristic
rules and standard procedures for analysts."
Connolly (1981) requires a decision model to be
uncomplicated and easy to understand. Hermann (1981) reveals
a special aversion towards computerized decision models:
"My own experience, " he says, "is that a lot of computer
models tend to destroy the intuition you have left." He is
supported by one of the questionnaire's commentators, who
says that "the structured decision process is a useful tool...
but it must emphatically not be plugged into a computer..."
[Appendix A, p. 227]. Thus, any decision presentation to
top-level decision-maker (s) should be easy to grasp, even by
people whose expertise is not necessarily in the very details
of the system alternatives or in sophisticated modeling proce-
dures. Models that have their logic "hidden" within a computer
or can be understood only by the experts who built them, have
a little value for top-level decision-makers, if any.
The cognitive style approach is reflected in several
written comments to the questionnaire as well as in the inter-
views. According to those comments, any decision technique to
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be used must not only be acceptable to the final decision-
makers, but also be brought in at early stage in time to be
modified by their comments, and to assure data base etc., is





As a conclusion of this chapter a list of require-
ments for a desired decision technique is presented. This
may be considered as a guideline in searching for such a
technique, or as a check-list in examining a proposed one.
The list accumulates requirements from all views of the deci-
sion-making process in order to exploit their individual advan-
tages, and avoid or reduce their weaknesses. In that sense,
these are requirements for some hypothetical, ideal, and
probably Utopian decision technique because no technique
can satisfy them all. Furthermore, not everyone would accept
all these requirements as desirable. However such a
list can serve as a good basis to start the search for
improvement in the current decision process.
2 A List of Requirements from a Decision Technique
a. Requirements Elicited from the General Nature
of the Acquisition Decision-Making
The decision technique should:
(1) Take into account the informal decision process and
actors, as well as the formal ones.




(3) Focus on the significant issues, scan the less signi-
ficant, and eliminate the irrelevant ones.
(4) Improve the decision-makers' capability to evaluate
and select between the decision alternatives.
(5) Reduce biases in decision presentations, and increase
objectivity of alternative presentation.
(6) Maintain continuity and evaluation model's updating.
b. Requirements Elicited from the Rationalistic View
The decision technique should:
(1) Be a comprehensive means for overall evaluation.
(2) Be quantitative by nature but maintain the capability
of handling subjective, intuitive and judgmental considerations
(3) Be implemented in such a way that will reduce the
probability of the model being used to counter the decision-
maker .
c. Requirements Elicited from the Satisf icing View
The decision technique should:
(1) Use descriptive elements and "rules of thumg," espe-
cially for the judgmental components of the technique.
(2) Exploit to the maximum the knowledge and skills of the
decision-makers
.
d. Requirements Elicited from the Organizational
Procedure View
The decision technique should:




(2) Spell out the importance-weights attributed to vari-
ous factors at lower levels (and by that, perhaps, disclose
some of the intentional and unintentional biases in the
decision presentation)
.
(3) Exploit the organizational structure for partial and
intermediate evaluations and decisions, but make sure that
they are consolidated to an overall picture at the final
decision phase.
e. Requirements Elicited from the Political View
The decision technique should:
(1) Give an "equal right" of representation to the various
people and organizations who have stakes in the decision.
(2) Articulate political interests, including "selfish"
ones
.
(3) Compensate for personal differences in charisma, bar-
gaining skills or presentation talents.
f. Requirements Derived from the Individual Differ-
ences Perspective
The decision technique should:
(1) Be simple and intelligible.
(2) Have sound and visible underlying rationale.
(3) Be acceptable to the decision-maker, and directed by
him from the early stages.
These requirements will provide guidance in the
search for an actual decision technique and its implementation
in top-level acquisition decision-making.
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III. SEARCH FOR DECISION METHODOLOGY
A. THE BASIC APPROACH TO THE SOLUTION
1 . The Essential Dilemma
The essential underlying dilemma in the search for
top-level acquisition decision-making methodology is whether
or not the key approach should be quantitative. The reser-
vations towards quantitative techniques as an overall top-
level evaluation device have been introduced in detail in
Chapter II.
At the core of those reservations rests the lack of
confidence in the capability of quantitative techniques to
incorporate subjective judgment. The ultimate conclusion is
not to use quantitative techniques at all as a comprehensive
decision basis. Hermann (1981) supports that idea:
I am not favorably impressed with complex modeling
as a basis for important weapons systems decisions.
A clear logic in our natural language is the most
important and preeminent need.
But there are opposing opinions as well, such as LaBerge's
( 1981) , who says:
The principal difficulty is that the selection of
alternatives has little quantitative basis, which
could be disputed. . .A quantitative decision tool
is absolutely desirable, and might bring about an
essential change in the quality of the acquisi-
tion decision-making.
Thus, it is this issue of whether or not quantitative tech-
niques are compatible for top-level acquisition decision-
making, which this section concentrates on. Special attention
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The Role of Judgment in Acquisition Decisions






A similar term (well-structured, moderately-structured, and
ill-structured) are used by Dunn (1981, pp. 103-105) in speci-
fying public policy problems. It seems that acquisition deci-
sions fall somewhere inbetween the second and the third
categories of problems as defined by the two above mentioned
authors. They fit Keen's definition for semistructured deci-
sions very well, i.e., "decisions where managerial judgment
alone will not be adequate, perhaps becuase of size of the
problem or its complexity. On the other hand the model or
data alone are also inadequate because the solution involves
some judgment and subjective analysis." But the acquisition
decisions and especially their political aspects, may fit as
well Dunn's definition for ill- structured public policy prob-
lems, in which the main characteristics are "conflict among
competing goals, and decision-making which involves high levels
of conflict among competing stakeholders" [Dunn, 1981, pp. 104-
105]. The acquisition decisions in many cases also fit Dunn's
definition for moderately- structured problems, since they
are usually involving one or few decision-makers, and a
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relatively limited number of alternatives. Dunn's charac-
teristic of moderately-structured problems, which views these
problems as "reflecting consensus on clearly ranked goals"
[Dunn, 1981, p. 104] can be achieved in some cases. Although
the starting point is usually the conflicting attitudes upon
values, after some iterations of interaction with stakeholders,
an agreement or even consensus may be achieved. The last
statement is approved by Edwards ( 1981) who reached in some
practical occasions through face-to-face interaction, stake-
holders' general recognition of a single "value tree" as
being a fair representation of their perceptions. In the
acquisition decisions some of the factors are completely
structured and objectively measurable, some require subjec-
tive judgment imposed on objective data, and some consist of
pure judgmental, intuitive analysis. At the top-levels the
latter have a considerable relative significance. Some people
involved in the actual decision-making process emphasize this
relative high significance of judgment by saying, "...Most
decisions are fundamentally subjective..." [Hermann, 1981],
or "...In my experience most, if not all, acquisition deci-
sions are a matter of judgment" [Appendix A, p. 203 ] . The
role of judgment in the acquisition decisions fits Keen's
(1978, p. 97) observation about the role of judgment in semi-
structured decisions:
This term will be defined in Chapter IV, p. 79 - 81 .
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The judgement is necessary either to recognize or decide
what constitutes the problem, or to create alternatives,
or to choose a solution. The judgment may define the
nature of the variables that are considered or the
values that are put on the known variables.
3. Compatibility of Quantitative Techniques For
Top-Level Acquisition Decision-Making
As a consequence of the previous section's analysis,
the first thing to do is to look at the capability of quanti-
tative techniques to handle judgment. Peck and Scherer (19 62,
pp. 54 3-580) approached the issue of weapon system performance
evaluation empirically. They asked whether "it is possible
to combine these diverse considerations into a single concep-
tual scheme which permits us to evaluate the overall effec-
tiveness of a weapon program. " Their analytical conclusion
was that measurement in the conventional sense is impossible,
but it may be possible to determine which program is better
executed than others and thus to establish a ranking of pro-
grams from best to worst. They recognized that ranking poses
a basic theoretical problem since weapon programs performance
"is presumably multidimensional." Their answer was that
"somehow the numerous dimensions underlying programs perfor-
mance must be weighted and combined if a unidimensional rank-
ing is to be obtained." Through their experiment Peck and
Scherer proved that, based on judgment only, the individuals
of the control group were able to express their preferences
and importance weights consistently and to express them in
numerical terms. Keeney and Raiffa (1976, p. 40) cite another
example of a similar experiment done by Huber, Sahney and Ford
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(1969, pp. 483-489) , who concluded that the results strongly
indicated professionals could develop and reliably use sub-
jective evaluation models. This is not to say that every
human intangible consideration involved in a decision can be
quantified. Rather, the major consequences of these consid-
erations may be quantified in terms of ranking order and rela-
tive impact on the decision. As mentioned by Keeney and
Raiffa (1976, p. 40) , "the literature in psychometrics is
replete with examples that establish such scales of subjec-
tive index." The above mentioned experiments support Edwards'
(1981) confidence in techniques especially designed for handl-
ing subjective judgment such as MAUT. His confidence is based
on a considerable experience of himself and others. According
to Edwards, letting the decision-maker create his own param-
eter estimates is appealing on an intuitive basis. It gives
the decision-makers a feeling that they have more control over
the process. Additionally, Dawes and Corrigan (19 74) show
that these estimates compare favorably to those derived
empirically in regression models.
By ruling out the obstacle of the "prejudice" about
quantitative techniques incapability of handling subjective
judgment, the way is open to exploit the generally agreed
advantages of those techniques, i.e., being a means for
rigor, discipline and communication in complex decisions.
Furthermore, Edwards and Newman (1980, Chapter 1, p. 3) empha-
size that the willingness to accept subjectivity into evalua-
tion, combined with the insistence that judgments be numerical,
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serves several useful purposes: First it partly closes the
gap between intuitive and judgmental evaluations and the
more quantitative kind; it makes coexistence of judgment and
objectivity measurement within the same evaluation easy and
natural. Second, it opens the door to easy combination of
complex concatenations of values. For example, it bridges
over the distinction often made by researches between process
evaluation and outcome evaluation. Third, it can greatly
shorten the time required for an evaluation to be carried out.
But a question is still valid: assuming that quanti-
tative techniques are capable of handling subjective judgment--
are they really required and desired for top-level acquisition
decisions? Recall LaBerge's response to this question which
has already been introduced in the opening section of this
chapter. His strongly favoring attitude is sound. Other
interviewees like Trimble (1981) , Hermann (1981) and Connolly
(1981), in spite of their reservations, think that quantita-
tive models may have merit, and can be helpful even to deci-
sion-makers such as the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE)
or SecDef. The questionnaire respondents, although far from
being enthusiastic, lean towards recognition of quantitative
models as a useful decision tool, including for top-level
decision-making [Appendix A, p. 194]. The compatibility of
such models to acquisition decisions is much more sound from
the responses that refer to a specific example of decision
technique /namely MAUT [Appendix A, pp. 186-188] . Many of the
reservations relate to deficiencies external to the models
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themselves, such as the decision environment ("The review
sessions are never so emotionless to deal with a dispassion-
ate review of alternatives" [Appendix A, p. 177). Others
refer to the actual way models are currently implemented ( "The
scope of models limited," [Appendix A, p. 177]), as the main
flaw in models 1 usefulness, rather than their inherent fea-
tures [Appendix A, pp. 179-194].
An indirect conclusion about the contribution to
decision-making of quantitative techniques can be drawn from
the review of the Israeli respondents, who consistently indi-
cated via the questionnaire a greater inclination towards usage
of such techniques, compared to their American colleagues.
At the same time they demonstrate a greater confidence in
their ability to "close" decisions. The linkage seems to be
clear
.
Several citations from the literature may contribute
to the recognition of quantitative techniques as being help-
ful decision-making tools. Cohen (1977), an Israeli Air Force
high-level officer refers to the issue of overall evaluation
of alternatives in his analysis of Headquarters decision-
making. Cohen suggests two methods of decision-making, both
based on breaking evaluation of the alternatives into factors.
One consists of weighted scores assigned subjectively to fac-
tors and then aggregated to final preference (which is
basically MAUT) . Edelman (1965) provides an interesting
comparison of the quality of managerial decisions in a compe-
titive bidding situation, with and without the use of a
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judgment based model. In seven tests managers-plus-model won
the bid, while managers alone won only three. The model was
extremely simple and did little more than to assist the
managers' own estimating procedures.
England (1975, pp. 435-438), dealing with selection
of an adequate source of supply states:
...the decision to place a certain volume of business
with a supplier is always based on some rationale.
The art of good purchasing is to make the reasoning
behind that decision as sound as possible.
These phrases precede an introduction of various types of
evaluations—some objective and others subjective, which are
done by separate factors. Each factor is assigned an impor-
tance rate (weight) , and each alternative is scored based on
each factor. The overall evaluation is derived from aggrega-
tion of the products of weight times score for each alterna-
tive separately. (Again, this is basically MAUT
.
)
A similar method is suggested by Archibald (1976, p. 63)
in referring to high technology project evaluation. Archi-
bald's evaluation is done according to the following guidelines:
(1) Priority factors are listed for each project with a
value of 1 to 10 assigned to each factor by several key managers
These scores are summarized and compared.
(2) Using the comparative scores and other information not
easily quantified, the "Project Priority Review Board" meets
sequentially and agrees on the relative priority to be accorded
each project. Archibald does not mention specifically a usage
of factor weights, but does mention that "the relative
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importance of the factors will vary, depending on the organi-
zation and the type of project involved.
"
The Brandaid system, designed by Little (1975) , is
an interactive Decision Support System (DSS) that supports
the decision process in commercial marketing, planning, and
estimating overall profitability. The main feature of the
Brandaid system is its emphasis on the role of judgment in
the decision process. Little found that managers generally
have a good understanding of the dynamics of the market, or
at least of the interrelationships among its components,
taken in pairs. But they are not capable of determining the
full interactions of different components simultaneously.
Little strongly recommends using judgment obtained in an or-
ganized way from more than one person. According to Little,
using a quantitative technique Brandaid encourages managers
to become more explicit and analytic in their problem solving,
but it still strongly relies upon their experience, knowledge
base and personalized judgments.
A major conclusion of LeGrow's thesis (1976, p. 2)
is that judgmental scaling techniques are presently more
valuable for measuring capability of weapon systems than more
computerized procedures. According to LeGrow, among those
judgmental scaling techniques the Multi-Attribute utility
scaling affords the best opportunity for ratio comparisons
of weapons capability, as being able to handle complex phe-
nomena composed of both intrinsic performance characteristics
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and external factors, like operating environment, operator
proficiency or the technological capacity of the user [LeGrow,
1976, p. 44]
.
A similar approach is chosen Sherwin and Laurance
(1979, pp. 377-387) in their search for better methodology
for arms transfers and military capability evaluation. They
find that the techniques generally known as "subjective
measurement techniques" are the most suitable for the task
and among them the MAUT is preferred. They emphasize the
judgment handling capability of MAUT by saying:
Basing a capability measure on multiattribute utility
theory capitalizes on the notion that, to date,
human insight remains the most reliable means for
synthesizing the interrelations among a complex set
of international relations variables, and that one
means of indexing an otherwise intangible concept
is to tap the collective judgments of human experts.
According to this notion, humans, by developing an
intuitive expertise, determine what factors are
salient; they interpret relevant information; and
by making weighted judgments, they differentially
integrate several types of information to form
subjective evaluations regarding key concepts.
Quade (1979, p. 48) recognizes that for public policy
questions, where social and political considerations tend to
dominate, models to be used to predict the consequences of
choice depend more and more directly on judgment and intuition
According to Quade, an explicit model, scientific or other-
wise, introduces structure and terminology to a problem, and
provides a means for breaking a complicated decision into
smaller tasks that can be handled one at a time. It also
serves as an effective means of communication, enabling the
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participants in the study to make their judgments in a con-
crete context and in proper relation to the judgment of
others. Moreover, through feedback— the results of computa-
tion in an analytical model or the countermoves in a game
—
the model can help the analyst and the experts on whom they
depend to revise their earlier judgments and thus arrive at
a clearer understanding of their subject matter and of the
problem.
All this variety of excerpts from the theoretical
literature and the "real life" experience comes to support
and strengthen the actual "actors'" somewhat hesitating recog-
nition of quantitative decision techniques as a useful tool
for top-level acquisition decision-making. The following
are the summarized conclusions resulting from the above
citations
:
(1) There are in existence quantitative techniques which
are capable of handling subjective judgment (but do not gen-
erate it; this is an exclusive task for human beings)
.
(2) For acquisition decisions, which are of semi-structured
nature, judgment based quantitative techniques might be of
great help.
(3) The secondary characteristics of the quantitative models,
i.e., the separation of tasks and the provision of a systematic,
efficient and explicit way to focus judgment and intuition
—
are of crucial importance. They provide a route for tracing
out the major consequences of choice.
In addition to the above three major conclusions, many
of the cited sources give some clues with respect to a
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preferred decision technique by pointint out indirectly
or explicitly the basic concept of MAUT
.
B. MAUT—THE PREFERRED TECHNIQUE
1. Limitations of the Traditional Weapon-Systems
Comprehensive Evaluation Techniques
The two most prevailing weapon-systems evaluation
techniques were cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit analysis.
Both meet the requirement of being quantitative techniques
which are widely based on subjective judgment. But they
still have some significant limitations that put their fit-
ness under question as an overall evaluation device for
top-level decision-makers.
Cost-effectiveness is a form of systems analysis in
which alternative actions or systems under consideration are
compared in terms of two of the consequences: dolar, or
resource cost, and the effectiveness associated with each
alternative. The effectiveness of an alternative is measured
by the extent to which that alternative, if implemented, will
attain the desired objective [Quade, 1979, p. 25]. Even the
definition reveals the limited scope of cost-effectiveness
models. Basically, they can handle one objective, which is
usually for weapon systems—maximizing the combat (operational)
effectiveness. As emphasized by Quade,
Whereas we are often able to use cost-effectiveness
to rank competing alternatives for the same goal,
we cannot use it to compare alternatives that seek
different goals— to decide, say, the best over-
all use of our money when we have several long-
range objectives in mind.
59

But the latter is often the case in early stages of the
acquisition decision (e.g. , concept selection at Milestone
I) .
Dunn (1981, p. 251) also emphasizes the limited
scope of cost-effectiveness approach by saying:
...cost-effectiveness analysis epitomizes technical
rationality, since it attempts to determine the
utility of policy alternatives, but without re-
lating their consequences to global economic
efficiency or aggregate social welfare.
But again, the latter, plus political considerations (which
are not mentioned here explicitly) , are in many cases very
crucial considerations in the major systems acquisition
decisions.
Edwards (1981) views the limited scope of cost-effec-
tiveness from the cost aspect. According to Edwards, this
technique aggregates all cost components to be a unit dimen-
sion (a single figure represents all costs) . But in real
life people attribute different importance to different cost
components and, thus, are willing to consider them separately
(For example, one who is short of cash cares more about the
down payment than about operating costs although both are
components of the total life cycle cost (LCC) ) . Presumably,
this is the type of model a commentator had in mind when he
said:
...the model [used for acquisition decisions, R.G.]
is always severely limited, for example, it might
use acquisition cost as only basis for comparison.
[Appendix A, p. 177]
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Cost-benefit is a broader- scoped evaluation technique
compared to cost-effectiveness. By expressing both the bene-
fits and costs in monetary units, the cost-benefit technique
allows evaluation and comparison of programs designed to ac-
complish widely differing tasks, on the same unit base [Quade,
1979, p. 26]. Quade points out that the great disadvantage of
cost-benefit analysis is that it is very difficult to perform
satisfactorily. It is really hard to express every human
benefit in dollar terms, or as it is put by Prest and Turvey
(1965) :
. . .one can view cost-benefit analysis as anything
from an infallible means of reaching the new Utopia,
to a waste of resources in attempting to measure
the immeasurable
.
Dunn (1981, p. 345) supports this criticism by emphasizing
that dollar amounts are not perceived as equally significant
by different persons, and therefore dollars are an inadequate
measure of responsiveness. (This problem of limited inter-
personal comparisons often means, for example, that income is
an inappropriate measure of individual satisfaction and social
welfare) . Edwards (19 81) thinks the reduction of everything
to dollar units in the traditional versions of cost-benefit
models "certainly takes the subjectivity out."
In conclusion, the traditional judgment-based, quanti-
tative decision techniques have sound limitations when used
for a comprehensive evaluation of major-systems acquisition
alternatives. Thus, a better technique should be looked for,
as is actually done in the next section.
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2 . MAUT as a Most Suitable Technique
So far throughout this thesis quite a few examples
of various versions of the MAUT concept have been introduced.
These examples cover various areas, but all of them have much
in common with system acquisition decisions, although none
of them precisely covers the whole scope of factors involved
in those decisions. Here is a brief reminder of the examples
(1) The formal Source Selection procedure (see Chapter II,
p. 27) .
(2) Peck and Scherer ' s weapon systems relative performance
evaluation (see Chapter III, p. 51).
(3) Cohen's decision-making method in the Headquarters
(see Chapter III, p. 54)
.
(4) England's selection source of supply (see Chapter III,
p. 55) .
(5) Archibald's high technology projects evaluation (see
Chapter III, p. 55) .
(6) LeGrow's weapon systems capability evaluation (see
Chapter III, p. 56)
.
(7) Helm's mission operability assessment (see Chapter
II, p. 27) .
(8) Sherwin's arms transfers and military capability
evaluation (see Chapter III, p. 57).
(9) Donnell's decision analysis of advanced scout heli-
copter candidates (see Chapter II, pp. 31-33) .
(10) Navy Program Manager's Guide's risk management model
(see Chapter II, p. 28-29) .
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In the literature MAUT is distinguished by its capa-
bility of handling a variety of factors such as technical,
political, economic, social, or environmental, in various
types of selections between similar and dissimilar, old and
new, certain and uncertain alternatives. In order to stress
MAUT's versatility, here is an additional list of MAUT actual
applications. Some are practical applications, others are
experimental. In all these cases MAUT has proven to be
capable in circumscribing a complex decision. The examples
are as follows:
(1) Airport development for Mexico City [Keeney & Raiffa,
1976, pp. 436-472] .
(2) Selecting nuclear power plant sites in the Pacific
Northwest [Keeney & Nair, 19 77]
.
(3) Selecting dams sites around Phoenix, Az . [Edwards,
1981] .
(4) Selection between future energy supply alternatives
(nuclear, coal and combined geothermal and conservation pack-
age) for Southern California [Social Science Research Insti-
tute, 1981] .
(5) Land use regulation on the Californian Coast [Edwards,
1977, pp. 256-265] .
(6) Planning research program for the Office of Child
Development (OCD) of the U.S. Department of Health, Education
and Welfare (HEW) [Edwards, 1977, pp. 265-267].
Finally, MAUT was highly preferred by the question-
naire respondents over any other decision technique for
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acquisition decisions. MAUT was selected by 50% of the
Americans and 55% of the Israeli's, while none of the other
contending approaches exceeded 15%. Furthermore, referring
to a concrete MAUT example, the respondents demonstrated
high confidence in the compatibility of this technique to
acquisition decisions, including at top-levels. This time
their attitude was much more favorable than their reaction
to the general use of quantitative models for top-level
decision-making [Appendix A, p. 186-188] . In addition, the
respondents view several favorable side-effects of the MAUT
procedure, some of them highly correlated to those already
mentioned in citations from the general literature. These
side-effects are:
(1) MAUT allows better communication and understanding
among the people involved in the decision-making.
(2) MAUT has the potential to focus discussion on the
important issues.
(3) MAUT assists decision-makers to consolidate their
thinking, and forces rigor into discussions.
But the respondents also warned against some poten-
tial pitfalls in using MAUT:
(1) Including irrelevant data items.
(2) Overlooking significant issues.
From the positive side, the respondents expressed
their confidence that MAUT does not suppress the decision-
maker's intuition, bias his judgment or restrict his decision
freedom. Finally, many of the respondents emphasized that
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although it may serve as a comprehensive evaluation tool, and
give a useful insight into the choice being made, MAUT proce-
dure never would and never should be the ultimate determinant
of the decision. It is, after all, only a tool, and thus
should not dominate the decision. The responsibility always
rests on the shoulders of the decision-maker, and no model
can be used as an excuse when he has to account for his
decision [Trimble, 1981, and Appendix A, pp. 202-212]
.
C. CONCLUSIONS
The conclusions of this chapter are the following:
(1) The acquisition decisions are of semi-structured nature,
and combine objectively measured, structured data, with
highly subjective judgmental considerations.
(2) For such kinds of decisions judgmental scaling tech-
niques might be of great use. The judgment handling capabili-
ties of these techniques are well-established through analysis,
experiments and actual practice.
(3) Among those techniques MAUT is the preferred one. Its
merits are recognized by a variety of authors, users, and--
perhaps most important—by the questionnaire respondents who
represent the defense systems acquisition decision-making
community.
(4) MAUT has some limitations and potential pitfalls that
should be noticed in its implementation.
These conclusions allow us to turn to a basic acquain-
tance with MAUT, which takes place in the next chapter.
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IV. MULTI-ATTRIBUTE UTILITY THEORY (MAUT)
A. GENERAL
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the reader a
basic acquaintance with MAUT, in order to understand its
basic concepts. Since this thesis addresses mostly the simple
forms of MAUT because it views simplicity as an essential
requirement for top-level decision applications, no extensive
introduction of MAUT has been undertaken. The user may, if
necessary, turn to the branched literature written on MAUT,
or consult with an expert practitioner (the latter is sug-
gested in any case)
.
B. OVERVIEW
The most typical problem setting for MAUT applications
arises when a decision-maker is required to make decisions
among two or more alternatives, whose utility varies along
several dimensions of value. As pointed out by Keeney (MIT,
1969, p. 16) and others, in reality there are only a few
decisions which are based on just one measure of effective-
ness. This realization has prompted the development of MAUT
and other procedures which attempt to cope with more complex
problems. Thus, MAUT is essentially a descriptive technique
that processes information according to specific rules. Data
processing is accomplished within a logical but flexible
framework founded upon quantitative combinations of evidence.
Evidence is brought to bear on the outcomes to be evaluated
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by locating them on various dimensions of value. The located
measures are then aggregated according to a combination rule
which weighs the relative importance of each dimension. If
the model is successful, it will present the outcome or
alternative that represents the greatest worth to the decision-
maker [Pacific Missile Test Center, 1979, p. 12]. The major
building stones of MAUT are:
(1) The basic structural principle in MAUT is hierarchical
decomposition. This means that the evaluation problem is
broken down or decomposed from the general problem to specific
components. The model provides the structure and rules neces-
sary to investigate and integrate the interrelationships of
all components.
(2) The selected value-dimensions are scaled, and utility
functions are established.
(3) Global utility in a MAUT procedure is expressed by a
single number. Thus multdimensional outcomes must be trans-
formed into a single figure of merit such as utility, system
worth or system effectiveness. This is done by means of some
aggregation rules.
Finally, according to Winterfeldt and Fischer (1973, p. 1)
and many others, MAUT combines a class of psychological measure-
ment that can be applied to the evaluation of alternatives
with multiple value relevant attributes. This notion, of
MAUT ' s capability of handling psychological measurement, or
in other words, subjective human judgment, is paramount in




Before the discussion proceeds further into more detailed
presentation of MAUT, it is necessary to provide clarification
of terminology that is used interchangeably in the literature
and in this thesis as well.
The various names and acronyms used to identify MAUT in
general have been already discussed in the Introduction (see
footnote in Chapter I, p. 14), and therefore are not repeated
here.
The type of decisions which are discussed in this thesis
are referred to as multi-objective , multi-attribute or multi-
criteria decisions. The three names represent three points
of view on the same type of decision. "Objective" generally
indicates the "direction" in which one should strive to do
better. The characteristic phrasing of an objective can be,
for example, "maximize air-to-air effectiveness." "Attribute"
is the term by which the extent of achieving the objective
is measured [Keeney and Raiffa, 1976, p. 34]. Therefore,
attribute is also called "measure of effectiveness" (e.g.,
by Keeney and Nair (1977)). The attribute for the above objec-
tive can be, for example, "kill-ratio in air-to-air engagements."
An attribute may be based on purely objective scale , or partly
subjective scale (objective measurement is subjectively evalu-
ated)
, or purely subjective scale [Edwards, 1977, p. 352].
"Criteria" is a required level of achievement. For example,
one may establish criteria for air-to-air effectiveness such
as: "ratios of 1:1 is poor, 1:5 is fair and 1:10 is very
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good." Criteria corresponds to "goal" in the sense that goals
clearly identify a level of achievement to strive toward.
To continue the above pattern of examples, the goal might
be, "strive to achieve 1:12 kill ratio."
The decisions are multi-objective-attribute-criteria
because they have several, sometimes conflicting, objectives
(e.g., "maximize air-to-air effectiveness," "minimize cost,"
"cause minimal environmental disturbance (such as noise and
smoke) ")
.
These objectives have corresponding attri-
butes and a set of criteria for each (which are in fact some
discrete consequences on a utility function scale)
.
As a consequence of the previous discussion, objectives
,
attributes and criteria
, although distinguished from each
•
other, all may be essentially interpreted as areas on which
an evaluation of an entity is based. In defining these areas
of evaluation two more terms are in use: "value-dimensions"
(e.g., Edwards (19 77)) and "factors." Thus, in the jargon,
all five terms are used interchangeably to describe areas of
evaluation, and in that sense they are considered synonymous.
As indicated by all decision analysts, objectives are
characterized by an hierarchical nature. In fact, everyone
who has seriously thought about objectives in a complex prob-
lem, has come up with some sort of hierarchy of objectives.
The lower-level objectives can also be thought of as the means
to an end, the end being the higher-level objective [Keeney
and Raiffa, 1976, p. 41]. The hierarchical construct of the





A value-tree can be a construct of objec-
tives, of value-dimensions, of attributes, of criteria, or
of factors. (In each case, of course, the various branches*
definitions are differently phrased.) The upper level objec-
tives (or value-dimensions, etc., of the hierarchical con-
struct are also called " categories " (which are divided into
"subcategories") or "branches " (of the "value-tree ") . There
is no strict definition at what levels these notations are
valid. Usually, categories are used to describe only the
highest level of objectives (only below the top, overall
objective) . Objectives at all levels below are referred to as
subcategories. Branches usually consist of objectives at all
levels except the bottom-level ones. Thus, while speaking
about subcategories or branches, additional indications are
required to know exactly at what level a specific objective
is.
The bottom-level components in the tree are called also
" twigs " (e.g., Edward and Newman, (1980)), or " entry-levels "
(e.g., Decisions and Designs (1980)). In MAUT, as will be
explained in more detail later in this chapter, the actual
evaluation of alternatives is done only at the entry-levels.
The weighted utilities at any higher level are an automatic
outcome of "multiplication through the tree." Thus, attri-
butes, i.e., evaluation tools are required only for the
bottom-level objectives. Keeney and Raiffa (1976) are con-
sistent in their definition of attribute, and thus refer to
attributes only at the bottom-level items, while all the others
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at higher levels are called objectives. The same way of
notation appears in Stillwell's technical report [Social Science
Research Institute, 1981] value-trees (see Figure IV-1)
.
Edward and Newman (1980) are less strict and use attribute
as synonymous with value-dimension, without identification
of the level at which they are located, or how they are
phrased. The broad meaning attributed by Edwards and Newman
to the term "attribute" is reflected, for example, in the
sentence "stakehold are sources of value-attributes. An
attribute is something that the stakeholders care about..."
[Edwards and Newman, 19 80, Chapter 2, p. 2] . A "proxy attri-
bute " is one that reflects the degree to which an associated
objective is met, but does not directly measure the attribute
[Keeney and Raiffa, 1976, p. 55]. Decisions and Designs (1980,
p. 12) uses the term surrogate to express the same idea.
Several terms are used for the numerical evaluation of an
alternative over a specific attribute. These are: "measure
location , " " utility location ," " single attribute utility "
(all the above definitions are found in Edwards and Newman,
(1980)). Another term is " scores " (e.g., used by Donnell
and Ulvila [Decisions and Designs, 1980]).
"Weights " are called also " importance weights ," although
the latter notation is rejected by Donnell and Ulvila [Deci-
sions and Designs, 1980, p. 9] with the argument that they do
not really express importance. Weights appear also as


























The purpose of this discussion concerning MAUT terminology
was to provide a background for subsequent text. The reader
should be aware of the usage of some synonymous terms inter-
changeably used in this thesis.
D. THE BASICS OF MAUT
Let X . be a set of possible values of attribute j and x.
be a particular value of attribute j. As an example, the j
attribute could be the color of a car, which might be one of
several attributes one might consider in buying a car. Let
there be a total of n attributes under consideration (e.g.,
price, style, economy, etc.). Any one alternatives (e.g.,
car types) can be represented as a particular attribute
combination:
\X, ,X_,,..,X.,...,Xj
The tendency to prefer one alternative over another can be
represented by a construct called "utility" and denoted U.
The utility of an alternative is a function of the particular
values of the specific alternative over all attributes under
consideration:
U . = r(X, ,X«,...,X. ,...,XJ
where U. is the overall utility of the i alternative. Most
authors dichotomize the functions as being additive or multi-
plicative. The simplest and most prevailing form of additive








w. is the normalized importance weight of the j
3 n
attribute (such as I w. = 100 or 1, as preferred);
j = l D
u(x.) is the normalized utility function (usually on
a scale of 0-10, 0-100, or 0-1000) on the
individual j attribute.
Let u. . = u (x
. ) , then
ID D
n




u. . is the utility of the i alternative over the
ID
single j attribute;
- U. is the overall utility of the i alternative.
[Edwards, 1977, p. 253]
Other types of additive models are those which include inter-
actions [Pacific Missile Test Center, 1979, p. A-6]. Those
will not be discussed here.









x, .x 9 .-.x [Pacific Missile TestU l Z n Center, 1979, p. A-6;
Or in the form
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n1 + kU(X) = I [1 + k k. u. (x.)]
j=l J 3 D
where
:
U(X) is a multi-attribute utility function,
k, k. are constants with k > -1 and < k. < 1, and
u.(x.) is the utility function of the j individual
3 J
attribute. [Giaque, 1972, p. IV-19].
In selecting among the various aggregation methods the authors
have taken several approaches. One way of evaluating a model
is to ask whether or not the model logically reflects the
decision-making process in a valid and predictive sense, while
the second way is to ask if the decision-making process can be
approximated by a relatively simple model. The additive ap-
proach is less compatible with the value independence assump-
tion that is assumed by both additive and multiplicative
versions. Consequently, Keeney (1974) has proposed use of a
multiplicative rather than additive aggregation rule. But
Edwards (1977), who consistently strove for model simplicity,
indicates:
...in the presence of even modest amounts of measure-
ment error, quite substantial deviations from value
independence will make a little difference to the
ultimate number U. (the aggregate utility) and even
less to the rank ordering of the U. values.3 i
Roughly, value independence means that the extent of one's
preference for location (score) x« over location x. of specific
attribute, say, X, , unaffected by the position of the entity
being evaluated on dimensions X- ,
X
? , . . . ,X , and so on




...the additive approximation will almost always work
well if, for each dimension, either more is prefer-
able to less or less is preferable to more through
the range of the dimensions that is involved in the
evaluation for all available values of the other
dimensions
.
Thus, Edwards and others conclude that additive models serve
as good approximations in most cases and are the most appro-
priate in terms of practical usage [Pacific Missile Test Center,
p. A- 7] . But Edwards admits that when the assumption of value
independence is unacceptable even as an approximation, much
more complicated models and elicitation procedures that take
value dependence into account should be used, like those pre-
sented by Keeney and Raiffa (1976). Edwards (1977, p. 250)
ends up with the following conclusion:
...theory, simulation computation and experience,
all suggest that weighted linear averages yield
extremely close approximations to very much more
complicated non-linear and interactive 'true*
utility functions, while remaining far easier to
elicit and understand.
(See, for example, Dawes and Corrigan (1974), and Einhorn
and Magarth (19 75)
.)
Most decisions involve uncertainties. These decisions
are referred to as "risky decisions." Essentially, the conse-
quence is using expected utilities rather than simple utili-
ties. Edwards (19 81) emphasizes that the expected values
should be calculated on the natural values (i.e., performance
measures) of the attributes, rather than on the normalized
utilities resulting from them. When the probability function
for the various possible outcomes is known, it should be used.
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Otherwise, probabilities have to be estimated, and then utili-
ties become subjective expected utilities. There is a
variety of ways of how to elicit those subjective estimated
probabilities. It starts from an extreme approach such as
Bauer and Wegener's (1977, pp. 342-343) who found out (in a
specific case) that probabilities are so difficult to estimate
successfully, that it implies an assumption of equal certainty,
or uncertainty, for all models output, and thus completely ig-
nore the notion of risk. At the other extreme stands the
sophisticated assessment of subjective probability estimates
of utility, introduced by Raiffa (1968) and Keeney and Raiffa
(1976). Besides the expected utility notion, uncertainties
may be taken care of by sensitivity analysis, in which effects
on the ultimate outcome resulting from deviations from the
expected values are tested [Fisher, 19 75, p. 74]. Another ap-
proach is using special value-dimensions for "risks involved"
as done, for example, by Donnell and Ulvila in their ASH
model [Decisions and Designs, 1980] . According to Edwards
(1981), "this is theoretically inelegant, but definitely
eligible."
E. EDWARDS ' 7 STEPS OF MAUT PROCEDURE
1 . General
There are many versions of MAUT in existence. While
all refer to the same basic ideas, the details of implemen-
tation differ from one another. Edwards and Newmann (1980)
introduce a 7-step MAUT procedure, which is a development of
similar procedures introduced by Edwards in his older
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publications [Edwards, 1971, 1977]. Edwards 1 approach has
been selected for further discussion in this thesis because
of the following reasons:
(1) Its framework applies almost to any MAUT procedure.
(2) It meets all six very important characteristics which
Little (1970, pp. 466-485) defined as vital for a model to be
useful. According to Little a model should be:
(a) Simple and easy to understand (though not simplistic)
.
(b) Robust: a user should find it hard to make the model
give bad answers.
(c) Easy to control: a user should be able to make the
model behave the way she or he wants it to behave.
(d) Adaptive: It should be easy to update in terms of
both parameters and structure as new information becomes
available.
(e) Complete on important issues: in conjunction with
simplicity, this implies an optimal level of detail and
complexity, which balances precision with scope. (According
to Little, "An important aid to completeness is the incorpora-
tion of subjective judgments.")
(f) Easy to communicate with: a user needs to be able to
change inputs simply, and obtain outputs quickly.

2. The 7 Steps 1
a. Step 1
Identify the objects of the evaluation, and the
function or functions that the evaluation is intended to per-
form. Determine the relevant alternatives (or options) to
be evaluated. They can be defined as outcomes of some actions,
or as the actions themselves.
b. Step 2
Identify the stakeholders. A stakeholder is
simply an individual, group, or organization with a reason to
care about the decision, and with enough impact on the decision-
maker so that the reason should be taken seriously. The deci-
sion-maker is usually a stakeholder himself and not just a
"judge." So he (or they) must be equally addressed at this
step like any other stakeholder.
c. Step 3
Elicit from the stakeholders (or their representa-
tives) the relevant value-dimensions and (often) organize them
into a hierarchical structure called a "value-tree." Develop-
ment of a value-tree is a phase of interaction between the
analysis team and the stakeholders. Structuring of the value-
tree is done in a top-to-bottom order. Judgment must be used
to decide where to stop formalizing the hierarchy by considering
The introduction of the 7 steps are based mainly on three
references: Edwards (1977), Edwards and Newman (1980), and
Edwards (1981) . Although these underly the whole section, they
will be specifically referred to where necessary within the
section. In some cases, the discussion expands beyond the




the advantages and disadvantages of further specification.
The more an objective hierarchy is subdivided, the easier it
usually is to identify attribute-scales that can be objectively
assessed. But of course, there are attributes which cannot
be objectively measured at all. Moreover, by going down too
far, not only the simplicity principle is violated, but the
efficient tool of human judgment, which can "leap frog" many
steps of elaborate "objective" evaluations is not fully uti-
lized. (With this repect, recall Little's comment, saying
that in the attempt to reach completeness and still keep the
balance between simplicity and complexity, incorporation of
subjective judgment is an important aid)
.
In many practical cases it is hard, if not impossi-
ble, to reach objectively measured attributes. For example,
Donnell and Ulvila's [Decisions and Designs, 1980, pp. 31-32]
model of the Scout Helicopter evaluation, although relatively
elaborate, still ends up with most of the bottom-level attri-
butes that are not readily quantifiable on an underlying scale.
A means to reduce the number of attributes is mainly
to combine some of them, what is in fact equivalent to stop
formalizing at a higher level of the attributes hierarchy, or
to eliminate the unimportant ones. Here one can use the
"test of importance," introduced by Ellis (1970) , in which
the decision-maker is asked whether he feels the best course
of action could be altered if a specified objective was ex-
cluded. An affirmative response would obviously imply that
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the objective should be included. Edwards (19 81) mentions
that it is desirable to get the stakeholders' common acceptance
of the value-tree, although, he indicates, "you can never
satisfy them all."
Donnel and Ulvila [Decisions and Designs, 19 80,
pp. 7-8] count the important benefits the hierarchical decom-
position provides as follows:
(1) It breaks the elicitation process up into "chunks" of
manageable size.
(2) It organizes the presentation of the final results,
highlighting the most important factors without losing the
ability to retrieve details when desired.
(3) It limits the required assessments to comparison
among attributes that are closely related in meaning, and
therefore relatively easy to weigh against one another.
d. Step 4
For each stakeholder group assess the relative
importance of each of the value-dimensions. Since values
change over time, the weights should be re-elicited in situa-
tions in which the program is periodically re-evaluted.
As emphasized by Helm [Pacific Missile Test Center, 1979, p. 12]
"MAUT is especially appropriate for the applied setting, since
in addition to its flexible structure it incorporates inter-
active methodology for data manipulation." Consequently, as
new data are gathered, existing information is revised in the
light of the new data. This process can be repeated as often
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as required. That feature protects MAUT from the fate of
many static models, which quickly reach obsolescence.
Step 4 is the second of the only two steps in
which- according to Edwards, stakeholders are involved. (The
first one is, as recalled, the value-dimensions elicitation.
)
Obviously, it is desired and in most cases even possible to
reach a common stakeholders ' agreement to both the value-tree
construct and the weights. The recommended way to reach such
agreement is through a face-to-face open discussion. If agree-
ment is not reached, the ultimate decision-maker may judge
and decide about the final value-tree construct and weights.
Another option is to use more than one set of weights (although
the value-trees must be identical) for parallel comparative
evaluations. According to Edwards (19 81) in many practical
cases, the ultimate outcome of different weight sets was
selection of the same alternative. That is explained by the
fact that in practical cases, weight sets which are determined
by reasonable people, usually only differ moderately, thus
the dominant discriminator is score rather than weight.
Edwards and Newman (1980) prefer the weighting method called
"ratio weighting." The procedure for this method is as follows
(1) Place the attributes in rank order of importance.
(2) Assign a value of 10 to the least important attribute.
(3) Assign to the next attribute a value according to your
evaluation of how much it is more important than the least
important one. For example, if it is twice as important as
the least important attribute, it should be assigned the value
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of 20 . Go up the rank order and assign relative values to
all attributes. Ties are permitted. Normalize the values
assigned to a scale of 0-1, 0-100, or as desired. This is
done by summing up all important values, and dividing each
individual value by the sum. The result is the attribute's
importance weight on a sacle of 0-1. For 0-100 scale, multi-
ply by 100. When you have a value-tree, use it to ease the
weighting: instead of generating weights for all attributes
together, do the same procedure for each level separately,
and within the levels— for each group of attributes (which
are under a common upper-level attribute) separately. Start
the procedure from the top and proceed to the bottom. The
final weight of each attribute is the multiplication of his
original weight by the weights of all attributes which are
above it, in its branched pattern up to the top. (A detailed
example can be found in Edwards and Newman (1980, Chapter 4,
pp. 12-14) . This is called "multiplying through the tree."
While Edwards and Newman ( 19 80, Chapter 4 ) pre-
sent some additional weighting methods which are even simpler
than the ratio weighting, there are also more complicated
methods (see for example Keeney and Nair (1977, pp. 310-312) ),
which are essentially based on exploring trade-off ratios of
scores among the various attributes.
e. Step 5
Ascertain how well each object of evaluation
serves each value-dimension at the lowest level of the value-
tree. This is expressed in terms of location-measures (or
single attribute utilities, or scores). Those numbers can be
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purely subjective or some sort of transformation on objective
measures. Edwards (1977, p. 252) distinguishes between purely
subjective value-dimension, partly-subjective— in which the
units of measurement are objective but the location-measures
are subjectively evaluated, and purely-objective— in which
location-measure can be measured unjudgmentally in objective
units before the decision.
An important part of the location measuring pro-
cedure is to construct a utility function in which the
location-measure of each alternative can be evaluated. While
some of the users prefer a sophisticated development of
dimension-by-dimension utility curves (like Keeney and Raiffa
(1976)), Edwards, who consistently strives for simplicity, is
a great advocate of using linear ("straight line") utility
functions. According to Edwards (1981), in most cases prefer-
ences are described basically by a straight line, or by a
bi-linear function with only one interior maximum (or minimum)
.
Edwards and Newman (1980, Chapter 5, p. 8) point out that
the use of linear and bi-linear location measures is an enor-
mous simplification, "which is very much out of the traditional
spirit of formal decision analysis." But they emphasize that
"if one's desirability or utility function increases steadily,
or decreases steadily, or has one interior maximum, then this
approximation will work so well that there is little point
in using anything more sophisticated." Donnell and Ulvila
[Decisions and Designs, 1980, pp. 10-21] distinguish among
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three methods of scaling: relative scales, ratio scales and
absolute scales. All three methods assume linearity. The
absolute method requires determination of range of performance
that starts at some very low "true zero" level, and ends at
some theoretical maximum level of performance. The advantage
of this method is that it indicates not only the relative
preference order between alternatives, but it also indicates
to what extent an alternative is "good" or "bad" relative to
some acceptable absolute reference scale. The disadvantages
are that it is hard to define the scaling range, and because
the true zero is so low, the spread in the alternatives *
scores is relatively small and hard to distinguish. In the
ratio scale the analyst can avoid the problem of defining
"perfect" capability, and the best alternative on each dimen-
sion serves as the upper limit of the range. Other alterna-
tives are evaluated relative to the best. But this method
still requires defining an "unacceptable" point of zero value
as in the absolute scale method. The relative scale does not
require definition of end points at all. The best alternative
at each dimension is used as the upper limit of the scale, and
the worst as the bottom limit. Other alternative evaluations
are located in-between according to their estimated (or objec-
tively measured) location relative to both limits. The main
advantage of this method is its simplicity and its "modest"
information requirements. The disadvantage is that it does
not indicate whether an alternative is "good" or "bad, " only
"better" or "worse" are meaningful. All three methods, if
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properly implemented, provide the same rank order of alterna-
tives and even the same ratio of preferences among them. In
most decisions relative order is sufficient, and if there is
no specific need for evaluation in absolute terms, according
to Donnell and Ulvila [Decisions and Designs, 1980, p. 7] the
relative scaling method, whose advantages outweigh its problems,
is preferred.
Edwards (1981) views the scoring process as done
essentially by experts. In any case, he recommends to avoid
letting stakeholders do the scoring because that is a poten-
tial source of biased outcomes.
f. Step 6
Aggregate the location-measures with the impor-
tance weights into an overall utility for each alternative.
As mentioned before, Edwards, and many others
prefer the additive aggregation rule to the multiplicative
one.
Another issue that may be recalled is execution
of several aggregations (but not too manyi) using different
sets of weights. Those can be presented concurrently for
decision-maker's judgment. Such presentations may convey
to him in a visible manner, controversies among groups of
stakeholders, if they are really significant [the word signi-
ficant refers to both controversies and stakeholders. To





An issue which has a great practical significance
that is suggested by Edwards and Newman (19 80, Chapter 6,
pp. 11-12) is subaggregation. As they say, aggregation need
not be an all-or-nothing affair. If value-trees have been
developed, one can select an appropriate level of higher order
value, and aggregate up to it. Then MAUT scores on each
branch separately can be presented as a "value profile"—an
aggregate but still informative summary of how objective evalu-
ation stands with respect to each of the higher-level values
considered relevant to its assessment. That gives information
at whatever level of detail seems to be just right for the
purpose on hand.
g. Step 7
Perform sensitivity analysis. As true for any
sensitivity analysis, the underlying question at this step
is whether a change in the various inputs or input-evaluations
will lead to a different conclusions. According to Edwards
and Newman (19 80, Chapter 7, p. 1), the most important kind
of sensitivity to look at is sensitive to weigths . This is
important both because weights are the essence of value
judgment, and because weights, being purely subjective num-
bers about which people disagree, are more likely to be in
dispute than location measures, which may be objective, may
depend on the judgment of experts—or may be in some cases
also matters of intense controversy. If there is some debate
about whether a branch or an attribute belongs in the analysis
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at all, it can be in effect eliminated in the sensitivity
analysis by giving it a weight of zero, or almost zero.
F. CONCLUSIONS
This chapter attempted to provide the reader a basic
acquaintance with MAUT. As noted, MAUT has variety of ver-
sions. In this context, the simpler ones were addressed,
with several references to the more complex ones. But it
should be emphasized that the simplest versions of MAUT,
like the one introduced by Edwards and Newman (19 8C) , may
not be adequate to handle the more complex acquisition
decisions. Edwards himself admits that he has not had experi-
ence with such complex problems [Edwards, 1981], For example,
Donnell and Ulvila's [Decisions and Designs, 19 80] value-tree
used for the Advanced Scout Helicopter evaluation is much
more complex than the "trees" exhibited in Edwards' examples.
On the other hand, Donnell and Ulvila's linear utility func-
tion assumption, their usage of relative scale, their prefer-
ence for additive linear aggregation rule, or the way they
treat uncertainties, corresponds more to Edwards' approaches,
than to the more sophisticated ones suggested, for example, by
Raiffa (1968), Keeney and Raiffa (1976), or Keeney and Nair
(1977). In any case, the selection of the approach depends
a great deal on the object of evaluation and on the prefer-
ences of the decision-maker. Nevertheless, many approaches
and techniques—the simple and the more complex—are available
for use as required. The conflict between the simplicity
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desired and the complexity required for acquisition decisions
will be addressed in the next chapter.
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V. IMPLEMENTATION OF MAUT FOR TOP-LEVEL ACQUISITION
DECISION-MAKING
A . GENERAL
The purpose of this chapter is to highlight some of the
implementation-related issues, in applying MAUT to top-level
acquisition decision-making. No doubt, acquisition decisions
are of the most complex kind. Although MAUT was originally
geared to complex decisions, there are still some important
problems, stemming mainly from the complexity of the acquisi-
tion decisions. These problems should be resolved in order
to make it more likely that MAUT be used in acquisition decision-
making. Many of the implementation problems may be associated
with each individual decision. Those, of course, cannot be
addressed in this context. Only the issues which are common
to most cases will be mentioned here.
Neither the thesis in general, and this chapter in particular,
pretend to cover all implementation aspects, nor are they supposed
to be a complete "user's manual." Thus, a preliminary recom-
mendation is that the user should be helped and consulted by
MAUT ' s skilled field practitioners. According to Edwards (1981),
although there are many who deal with MAUT, "there are only a
few real skilled practitioners around." This is by no means
to say that those practitioners will do the evaluation by
themselves. It is to say that their help is vital. Basically,
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the MAUT procedure is managed at staff level by a team of
MAUT's experienced practitioners, usually externally hired,
and combined with staff members. (The combined group, here-
after, will be called "the analysis team") . The analysis
team works in close interactions with the various stakeholders,
experts, and, of course, the decision-maker (s) . Those inter-
actions, which are paramount for MAUT procedure scuccess, will
be discussed in more detail later in this chapter.
A final comment, which is preliminary to any further dis-
cussion of the implementation issues, is that MAUT procedure
must be acceptable to the final decision-maker. This notion
has been raised by several of the people involved, by means
of the questionnaire and the interviews (e.g., Connolly (1981)
and also see Appendix A, p. 227) . Furthermore, one of the
questionnaire respondents emphasizes the potential contribu-
tion the decision-maker's experience and intuition may offer
to models by steering them from the early stages. According
to this commentator, "'Good* decision-making is enhanced by
bringing them [the models, R.G.] in early, so that data base,
etc., is organized to their [the decision-makers', R.G.]
'taste'" [Appendix A, p. 227].
The words "procedure," "technique," and "model" are used
interchangeably in this chapter to refer to the implementation
form of MAUT. There are practitioners such as Edwards (1981)
who have reservations about using the term "model" in this con-
text, since model is some representation of real phenomena,
and MAUT is merely an analysis and communication mechanism.
("Algebra is also not a model.") But in the prevailing jargon
the MAUT framework for specific analysis is_ called a "model"
(see for example Decisions and Designs (1980) . Thus, this
term will be used in that sense in this chapter as well.
91

The various implementation issues will be addressed
by their order of arrival according to MAUT's 7 steps.
B. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
1. Step 1
As recalled, at this step the scope of the decision
is determined and alternatives defined. That brings about
the question: what type of acquisition decisions is the MAUT
procedure applicable? Edwards (1977, p. 248) says:
I don't understand the differences among evaluations
of plans, evaluations of ongoing projects and evalua-
tions of complete projects; all seem to me to be
instances of the same kind of intellectual activity.
MAUT can, and I believe, should be applied to all
three; the only difference is that in ongoing or
complete projects there are more opportunities to
replace judgmental estimates of locations on value
dimensions with utility transforms on actual
measurement—still subjective, but with firmer
ground in evidence.
A similar attitude is taken by Hermann (1981) who says:
I am not sure that there is such a clear distinc-
tion between source selection decision and status
review decision session [i.e., Milestone session,
R.G.] .
In fact, there should not be a clear distinction. As men-
tioned in Chapter II, Milestones I and II are designated
to approve the alternative (s) and authorize the acquisition
process to proceed into the next phase. Apparently, the
approval of the alternatives is based on their status review.
But from another aspect, each alternative system is usually
identified with a specific contractor. So that is in essence
the linkage between the system/contractor Source Selection
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and the Milestones decisions. The above mentioned notion
contradicts some people's arguments (such as Trimble (1981))
that the DSARC is not supposed to make any kind of comparison
between alternative systems since that is exclusively the
Services' business. According to Trimble, DSARC ' s basic job
is to recommend to approve or disapprove the Service selec-
tion. Thus, with this pattern of logic Trimble concludes that
MAUT procedure might be most useful at the Department level,
and especially for Source Selection (which, in fact, already
uses such procedures). One of the questionnaire respondents,
a program manager, concludes his lengthy written analysis
with four conclusions which essentially match Trimble's per-
ception. These are:
(1) Models are good tools for evaluating two
basically 'technically equal' systems, i.e., Source
Selection.
(2) Models are useful for prototype evaluation.
(3) They are of limited use in the A-109 proc-
ess, even when comparing similar systems.
(4) They are of no use in unlike alternatives
(e.g., TOW missile vs. A-10 aircraft, to kill
tanks)
.
While it absolutely agrees with the first two conclu-
sions, the thesis analysis disagrees with the last two. In
response to the third conclusion, as explained before, it
argues that there should not be a difference in essence
between " Circ A-109 process" (or "DSARC process," or any
similar new process) decisions, and top departments decisions,
such as Source Selection for major systems. If, in fact,
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there is a difference, it stems partly from weakness of
evaluation capability of the DSARC process decision bodies,
rather than from principle. Secondly, the flexible nature of
MAUT may allow its use in assisting top-level decisions, even
when they change shape while moving up the ladder of the
"DSARC Process" hierarchy. The fourth conclusion raises a
set of questions with respect to how to compare unlike alterna-
tives or old or with new ones. According to Edwards (1981),
it is harder, because the range of value dimensions to be
considered is greater, but it is possible. "In fact," he
says, "we were able to generate value trees [to such evalua-
tions, R.G.] never-the-less . " In the case of unlike alterna-
tives there might be many low level attributes which are not
common to all alternatives. On the other hand, since all
alternatives aim to achieve common upper-levels objectives,
the upper levels value dimensions are probably shared by all.
Thus, a value tree may consist of bottom level attributes
accumulated from all alternatives, while each alternative is
actually evaluated only on those attributes which are rele-
vant to it, and is scored on the irrelevant ones.
A more concise option is to construct different value
trees for each alternative, which includes for each alternative,
just the relevant attributes, and thus may differ at the
entry-levels, but be identical at the upper levels. Old vs.
new alternatives differ mainly in to what extent objectively
measured attributes are used, and in the degree of uncertain-
ties. In such a case it is possible to use a specific
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value-dimension subjective scale for one alternative (proba-
bly the new, yet "unknown" one) , and more objectively-based
scale, for another (probably for the old, well-known one)
.
Uncertainties are taken care of by expected value
computation (or estimation) and sometimes by applying special
value dimensions of risk (see more detail--this chapter, p. 110)
Thus there is no fundamental problem in applying MAUT to "old
vs. new" evaluation context. Some examples of MAUT actual
implementation for "old vs. new" evaluations were mentioned
in Chapter III (see p. 63) such as: Airport for Mexico City,
Energy supply for Southern California, or Advanced Scout
Helicopter selection. All of them deal, and manage well,
with mix of "old" and "new" alternatives.
Scoping the decision might be a problem when the MAUT
procedure is expected to serve some levels of decision-makers,
whose scope of decisions are not the same. In such a case,
the procedure should refer initially to the broadest scope,
which is usually determined by the highest decision-maker.
The scope is expressed by the range of value-dimensions in-
cluded in the model. The construct of the value-dimensions,
namely, the value-tree should be modular, so complete branches
would be eligible for elimination as a unit. Lower decision
levels would be presented only by these models' branches
which are relevant to their scope of decision. In most
cases this is not difficult to do, since usually the struc-





The generation of alternatives is usually a straight-
forward task in the acquisition decision. Cases of variation
on the same basic alternative, which differ by various com-
binations of some components (for example, those resulting
from trade-offs between performance cost and schedule)
,
should be referred to as separate contending alternatives
[Edwards, 1981], Such trading-off processes can be continu-
ous with an infinite number of alternatives; but some discrete
alternatives selected from the reasonable range might be good
enough to represent the real life selection options.
2. Step 2
As recalled, at this step stakeholders are identified.
In the acquisition context, besides the DOD visible stake-
holders, they may also be found in Congress, at the states'
level, or in industry. Naturally, in a real case there can
be too many stakeholders to permit a reasonably "managed"
evaluation model. So the list must be refined, organized in
a more or less homogeneous groups of individuals and organi-
zations, and representatives for the actual interaction should
be identified.
As mentioned before, the decision-maker is usually a
stakeholder himself and as such, may be addressed at this
phase like any other stakeholder. Although he has the authority
to dominate other stakeholders, he is wiser not to exert this
authority at this early stage, because he may lose inputs
generated by others—inputs which may be of importance to his
own later-on decision. Authority to dominate the process is
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suggested not to be activated until the final decision
phases. On the other hand, any decision-maker's directive
which is a condition of his acceptance of the methodology in
the first place, should be implemented immediately.
3 . Step 3
As recalled, at this step elicitation of relevant
value-dimensions from the various stakeholders takes place.
Usually the hierarchy of the value-dimensions correlates
with the natural hierarchy of the stakeholders. It is not so
difficult to generate a global list of value-dimensions. There
might be some difficulty in eliciting subjective "political"
value-dimensions; on one hand, as suggested by Edwards (1981),
a stakeholder should be told that "it is OK to be selfish."
But it is questionable whether a Congressman would openly
expose himself by articulating his "selfish" interest to
provide his constituency a multimillion dollar contract.
Edwards (1981) suggests the use of proxy attributes in such
cases. For example, the Congressman's objective to select
the systems alternative that means contract awarding to his
constituency can be considered under the "legitimate" lable.
"Inter-regional balance of labor force" or, "inter-regional
balance of income allocation", or even more indirectly
—
"Prospects for Congressional Approval."
A harder task is to organize the value-dimensions into
a value-tree. This is mainly the analysis team's job. They
have to make sure that all important value-dimensions are in
there, and "including all relevant decision factors is a tough
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part" [Appendix A, p. 200]. An effort should be made to make
the value-tree as concise as possible. Some possible ways
to do so have been already mentioned (see Chapter IV. p. 80)
.
In cases where the tendency is to reach objectively measurable
attributes because the subjective scale seems to be inade-
quate, attributes in addition to those elicited from stake-
holders are required. This attributes* generation is done by
experts. But to avoid too elaborate a value-tree, a compro-
mise is suggested as an option by Keeney and Raiffa (1976,
p. 45] . They say that,
...the vertical depth of the proliferation of the
hierarchy does not necessarily force us to quantify
our preferences down to this level of detail. The
hierarchy after a given level may serve merely as
a qualitative checklist for items to consider.
But even when there is an effort to limit the level of detail
of the value-tree, it still turns out to be fairly elaborate.
Figures V-l—V-9 exhibit an example value-tree for a selection
between several hypothetical advanced fighter aircraft types,
in order to proceed with one (or two) into Phase II (Demon-
stration, Validation) of the acquisition life cycle. It
should be emphasized that this value-tree has not been gener-
ated through the procedure recommended here (which requires a
lot of manhours of a professional team) . It has been constructed
by the thesis author just as an illustration tool. Thus
In constructing this value-tree the author was assisted
by two sources:
(1) The value-tree used by Donnell and Ulvila [Decisions
and Designs, 1980, pp. 21-34] in their Decision Analysis of
Advanced Scout Helicopter Candidates.
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the details of its construct are not subject to discussion
or critique (which would be difficult anyway, since there are
no real specified alternatives behind this value-tree which
can be referred to) . As one can notice, the tree is quite
elaborate. (As a matter of fact, Donnell and Ulvila's [Deci-
sions and Designs, 1980] Scout Helicopter model goes even
further in its attribute division.) The complex structure
of the illustration value-tree stands in conflict with the
principle of simplicity that is emphasized throughout this
thesis. Two basic approaches to cope with inevitable model's
complexity can be recognized:
(1) To refer to only the upper levels as the formal tree,
while all other levels serve as a checklist for judgmental
location measures.
(2) To retain the existing construct, but adjust the model's
complexity to the level of decision-maker whose decision the
model serves.
Between the two, an intermediate approach is selected.
With respect to the first approach, the object of the decision
requires, and permits, subdivisions down even to 6 , 7 or
8 levels. That is required in order to reach an objectively
measured data base for some of the utility functions. This
is considered unreasonable. Thus, in most attributes, and
even at the lowest subdivisions, judgment should be applied
in partly-subjective or purely-subjective evaluations. Thus,
the question is what should be the optimal level at which to
stop the attributes division. The complex acquisition
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evaluations require at least 4-6 attribute levels. That can
be acceptable if the second approach, namely, adjusting the
model's complexity to the decision-maker level, takes place
as well. That will be addressed in more detail later in this
chapter.
Another feature of the value-tree is its modular
structure. For example it separates the political category
(see 1.4 in Figure V-l) from the others, and enables the rank-
ing order of alternatives to be based on military related
grounds only. The political, economic, and social analysis
can be done separately, and be added to the rest with suitable
weights for the final conclusion.
As one can notice, cost is evaluated through the four
main subcategories of the life-cycle-cost, which are at the
entry-level of the cost category (see Figure V-7) . This
stands in conflict to many prevailing analysis approaches
which discount costs to present-value and then refer to them
as a unit dimension. The approach presented here offers a
more realistic handling of cost, since in real life, cost's
present-value minimization is not the only, or major considera-
tion. ("As if the only thing one is worried about is the
rate of interest" [Edwards, 1981].) In many real life cases
one may be willing to accept smaller initial costs, even if
they mean eventually greater costs through time. Thus the
way cost is handled in the example provides a less mechanical
approach, and greater emphasis of the cost over time factor.
Later on, at step 5, the cost will be assigned a negative
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utility which is subtracted from the aggregate utility. That
would cause the model as a whole to be, in a sense, a cost-
effectiveness model, that measure the difference between the
negative utility of cost, and the positive utility of other
factors (effectiveness here is synonymous to global utility)
.
Another issue that stands out in the example is the
existence of specific value-dimensions for risks in various
areas (see for example Figure V-5, Technical Risks, 1.1.4.6).
Those appear in addition to the expected-value calculation
(or estimation) that should take place in any case for the
uncertain location measures. The approach of having specific
attributes for risks is also selected by Donnell and Ulvila
[Decisions and Designs, 1980, pp. 25-, 32] in their Advanced
Scout Helicopter model. Edwards (1981) refers to this approach
as "conceptually inelegant," though acceptable. As a matter
of fact, it suits very well the basic logic, suggesting that
once you've calculated an expected-value, you deal with a
single specific location-measure for each alternative at each
attribute. But there can be, for example, two alternatives
of which one is an existing system with well known parameters,
and the other still on the drawing board with highly variable
possible parameters. Both alternatives may have equal measure
location over a specific attribute, and thus considered utility-
equal with respect to that attribute. But in fact, they are
not perceived equivalent since one involves high risks and
the other does not. A prudent decision-maker would like to
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take into account the possibility that the new system would
not perform as well as the expected value suggests. The risk
dimension allows an explicit consideration of the uncertain-
ties involved with the various alternatives in the value-tree,
Another way to cope with the above problem is through sensi-
tivity analysis, while mainly the variable and risky attri-
butes are checked for their impact on the ultimate outcome
if location measures are different from the expected value.
Without overlooking the need for sensitivity analysis, it
seems that the special attributes for risks spell out the
risks involved to the decision-maker more clearly. It meets
the requirement raised by one of the questionnaire respon-
dents who stated:
A range of subjective values and numerical estimates
needs to be presented to top decision-makers, with
uncertainties clearly spelled out. [Appendix A, p. 224]
4. Step 4
As recalled, at step 4 important weights are assigned
to the value-dimensions at the various levies of the tree.
Weights, as well as the value-dimensions, are elicited from
the stakeholders. As mentioned before, stakeholders are
usually arranged in some sort of a hierarchy that correlates
the hierarchy of the value-dimensions. This feature suggests
that specific weights are elicited from specific stakeholders,
Not all stakeholders are supposed to refer to all weights of
all value-dimensions. The use of the value -tree construct
for the weighting procedure (see Chapter IV, p. 83).
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provides a convenient framework for weighting by small groups
of weights distinguished by their horizontal belonging to
specific attributes levels, and by their vertical relation-
ships to specific branches. Like in the attributes elicita-
tion, the weights for many of the entry-level attributes in
the acquisition case should be done preferably by experts
rather than by stakeholders.
The questionnaire respondents give priority to the
decision-maker in weights determination. It seems that they
are not aware of the possibility of elicitations from stake-
holders (and the questionnaire itself did not provide it)
.
Even with a broader weighting source, the decision-maker should
retain the last word in resolving unsettled disputes over
the value-tree construction and weighting.
The notion of disagreements over weights brings about
the issue of using several weight sets. As revealed by the
questionnaire [Appendix A, pp. 231-236] , there are different
sets of relative weights for different decision-makers levels.
Those differences are very natural. It is quite obvious that
SecDef, for example, would assign higher weights to political
value-dimensions than the Service. While the modular struc-
ture of the value-tree may provide resolution for different
scopes at the various levels, it does not provide a resolution
for differences in weighting of the same spectrum of value-
dimension. In fact, the same factor areas considered at
DSARC or SecDef level are considered also at the top Service
Department levels, though not with identical importance weights
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For example, the questionnaire indicates that political and
socio-economic aspects are also considered at the Service
level, although by different importance weights compared to
OSD top-levels. As mentioned, these differences cannot be
resolved by the modular structure. Another approach should
be selected: First, weights should be reduced to very few
sets. Agreements within the main groups involved such as OSD,
Service, or Industry may be reached. After all, as said by
Edwards (1977, p. 248), "Every boss has a boss, and every
one attempts to take the values of his superior into account
in his own decisions." And really, the questionnaire reflects
only reasonably moderate deviation between the weight sets of
the four DOD top-level acquisition decision-makers (see Appen-
dix A, p. 233) . Then, as previously mentioned, there is an
option to present separate evaluation outcomes as developed
by using several major weight sets, while each represents a
major group of stakeholders. The judgment between them is
left for the ultimate decision-maker.
5 . Step 5
As recalled, at this step utility functions are con-
structured, and each alternative is evaluated as to how well
it performs at each of the value-dimensions. The construction
of utility functions is a complex process and each of them
should get individual treatment, using a suitable approach.
Naturally, the utility functions for objectively measured
technical attributes should be constructed by different
methods, consulting different experts than the purely subjec-
tive ones. There is no intention to describe in detail these
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methods, whose use should be considered on a case by case
basis. In general, there must be a striving for linear func-
tions, as suggested by Edwards and many others (see Chapter IV.
p. 84) . For the purely subjective attributes an even
simpler way may be appropriate. Instead of a continuous
linear function, some 5 or 10 discrete points on it can be
selected, stated in terms of "excellent," "very good," etc.,
or by a broader verbal formulation of quality grades (for
example, see Larichev, (1977, p. 199)). Each such verbal
utility grade has an associated numerical value over the utility
function scale, so it enters the model mathematical procedure.
In constructing the utility functions, the notion of
thresholds arises. Several of the questionnaire respondents
require the procedure to maintain a provision for handling
thresholds. If the relative scaling method recommended by
Donnell and Ulvila is selected (see Chapter IV, pp. 84-86) , no
inherent threshold handling capability is provided. Accord-
ing to Donnell (1981) the solution for that problem is to test
the alternatives for meeting thresholds external to the model.
Only those who pass the test enter the formal evaluation.
But since a threshold is not usually an absolutely unchange-
able entity, interesting alternatives may get lost. For
example, Keeney and Nair (1977, p. 299) decided, in their
Nuclear Power Plant Sites analysis, not to exclude areas merely
because they failed just under or over cutoff level on one
criterion. Using the threshold as a "true zero" point in the
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absolute or the ratio scaling methods, enables implementing
what Edwards and Newman call "outside-the-range objects scor-
ing," i.e., scores that below zero are legal, "so long as the
meaning of the ranges is kept clearly in mind" [Edwards and
Newman, 1980, Chapter 5, p. 5], Thus, the strong requirement
for thresholds in real life cases weakens somewhat Donnell's
strong support for relative scaling. But as indicated by
Donnell (1981) himself, different scaling methods can be used
in the same model, as long as a complete branch (or category)
uses the same scaling approach. Thus, for threshold-sensitive
value-dimensions such as cost, the absolute scaling is pre-
ferred, while in other cases the relative, or ratio, scales
are good enough.
Another issue associated with step 5 is the question
of who should evaluate the alternatives and determine their
individual scores over the various utility functions. Ac-
cording to Edwards (19 81) that is an experts 1 job. Truely,
looking at the nature of the entry-level attributes, almost
none of them are separately a subject for high-level judgment.
Furthermore, Edwards warns against letting stakeholders do the
scoring. According to Edwards, models are more sensitive to
scores than to weights, and if there is a place for biasing a
model, scoring is that place. The questionnaire respondents
reveal clear reservations towards experts' evaluations [Appen-
dix A, p. 219]. (The Israelis are much more open to experts'
aid.) In general, the respondents would like to see extensive
involvement of the decision-maker in the scoring process, but
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this is not very practical. In any case, the message is
clear: they don't want the evaluations of some medium or
low-level experts (those can be operational people as well
as technical ones) to be the only input to the procedure. It
is not acceptable that once the low level evaluations take
place, they are pluged into the model and automatically run
to the final outcome. The feeling is that some sort of higher
level reviews of the model are required before it is presented
to the ultimate decision-maker. Two ways are suggested to
meet this requirement:
(1) Limit the value-tree to some relatively high-level of
value-dimensions. Then the evaluation, naturally more sub-
jective, will be done by higher level evaluators.
(2) Review the evaluations done by "experts" by higher-
level "judges." Each will take care of a specific branch that
is in his area of expertise. Those higher-level "judges" will
be eligible to override evaluations that they do not accept.
The question, of course, is who are these "judges?" It is
hard to imagine such an evaluation process accomplished com-
pletely independently of the stakeholders, by some 'objective
evaluators." No doubt, the Service should be the major evalua-
tor for any military related aspects. To counter possibility
of biased evaluations there are, after all, some "insurances"
while the MAUT procedure is used. The procedure cannot be




(1) The very fact that "sub-decisions" are done separately
for each value-tree module (or branch) reduces the possibility
of overall bias.
(2) The procedure forces people to articulate their impor-
tance weights, preferences, evaluations, and hence automati-
cally increases transparency of the alternatives presented
[Edwards, 1981]. This notion is supported by the Navy Program
Manager Guide [Naval Material Command, 1980, pp. 3-25], which
views the achievement of a much greater degree of objectivity
in the evaluation process than might otherwise be expected, as
one of MAUT * s greatest advantages:
When opinions are displayed and critiqued, narrow
minded orientations give way to more balanced outlook.
This is true at any level of decision-making. While the sub-
decision-makers or the "experts" for specific categories are
in most cases inevitably associated with one or another party
of stakeholders, it is important that the analysis team, which
runs the procedure, be independent or report directly to the
top decision-maker office. That can be another safeguard for
objectivity. All this is unnecessary in an environment of
greater mutual credibility than the one described by the ques-
tionnaire comments. In environments in which the danger of
biased evaluations is not so significant, the program office
is the natural home for running the MAUT procedure.
6 . Step 6
As recalled, at step 6 the weighed location measures
are aggregated into a single figure of merit, i.e., an overall
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utility figure for each alternative. The one with the highest
figure is the preferred alternative (according to the MAUT
procedure only, of course) . The aggregation rule recommended
here is the additive rule, as preferred by most MAUT practi-
tioners (see Chapter IV, p. 76). The aggregation, by itself,
is a relatively simple calculation, but it is not yet a deci-
sion. It is the decision-making process that will be addressed,
rather than the mathematical computation of the aggregate
utility. Some highlights of the decision-making process asso-
ciated with the MAUT procedure implementation are presented
here
.
As mentioned in the previous section, various branches
of the model may be reviewed by separate sub-decision-makers
that are authorized to do so. But when the decision reaches
top-levels such as (S)SARC, Service's Source Selection Board,
(S)Sec, DSARC or SecDef, the presentation should include all
the model's major categories. However that might be an ex-
hausting presentation, unless the model's complexity, or in
other words— level of detail, is adjusted to the position and
the personal preferences of the decision-maker involved (recall
Chapter V, p. 108). The actual meaning of this adjustment is
the model's presentation that starts from some selected level
of attribute subdivision and up. The lowest level presented
should not necessarily be uniform at all branches. It depends
on how deep the decision-maker is willing to go down at each
of them. In some instances he may be willing to go down to
the entry-level in order to examine the utility functions, and
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in another he may be satisfied by reviewing to only the second
or third level. The model's presentation should be supple-
mented by subaggregation output for each desired level of
attributes (see Chapter IV, p. 87) . In addition, the decision-
maker should be verbally briefed about the underlying data,
and the rationale behind the model's construct. In such a way,
the decision-maker has a good picture of the main objectives
or value-dimensions of his interest and their relative weights;
the relative location of each alternative over the major cate-
gories (by the subaggregations) ; and a more general idea about
the construct and the utility functions at those levels which
are not presented.
The notion of presenting the basic data, how the evalu-
ation was generated, and the MAUT procedure construct rationale,
as a supplement to the model's numerical parameters, is strongly
recommended by the questionnaire respondents [Appendix A, pp. 224,
226 ] . Another questionnaire input is that subaggregations
should not replace the presentation of the single figure aggre-
gated global utility. The latter is definitely required, as
reflected in the answers to Q28 of the questionnaire [Appendix
A, p. 214]. That is different from methods found in the litera-
ture, which recommend listing the characteristics and impacts
of the various alternatives, and leave the task of ranking to
the judgment and intuition of the decision-maker. Those methods,
such as "Goeller Scorecard," sometimes supplemented with "color
coding," have been suggested for cases where "classical" ap-
proaches like cost-benefit were not able to prepare unambiguous
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ranking of alternatives [Quade, 1979, p. 59]. But that is not
the case with MAUT, which overcomes many of the "classical"
analysis method's weaknesses.
Some of MAUT ' s advantages noted in the literature
were also pointed out by the questionnaire respondents. Ac-
cording to the questionnaire [Appendix A, p. 211-212], the
following benefits might result if MAUT is used in the acqui-
sition decision sessions:
(1) It allows better communication and understanding among
the people involved.
(2) It has the potential to focus discussion on the impor-
tant issues.
(3) It assists the people to put rigor into their line of
thinking.
Of course, as in any discussion, these points can be
missed if the discussion is badly managed. As a consequence,
some of the questionnaire respondents are reluctant to use
MAUT because of the worry that the procedure may shift a dis-
cussion to unnecessary arguments on weights and scores [Appen-
dix A, p. 203]. The answer to this worry is very simple:
"don't mismanage" [Edwards, 1981].
An interesting issue is the case that the procedure
would result in an outcome which the decision-maker is not
willing to accept, whatever the reason— "gut feeling," or
more explainable reason. However, some of the questionnaire's
respondents say, "then he may be baring his belly to his foes"
(by agreeing to use the procedure, R.G.) [Appendix A, p. 206].
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There are several ways to avoid this problem. First, the
preliminary acceptance of the procedure by the decision-maker
reduces the probability of the outcome being rejected later
in the process. If the decision-maker participates in the
model's construction and guides, or even overrules parameters
decisions, that probability is even smaller. Thus, it is
essential for the MAUT procedure success to have the decision-
maker's involvement from its early phases. Second, it should
be recognized that it is perfectly legal for the decision-
maker to change the model's parameters according to his own
perception. After all, he is the one that should make the
ultimate decision, and the responsibility is always on his
shoulders [Trimble, 1981]. The questionnaire responses strongly
support the decision-maker's authority to change the model's
parameters [Appendix A, p. 214]. That is also acceptable by
practitioners such as Edwards (1981) . In the worst case, the
decision-maker would adjust the model "brutally" to fit his
own selection. Even in such a case, the model usage has been
probably contributed to the decision-making: first, it served
as an input that after all cannot be ignored. Second, in
changing the model's parameters the decision-maker is forced
to articulate his own parameters in terms of weights and scores,
which puts rigor into the decision-making. But in real life,
the decision-maker interaction with MAUT model is not so





Usually, I don't think the decision-maker will
openly or overtly change weights and scores. To
do so at the "end" only invites allegations of
improper rigging of selection. [Appendix A, p. 218]
Edwards (1981) adds that the decision-maker should challenge
the analysts if he thinks the models outcomes are incorrect.
As a consequence, a wise decision-maker would not allow a
model to provide a "wrong" result in the first place. By
following its preparations he may affect it in the early
stages. But if a conflict arises with his own attitudes at
the final stages after all, he would probably send the analysts
back for a "second guess" while pointing out what he
.
thinks is
wrong. That should be the real meaning of interaction between
the decision-maker and the MAUT procedure. True, in some in-
stances time constraints do not allow the full interaction as
suggested here, but some level of interaction must exist if the
procedure is selected as the decision tool. The acquisition
decisions are important enough to justify several iterations
of the evaluation model presentation to the top decision-makers,
in order to obtain their acceptance of the evaluation, and
the procedure's outcome.
Finally, it has to be emphasized, as noted by some of
the questinnaire respondents [Appendix A, p. 202] and the
interviewees (for example Trimble (1981) and Edwards (1981))
that the MAUT procedure should never dominate the decision.
The final decision is the exclusive responsibility of the
decision-maker, and no model's outcome should be an excuse
for a bad decision. He should exploit wisely whatever available
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from the MAUT evaluation procedure, but he should never let
it replace him. In that sense, the MAUT procedure is only a
"tool, " as defined by many of the respondents [Appendix A,
p. 202] • Truely, it does no more than provide a mechanism
whereby proposed alternative concepts can be evaluated
[Navy Material Command, 1980, pp. 3-25], Though accepting
this view as noted above, the thesis analysis suggests that
this mechanism should be used as the major framework for the
evaluation process and decision-making.
7. Step 7
As recalled, step 7 involves a sensitivity analysis.
This is an important part of MAUT * s implementation, and its
results should be an integral part of the model presentation
to decision-makers at the various levels.
As mentioned in Chapter IV, the most important kind
of sensitivity to look at is sensitivity to weights. Sensi-
tivity analysis of weights can replace or complement presenta-
tion of several weight sets in order to represent separately
the major groups of stakeholders involved in the decision.
Instead of several weight sets, only one is used, serving as
a basis on which changes of weightings are tested and analyzed
The ranges of weights to be tested may be reduced by applying
some "rules of thumb," which define the relationships between
weight perceptions of groups or organizations. Such rela-
tionships between weights sets made at several decision levels
within the DOD are presented and analyzed in Appendix A
(pp. 231 - 239 .
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C. MAUT PROCEDURE AS AN ONGOING PROCESS
The basic ideas of the MAUT procedure as an ongoing proc-
ess have been, in fact, introduced by means of the detailed
comments about its implementation in the acquisition decision-
making process. This section attempts to combine those ideas
into a complete concept. The idea is to use MAUT procedure
not only as a "one shot" evaluation tool, but as an ongoing
framework for evaluation through the whole acquisition life
cycle. The value-tree's various branches may be used as inde-
pendent evaluation models for various aspects of the program.
When combined altogether, they would provide the over-all
evalaution. The model as a whole or its separate modules may
serve as the major tool for any current review or decision-
making session, and not necessarily for top-level decision-
makers. It should be updated and changed in both construct
and parameters as more information accumulated through time.
Consequently, it should be maintained currently by a suitable
team. (After procedure initiation, its maintenance should not
be a full time job for the team members.) The natural home
for such a team might be the program office. But the team's
nucleus should consist of independent personnel who report
essentially to the top decision-maker. That is required as a
safeguard against biased evaluations.
In such a way, an up-to-date evaluation and comparison
between program alternatives can be provided at any time, and
not only towards Milestone decisions. From the methodological
aspect, MAUT, as a modular easy-to-update procedure fits
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the function of an ongoing evaluation and comparison framework
very well.
D. CONCLUSIONS
1 . The Chapter's Conclusions
The major conclusions of this chapter can be summarized
as follows:
(1) In any case of using MAUT for major acquisition decision-
making, skilled practitioner's consultation is required.
(2) The decision-maker's acceptance of MAUT procedure as
the major evaluation and presentation tool should be assured
in early phases of the implementation.
(3) MAUT procedure is very versatile and fits various types
of acquisition decisions such as Milestones decisions (mainly
I and II) , source selection, and other status reviews and
sub-decisions at the various decision-making levels.
(4) MAUT procedure is applicable to the evaluation and
selection between unlike systems (such as missile vs. air-
craft) or between "old vs. new" systems. Though such compari-
son raises some practical problems, they should be and can
be resolved.
(5) The modular construct of MAUT ' s value-trees permits
implementation of separate, partial evaluations for components
of the overall decision.
(6) Value-dimensions should be elicited from all major
stakeholders, including the decision-maker himself. Value-
dimensions should also include "selfish" political factors,
perhaps, in the shape some surrogate (proxy) attribute.
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(7) Inspite of simplification efforts, value-trees for
major acquisition decisions inevitably turn out to be quite
elaborate
.
(8) Adjustment of model complexity to top-level decision-
maker levels can be done by a partial presentation of the
model, starting at some value-dimension level and going up to
the prime objective. Such a presentation is supplemented
by subaggregations , underlying data and methodology rationale
briefings
(9) There might be differences in weighting between stake-
holders or levels of decision-maker . when they cannot be re-
solved, several aggregations, using several weights sets, can
be presented, being subject to the decision-maker judgment.
(10) To avoid leaving the scoring of the alternatives only
to "experts," various branches of the model should be re-
viewed by sub-decision-makers, who would be authorized to
exert their judgment in overruling the experts' evaluations.
(11) The scaling method should meet the requirement for
threshold inclusion for some of the attributes.
(12) While "experts," evaluators and sub-decision-makers
are inevitably identified with some stakeholders' organiza-
tions (e.g., a Service), the analysis team should report to
the final decision-maker, as a safeguard for unbiased
evaluations
.
(13) The decision-maker is eligible to change the model's
construct and parameters according to his own subjective
judgment. A "wise" decision-maker should interact with the
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model during its development to assure that conflicts would
not be exposed only at the final stages of the decision
process. If there is a conflict between his preference and
the model's outcome, he had better challenge the analysts to
find out what was wrong, rather than "brutally" change the
model, or worse, just ignore it.
(14) The MAUT procedure is, after all, a decision "tool,"
although as suggested here--a central one, and should not
replace the decision-maker who always has the ultimate responsi-
bility for the decision.
(15) MAUT procedure is suggested to serve as an ongoing
comprehensive evaluation base through the whole acquisition
life cycle.
2 . A Check for Meeting the Required Criteria
At this stage, after having introduced MAUT ' s charac-
teristics in general, and its implementation issues for acqui-
sition decisions in particular, it is appropriate to go back
and check how well the sugtested methodology meets the criteria
set at the conclusion of Chapter II (see pp. 45-47) . This check
provides the following observations: (Comment: Order of
items here correlates the order of the requirements in Chapter
II.)
(1) MAUT takes into account the informal decision process
by identifying the informal stakeholders and by eliciting
from them value-dimensions and weights.




(3) The value-tree construct allows sorting of the fac-
tors, focusing on the important ones, and eliminating the
irrelevant ones. The partial presentation described in this
chapter enalbes any desired level of detail of presentation
for decision.
(4) The concise but comprehensive alternatives' presenta-
tion through the MAUT procedure makes the decision-maker more
capable to evaluate and select alternatives.
(5) The rigor and discipline imposed by MAUT procedure
inherently increases model transparency and by that counter
biased presentation tendencies.
(6) The suggestion that MAUT be an ongoing evaluation
framework provides the element of evaluation updating.
(7) MAUT can serve as a comprehensive evaluation tool
including political, economic and social issues.
(8) MAUT is a quantitative technique which is capable of
handling subjective, judgmental consideration.
(9) The "wise" interaction of the decision-maker with the
model may reduce the possibility of conflict between his deci-
sion and the model outcome, and thus reduce the possibility of
using the model against his decision.
(10) The subjective evaluations involved in MAUT include
also "rules of thumb" and descriptive elements, but putting
them into order causes a better exploitation of the decision-
maker's skills.
(11) Although top-level decision-makers remain highly depen-
dent on their subordinates evaluation, the comprehensive
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decision presentation allows them better evaluations of their
own.
(12) The modular construct of MAUT model enables working
through the organizational functional and hierarchical structure
(13) The MAUT procedure provides fair and ordered repre-
sentation of political powers and their attitudes.
(14) The framework of the procedure's presentation compen-
sates, to a certain degree, personal differences of charisma,
presentation skills and alike.
(15) The modular construct of a MAUT model enables adjust-
ment of the presentation complexity to the individual
decision-maker.
(16) The implementation recommendations of this chapter meet
the requirement of the model's early acceptance by the decision-




VI . CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The major concern driving this research has been the
desire to improve top-level acquisition decision-making. The
following major problems, deficiencies, and difficulties of
the present acquisition decision-making situation, have been
identified:
(1) Difficulties in circumscribing the decision factors
and consolidating them all for a final decision. This stems
from the complex, multi-objective nature of the acquisition
decisions
.
(2) Lack of balance of political impacts of individuals,
groups and organizations, imposed upon the decision-making
process. Disorder in the representation of those who have
stakes in the decision.
(3) Existence of phenomena such as biased decision presen-
tation, which is amplified by the inevitable reliance of top-
level decision-makers on their subordinates' evaluations.
(4) Aversion to the usage of quantitative techniques as
top-level decision aids which stems mainly from the lack of
confidence in the capability of these techniques to incorporate
intuitive, judgmental issues.
In the search for decision techniques that may improve the
above deficiencies, the thesis concludes that there are in
existence decision techniques which are capable of incorporating
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subjective, judgmental issues, and of combining them with
objectively measured data. After analyzing the nature of the
acquisition decision, a conclusion is drawn that the above-
mentioned techniques might be of great help to these decisions.
Among the decision techniques MAUT stands out as the most
preferred by theoreticians, as well as actual users.
After a review of the basic concepts of MAUT, recommenda-
tions for implementation of the procedure are suggested.
The major conclusions for implementation are:
(1) MAUT, as a versatile method, is compatible with a
broad spectrum of acquisition decision types.
(2) MAUT ' s model for major system acquisition decisions
is inevitably complex, but its modular construct allows
"vertical" and "horizontal" cuts, in order to adjust the
model's scope and level of detail to the decision-maker's
position and personal preferences. Ways to do it are
suggested.
(3) A "fair" representation of stakeholders can be achieved
by their substantial involvement during the model's construct
process (value-dimensions and weights elicitations) and
during the model's presentation (by presenting several aggre-
gations with several weights sets)
.
(4) The ultimate decision-maker should "interact" with MAUT
procedure from the beginning by preliminary acceptance,
participating in the value-dimensions and weights elicitations,
guiding the model's construction and interacting with the
model in the presentation for the decision.
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As explained at the end of Chapter V, the MAUT procedure
satisfies to a great extent the criteria established in
Chapter II, and thus, offers solutions to many of the defi-
ciencies and difficulties of the present decision process.
However, MAUT is by no means a "magic prescription" for all
the existing decision process' weaknesses: First, there are
still questions of how to generate reliable data for its
various inputs. Second, its success is sensitive to the
quality of the implementation process in each individual
case. Third, although capable of incorporating subjective
judgment, it cannot generate it. It also cannot express and
represent all the delicate components of human thought. The
above mentioned issues imply an important conclusion: MAUT
is, after all, a "tool," and should never dominate the decision
It is the decision-maker who has the responsibility and the
authority to make the decision, and he is accountable for it.
The message of this thesis is that usage of MAUT proce-
dures as the major evaluation framework and the center of the
decision presentation for the highest decision levels, would
improve the efficiency of the process, increase objectivity,
contribute to top-levels decision-making capability, and
consequently bring about better decisions.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
(1) The MAUT procedure should be used as the major tool
for presenting and evaluating alternatives for acquisition
decisions at the top levels. The procedure should include
political, economic and social factors in addition to the
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directly relevant factors such as military worth or cost.
It should provide fair representation of the major stakeholders
involved in the decision.
(2) For each major system MAUT should serve as comprehen-
sive, ongoing, updated evaluation framework through the whole
acquisition life cycle. On the base of this evaluation frame-
work, major decisions as well as sub-decisions would be made.
This ongoing evaluation framework should be constructed, main-
tained and reviewed by staff members and sub-decision-makers
through the functional and hierarchical organizational struc-
ture. At the nucleus of the evaluation framework would be
an analysis team that may be located at the program office,
but would be formally subordinate to the ultimate decision-maker
For more detailed description of implementation issues,
reference may be made to the conclusions as presented in
Chapter V.
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
(1) The implications of the model's "vertical" and "hori-
zontal" decompositions should be further explored. That
includes modifications suggested by the thesis such as:
(a) Presenting only the upper level value-dimensions
to the decision-maker.
(b) Reviewing issues and making sub-decisions referring
the separate branches of the model's value-tree and only as
a later step integrating them into the overall model.
(2) The approaches and methodologies for constructing
utility functions for major systems should be further
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researched. Some of them may have general application, while
others, presumably, are unique to the system under question.
(3) The specific procedural and organizational adjustments
required for MAUT implementations should be further examined.
That should be the duty of the authorities actually responsi-
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As a part of the research work for this thesis, a question-
naire was distributed to various high-level officials in the
U.S. DOD, and in the Israeli Air Force (IAF).
B. PURPOSE
The purpose of the questionnaire was to obtain inputs asso-
ciated with the thesis theme from the people who are actually
and personally involved in the major systems acquisition
decision-making
.
There were two main reasons why two decision-making com-
munities—the American and the Israeli—were addressed:
(1) It provided the basis for comparison between two different
disciplines, dealing with the same issue, while one is not
bound by the perceptions, tradition and procedures of the other
(2) The special interest of the author in both communities as
being an Israeli officer and currently a student at the Naval
Postgraduate School.
C. THE QUESTIONNAIRE OBJECTIVES
The main objectives of the questionnaire were:
(1) To examine the current practices of top-level acquisi-
tion decision-making processes and find out to what extent
quantitative decision models are in use, and whether a further
use of such models might be helpful.
(2) To find out the respondents attitude toward a specific





and its compatibility to assist
top-level acquisition decision-making.
(3) To explore the respondents ideas about the actual
implementation of the above mentioned procedure in the
decision-making process.
(4) To examine the possibility of constructing a general
"value tree", i.e., to define value dimensions (or, attributes,
factors) and arrange them in hierarchical structure, which,
with some inevitable modifications would apply to any major
. . . . 2system acquisition decision-making process.
D. THE RESPONDENTS POPULATION
1 . General
As mentioned before, the questionnaire was distributed
to people from two decision-making communities: the U.S. DOD
and the Israeli Air Force. In both cases no purely random
selection of the sample respondents took place. They were
arbitrarily selected according to their positions and estimated
involvement in the "real life" acquisition decision-making
process. On the other hand, the sample was selected from the
DOD Phone Book and the author had no prior idea about the
Also called in its various versions Multi-Attribute Utility
Theory (MAUT) , Multi-Attribute Utility Measurement (MAUM) , Multi-
Attribute Utility Technology (MAUT) , Multi-Attribute Utility
Analysis (MAUA) , or Simple Multi-Attribute Rating Technique (SMART)
2Originally, the questionnaire was supposed to concentrate
mainly on fighter aircraft acquisition decisions. Later on,
the scope of the thesis has been broadened to apply to more




respondents attitudes, and in this sense there was some extent
of "randomality" in the selection, as reflected in the devia-
tion of the answers.
2 . The American Distribution
a. The questionnaire was distributed to 73 American
officials of which 42 have responded (57.5%) . 4 claimed they
did not feel eligible to fill in the questionnaire ("new in
the job," "unfamiliar with the subject," etc.). Thus 38 filled-
in questionnaires came back, which accounted for 52% of the
initial distribution. This can be considered as an excellent
rate of response, taking into account that the questionnaire
answers required about 2-3 working hours from very busy high-
level personnel.
b. The American respondents 1 population accounted for
28 military personnel and 10 civilians. The ranks of the
military officers were distributed as follows:
(1) LT. GEN — 2
(2) V. ADM. — 4
(3) MAJ. GEN. — 1
(4) R. ADM. — 7
(5) BRIG. GEN. — 1
(6) CAPT (Navy) — 5
(7) COL — 4
(8) LT. COL ~ 3
(9) LT. CDR — 1
10 American civilians responded to the questionnaire. The
civilians were all of relatively high levels, from GS-15,
SES IV, and above.
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c. The respondents, spread according to their DOD
components, were as follows:
(1) OSD -- 13
(2) Navy Department — 16
(3) Air Force Department — 9
d. The respondents were from a broad range of posi-
tions in the OSD and the Service Departments, starting at the
level of staff members, executive assistants and program
managers, and up to the level of Under Secretary of Defense.
The common denominator for all respondents was involvement in
the major systems acquisition decision-making process, within
the OSD and the Services.
e. The Israeli respondents population consisted of 11
officers of the IAF. Their ranks were distributed as follows:
(1) BRIG. GEN — 4
(2) COL ~ 3
(3) LT. COL — 2
(4) MAJ. — 2
Having in mind that the rank of the IAF Chief of Staff is "only"
MAJ. GEN., the level of the Israeli respondents were considered
as equivalent to the Americans. Thus, the Israeli respondents
population included two ex-deputies to the IAF Chief of Staff
(the second position in the IAF hierarchy) , the IAF Chief of
Maintenance and Logistics, IAF HQs department heads, etc.
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A- I I . Example of the Questionnaire
A. GENERAL
This appendix presents the American version of the ques-
tionnaire, with the escort letters attached to it. As one
can notice, the title of the questionnaire speaks about
"Methodology for Aircraft Acquisition Decision-Making." This
is not identical to the thesis title. The reason for this
discrepancy is that according to the material accumulated
through the research for this thesis, the author has decided
to broaden the scope of the thesis theme. Nevertheless, this
change does not affect the substantial application of the ques-
tionnaire in providing insight into the top-level acquisition
decision-making. The Israeli version of the questionnaire is
not introduced in this context since it is similar to the
American one. On the other hand, because of some natural
differences between the two responding populations, and because
both questionnaires were not distributed in the same time-frame,
there were some substance and format differences, especially
in Part V, which made the answers ' consolidation sometimes





First, I would like to introduce myself. I am Colonel Ran
Goren, a pilot in the Israeli Air Force. I have about 4000 jet
flight hours, and 250 operational sorties. I did a variety of
jobs at the field and Headquarters, among them squadron com-
mander, vice wing commander, and head of a department in the
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ISAF Headquarters. Currently, I am a student at the Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.
As a requirement for the master's degree, I have to submit
a thesis. As a theme for my thesis, I have chosen "The Method-
ology of Decision-Making in Aircraft Acquisition." The com-
pleted thesis will be available to the DoD acquisition com-
munity through the NPS and the Naval Center for Acquisition
Research.
I am definitely aware of how big and complex the issue is
and therefore, I have limited myself as follows:
1. To deal only with the top-levels of decision-making
(in American terms— (S)SARC, (S)Sec, DSARC and SecDef—or
equivalent to those)
.
2. Not to deal in detail with the whole acquisition life
cycle process. The process would be referred to only in terms
of the inputs it should provide for the milestone decision-
making.
3. To analyze mainly milestones I (demonstration/validation)
and II (full scale development)
.
I thought that getting the personal perception of people
involved in this decision-making might be a vital contribution
to my work. In order to obtain this perception, I am dis-
tributing the enclosed questionnaire.
Although the questionnaire is voluntary, I would like you
very much to respond.
If you find it too long, please answer personally the
first half (Parts I, II, III) only.
Since the distribution of the questionnaire is very small,
it will be analyzed by simple percentages, and ANOVA (Analysis
of Variance)
.
I am not going to quote any respondent by name. Names and
positions are needed just for relating the responses to the
respondents viewpoints. But, if you prefer not to fill in
your personal information--please leave it blank or put just an
indication of your level.
I will be grateful if you return your response up to the
end of July. At any rate, after August 31st, the questionnaire
will be longer be administered. Please return the completed




Monterey, CA 9 394
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Thanks a lot for your cooperation.
Sincerely yours,
Dear Sir:
As you may know, I recently moved from being the Principal
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense to Dr. W. Perry to being an
Adjunct Professor here at the Naval Postgraduate School. As
part of this way for me to finish the last few months of my
civil service, I have been writing down, for the new Under
Secretary Dick De Lauer, things which may otherwise be lost
in the transition. One of these areas of interest to both
Dr. De Lauer and myself has been how best to improve the
acquisition process.
The purpose of this note is to introduce the request made
of you to assist in an important study of one facet of our
acquisition process being done by Colonel Ran Goren, IAF, as
part of his thesis work at the Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, California.
The study will survey an important aspect of the acquisition
process, namely whether there exists an adequate review of
alternatives before selection of hardware for development or
acquisition. Colonel Goren will also present, for comment a
potential qualitative technique for aiding in this selection.
His thesis, when published, will be available to you and
to others in the acquisition community. It should provide
an especially pertinent insight into an important acquisition
question. It is for that reason I ask, as a favor, your con-
sideration of his request to put down your thoughts through





Methodology for Aircraft Acquisition Decision-Making
1 . Respondent Information:
rank first name middle last
Address
Present Job





Part IV of the Decision Coordination Paper (DCP) requires:
"Summarize system and program alternatives considered
and the reasons why the preferred alternative was selected."
Part VI of the DCP requires: "Identify and assess issues
affecting the SecDef's milestone decision," which presuma-
bly are political and socioeconomic issues.
The DCP is supplemented by a list of various goals and
thresholds, costs and resources.
The Integrated Program Summary (IPS) addresses 23_ different
topics
.
There can be defined 16_ decision criteria for milestone I
and II decisions.
The AF (as an example) requires about 3_5 decision data
topics to base on in its milestone review.
The milestone decisions might be a very complex task, even after
the analyses, data collection, refinements and eliminations
that have been done through the preceding process.
This questionnaire attempts to explore some aspects of the above




a. Ignore questions which do not apply to you.
b. While answering the question refer as much as possible to
cases of:
1) Miestones I and II decisions.
2) Selection between two or more different types of
weapon-systems (aircraft type A vs. aircraft type
B, and not a selection between alternative acquisition
strategies of the same system)
.
3) If possible, refer to aircraft or airborn weapon
systems (although other systems are ok too)
.
c. Although the questions aim at top-level decision-making,
you may use your experience in other levels, as long as






For each question select one answer. Please, circle the number
to the left of the selected answer.
1. Are the evaluation of alternatives and the explanation for
recommendations in the DCP made in a sufficiently descrip-






2. Are the evaluation of alternatives and the explanation for







3. In the milestones review sessions (DSARC, (S) SARC) --how







4. If you ever used a model for overal evaluation of acquisi-
tion alternatives (not necessarily at milestones decisions
which one did you find the most useful?
1. Scores and weights assigned to factors
2. A decision tree
3. A computerized model
4. Another (which one?)





In each question there is a statement. For each statement
select your degree of agreement.
5. There is no problem in selection of an alternative at the
milestones reviews, since the pre-DSARC process leads to






6. After hearing (or reading) the detailed evaluation of the
alternatives by individual areas (i.e., cost, performance,







7. The less the selection is clear cut, the greater is the







8. In cases where the overall preference is unclear, a quanti-






9. In fact, top level decision-makers do not select between









10. There is no use for a decision-making model to support top
level decision-makers because they base their judgement
mainly on a subjective experience, perception and intuition








Recall 2 cases of aircraft acquisition. (If you wish you may
relate to systems other than aircraft, or even to an unspeci-
fied general case. Please, note what kind of a system you
are relating to.) Evaluate the relative weights of three
main categories; —direct, socioeconomical and political factors'
in the evaluation. Express weights by percentage. Please,
make different evaluations for some different levels.
Case 1 Case 2
Level of decision Dir. SE. Polit. Dir. SE . Polit.











This part contains a simple evaluating model example. Ques-
tions in the following parts of the questionnaire refer to
this example. The example is a submodel of an overall model,
which evaluates the alternatives in one category (change in
the Air-Force capability) . Scores assigned relative to a
specified benchmark (i.e., acceptable criteria, threshold)
according to a key:





4 - very good
5 - excellent
Significance weights express the impact of the factor on the
evaluation within the category (they should sum up to 1)
.
Change in the Air-Force Capability - Example Model
UTo-i rrU +- Score Weighted Score
Alt. 1 Alt. 2 Alt. 1 Alt. 2
Effectiveness (with
respect to MENS) .30 5 3 1.5 .9
Cost-Effectiveness .25 2 ! 5 .5 1.25
Timeliness .15 3 1 .45 .15
Manpower and
Training .15 3 2 .45 .30
Maintainability
and Reliability .10 4 2 .4 .2
RSI .05 2 4 •1 .2
1
Overall evaluation 3.4* 3.00
Alternative 1 is preferred.
Comment : Scores and weights are arbitrarily assigned. I refer
to the model to illustrate the principle ideas and not to the





This part contains a list of statements with respect to using
such a model. Please, indicate your degree of agremeent to
the statements by circling a number according to the following
key:
Decidedly agree - 1
Moderately agree - 2
Perhaps agree - 3
Moderately disagree - 4
Decidedly disagree - 5
11. Such a model may be used only if supplemented by represen-
tation of the detailed data for each topic.
12. The decision-maker himself has to determine weights and scores.12 3 4 5
13. The model is supposed to be objective therefore may not be
changed. (The decision-maker is not bound, of course,
by the model outcomes)
14. The model is prepared by an analytical process through the
different levels, but the decision-maker may change weights
and scores (interact with the model) according to his
judgement:
15. Such a model is not for acquisition related decisions.12 3 4 5
16. Such a model may be useful in most cases of acquisition
selection decisions.
17. Such a model is not useful for top-level decision-making.12 3 4 5
18. Such a model is useful for all levels except SecDef, since
political aspects can't be handled by the model.
19. Evaluation by separate factors is not appropriate, since
the appropriate evaluation is derived from the complex




Decidedly agree - 1
Moderately agree - 2
Perhaps agree - 3
Moderately disagree - 4
Decidedly disagree - 5
20. The model leads people to manage their judgement in a
logical manner, which helps the decision-making.
21. Such a model leads people to refer to the really important
issues in the decision.
22. Such a model suppresses the natural intuitive judgement.12 3 4 5
23. Such a model may bias the decision-makers good judgement.12 3 4 5
24. Such a model may somehow bind the decision-makers freedom.12 3 4 5
25. Such a model enables better communication among people
involved in the decision-making.
26. Such a model may be used as a tool to criticize the
decision (e.g., by Congress), and therefore undesirable
27. Such a model is a very good way to reach a decision in a
multicriteria case.
28. There is no need for weights and total score. A score for
each factor separately is sufficient. The rest should be
left for pure judgement.
29. Such a model may shift the discussion from the significant
issues to unnecessary arguments on scores and weights.
30. Weights and scores should be assigned independently from




Decidedly agree - 1
Moderately agree - 2
Perhaps agree - 3
Moderately disagree - 4
Decidedly disagree - 5
31. The weights are the main ingredient in the model outcome,
therefore they should be determined by the decision-maker
himself
.
32. Weights and scores should be determined by a common work
of a group of experts.
33. Weights and scores should be determined by summing up
assignments made individually by people involved in the
decision.12 3 4 5





Based upon your knowledge and experience of two recent cases
of selection between acquisition alternatives - evaluate the
following list of possible factors which affect the decision-
making .
a) For each factor assign the degree of impact on your
evaluation of the alternatives.
b) For each case note:
1) the nature of the weapon system under discussion
(aircraft, missile, ship, etc.)
2) the phase in the acquisition life cycle you refer to.
Rate the degree of impact using the key:
No impact -
Weak impact - 1
Medium impact - 2
Strong impact - 3
Very strong impact - 4
Case 1 Case 2
Weapon System
Phase of Decision
Factors Impact on Evaluation




5) Maintainability and reliability
6) Manpower and training
7) Vulnerability







Weak impact - 1
iMedium impact - 2
Strong impact - 3
Very strong impact - 4
Impact on Evaluation
Factors Case 1 Case 2
11) Initial investment
(procurement and infrastructure)
12) Operating and support costs
13) Funding resources
14) State of the art
(implemented in the system)
15) R&D current status
16) Feasibility and risks
17) Critical components





Please, add more factors that you think deserve to be evaluated











In this part I'll appreciate any of free comments with respect
to the questionnaire subjects.
End of the questionnaire.






A- III. Introduction to the Analysis of the Questionnaire
A. GENERAL
The following chapters include the analysis and the sum-
maries of the numerical results of the questionnaire. It is
emphasized that the analysis in these chapters refers to the
questionnaire only, and attempts to represent objectively the
aggregate attitudes of the respondents. Any broader view of
the thesis theme based on additional sources is left for the
body of the thesis.
B. SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS
The responding sample was not purely randomly selected.
Thus, from a pure scientific viewpoint, the results and the
analysis cannot be considered as an unbiased representation
of the total population of people involved in top-level acqui-
sition decision-making. In the worst case the results may be
considered as representing the responding sample only. But
the responding sample has a great significance in its own
right. As mentioned in Appendix A, it consists of 38 DOD
personnel, 28 military and 10 civilians, of which 23 are at
high ranks (Generals, Admirals and the equivalent civilian
ranks), up to USD (R&E) . It represents, by more or less equal
portions, the OSD, the Navy Department and the Air Force
Department. The Israeli responding group consists of 11 Air
Force officers including 4 Generals of the highest positions
concerning acquisition. Consequently, though not taking for
granted any statistical result, the responding sample may well
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represent opinions, attitudes and trends within the top-level




The numerical summaries and the analysis are presented in
6 chapters (IV to IX) . In each chapter the numerical summaries
and the analysis associated with the subject under discussion
are attached together for the reader's convenience. The sub-
jects of the chapters follow the underlying questionnaire sur-
veying purposes, but not necessarily create a complete logical
continuity.
The questions are referred to in these chapters according
to the issues they inquire, and not according to their order
of appearance in the original questionnaire. This is also the
rationale of the numerical summaries presentation order.
The subjects of the chapters are as follows:
(1) Examination of the present situation in top-level
acquisition decision-making.
(2) Competability and usefulness of quantitative decision-
making techniques for top-level acquisition decision-making.
(3) Advantages and disadvantages of MAUT as a top-level
acquisition decision-making tool.
(4) Implementation of MAUT procedure in major system acqui-
sition decision-making process.




(6) Identifying acquisition decision-making attributes
(value dimensions)
.
The responding sample is referred to three categories:
(1) Low levels—Colonels, Captains (Navy), GS-15, and below.
(2) High levels—Generals, Admirals and the equivalent
civilian ranks.
(3) Total—all levels together.
The rationale behind this division rests on the assumption
that the "low" levels are mostly staff members while the "high"
levels are personally involved in the decision-making. Although
such distinction is oversimplified, it has been selected for
convenience reasons, under the assumption that no major error
will result.
D. METHODOLOGY OF THE NUMERICAL SUMMARIES
The numerical summaries are done on a single question basis,
i.e., each question has a separate summary. Interrelations
among questions are addressed in the verbal analysis.
As a result of the small sample size, no complex statistics
are developed. Rather, a simple frequency distribution is the
most common tool for this analysis. The frequency distribution
is introduced in three shapes:
(1) Absolute amount.
(2) Relative frequency (expressed as percentage)
(3) Relative frequency histogram.
Some differences between the American and the Israeli ques-
tionnaire versions do not allow a consolidation of the data.
As a matter of fact, such a consolidation is not desirable since
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a comparable analysis is preferred. Thus, the Israeli sum-
maries appear separately. Because of the small Israeli sample
size, only the total frequency distribution is exhibited,
although the data about the separate distributions of the
Israeli "high" and "low" levels does exist, and it is referred
to in the discussion of the analysis when necessary. In the
Israeli questionnaire there are only four alternative answers
for each question, compared to five in the American version.
This requires some adjustments for comparison needs. Part V
of the Israeli questionnaire is structured differently from
the corresponding part in the American version. Therefore the
summary of this part for the Israeli answers only is located
separately at the end of the associated chapters.
E. METHODOLOGY OF THE ANALYSIS
The analysis refers to the questionnaire answers and written
comments only. Neither the analysis of the questions, nor the
chapters 1 summaries are supposed to represent the final con-
clusions of this thesis. That is the reason why there are no
conclusions to the analysis. The conclusions are deliberately
left for the body of the thesis.
To facilitate the analysis, the five answer alternatives
are usually grouped into three categories:
(1) The "agree" category includes the "decidedly agree"
and "moderately agree" answers.
(2) The "disagree" category includes the "decidedly dis-
agree" and the "moderately disagree" answers.
158

(3) The "middle" category includes the "perhaps agree"
answers
.
The division is equivalent where frequency type answers
(never, seldom, etc.) or others are concerned. Obviously,
where necessary, the full fine distinction through all five
alternative answers is used.
For a common language, four types of distributions are
defined:
(1) The "uniform" distribution—the answers are more or
less uniformally distributed through the various answer








D.A. M.A. P. A. I-i.D D.D
Figure A-III-1. "Uniform" Distribution
(2) The "split" distribution—the answers are divided cate-
gorically on both sides, while very few are in the middle
In this and all future exhibits, the following abbreviations
are used to label the entries along the x-axis: D.A. = Decidedly
Agree, M.A. = Moderately Agree, P. A. = Perhaps Agree, M.D. =
Moderately Disagree, D.D. = Decidedly Disagree. See above sections
of this appendix for a fuller discussion of the categories.
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column. That means that people have clear opinions about the










D.A. M.A. P. A. M.D D.D.
Figure A-III-2. "Split" Distribution
(3) The "middle" distribution—This is the case where the
largest column is the one at the middle, i.e., the group of
people who do not have definite opinions about the subject is
dominant. Usually the two next in size are the columns on both
sides of the middle— the "moderately agree" and "moderately











D.A. M.A. P. A. M.D CD
Figure A-III-3. "Middle" Distribution
(4) The "one-sided" distribution—The answers tend to be
concentrated on one side of the histogram, i.e., the majority










D.A M.A. P. A. M . D D.D.
Figure A-III-4. "One-sided" Distribution
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Some of the questions appeared in different shapes in the
Israeli questionnaire. Instead of having five degrees of
agreement for each question, the Israeli respondents were
presented a list of statements from which they had to select
only those which they think are true. The statements them-
selves are almost identical to those appearing in the American
version. Thus, the numer of respondents that picked up a
statement is the number of those who agree with the statement.
Those who did not pick up a specific statement probably dis-
agree or don't have a determined mind about it. A concentra-
tion of that type of question appears at the end of each
chapter, consisting of the questions corresponding to the
chapter's theme.
Generally, each question is treated separately. But
where necessary, interrelations among questions, mostly within
the chapters, are addressed—verbally and statistically.
The American questionnaire serves as the analysis base,
while the Israeli one—since quantitatively small— is used
as a reference and comparison mean.
Another notation which appears in this analysis relates
to the quotes from the written comments to the questionnaire.
On one hand, there is a commitment not to identify commentator
by name. On the other hand, it is important to recognize
that a set of, say, very critical comments, came from the same
person, and they do not necessarily represent a wide range of
respondents. Therefore, commentators are assigned an arbitrary
notation which appears in brackets following the quote or
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reference citation. The notation distinguishes between high-
level personnel and low-level personnel (see definition on
p. 157) as follows: H-l, H-2, etc., for high-levels, and
L-l, L-2, etc., for low levels.
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A-IV. Examination of the Present Situation
A. PURPOSE
The purpose of this section and the corresponding ques-
tions is to reveal what are the real difficulties the decision-
makers face when they reach a decision point.
B. DISCUSSION ABOUT THE BASIC APPROACH OF THE ANALYSIS
The questionnaire addresses mostly the formal decision
sessions and documentation. The assumption underlying the
above approach is that the formal decision sessions (e.g.,
Milestones DSARCs) or documentation (e.g., DCP) do reflect
or should reflect the alternative system evaluating techniques
used throughout the decision process. Obviously, they do re-
flect the decision and evaluation tools offered to the decision-
makers themselves for their decision-making.
The questions deliberately refrained from touching the
underlying essential acquisition decision-making difficulties,
mainly stemming from uncertainties, such as how to make a
realistic cost estimate, how to predict the performance of a
system that has not been born yet, or how to define the real
mission needs, based on a projected threat assessment. These
warrant a treatment beyond the scope of this thesis. However,
the assumption is that better evaluation and decision-making
techniques have significant impact on the essence of the deci-
sion. Several commentators write that dealing mostly with the
so-called "DSARC Process", or "A-109 process" is inappropriate
since it is subject to continuing revisions, including expected
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near-term substantial change [H-1,L-1] . Others mention that
the "acquisition process documentation is of limited value,
if any..." [H-l]
. They emphasize the informal decision process
that takes place parallel to the formal one, and the "less
conspicuous decision-makers, who are often more influential
than the formal and obvious ones" [H-2]
.
While admitting that the issue is obviously more complex
than the questionnaire will permit, several points can be made
to stress the value of the data that this part of the ques-
tionnaire does provide. These points are:
(1) Decision-making tools are not attached to a specific
formal decision process. Change of the present process, say,
to a greater extent of decision authority granted to the Services,
less DSARC Milestone sessions, or more pages allowed in the
DCP , does not necessarily change the extent to which decision-
making tools are used. The present decision difficulties and
decision-making tool usage are symptoms of basic approaches
and not attached to a specific decision process.
(2) Correcting the weaknesses of the formal process may re-
duce the informal powers affecting the process.
(3) The formal sessions and documentation have, after all,
a significant value. For very busy top-level officials who
do not deal with the acquisition issues on a day-to-day basis,
the formal sessions and the documentation they receive repre-
sent a significant part of the input for their decisions.
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C. DIFFICULTIES IN THE DECISION MAKING
According to Ql (see Exhibit 1) , 46% of the American re-
spondents think that the evaluation of alternatives and the
explanation for recommendations in the DCP are made in a
sufficiently descriptive manner to be useful. The preference
here is clear as compared to only 14% who think that it is so,
seldom or never. However, no less impressive is the percentage
of those who think that only sometimes are the descriptions
in the DCP good enough to serve as a decision basis. Thus, a
considerable percentage are not generally satisfied with what
is presented in the DCP. Q6 (see Exhibit 2) reveals very
clearly, with 69% at the "disagree" region ("moderately dis-
agree" plus "decidedly disagree") , that after the alternatives
demonstration (presumably with the current techniques) , there
is no difficulty in determining which alternative was preferred.
This question might have been misinterpreted because of inex-
plicit wording. The question was aimed at the decision-maker's
difficulties in determining his own preferences based on the
alternatives presented, and not on his ability to recognize which
alternative was preferred by the program sponsor. This possi-
ble confusion is, perhaps, disclosed by the corresponding Q5
(see Exhibit 3) which deals with the same issue of preference
or selection of alternatives. Here, 47% of the respondents
think that a problem does exist in the selection of alterna-
tives while 29% think that there is no problem, and 24% are
inbetween. This is supported by the Israelis, who express their




Question No. 1 (Ql) —Numerical Summary
The Question's Phrasing:
Are the evaluation of alternatives and the explanation
for recommendations in the DCP made in a sufficiently
descriptive manner to be useful?
Table A-IV-1
American Responses Distribution
Distribution (Amount) Distribution (Percent)



































Never Seldom Some- Usually Always
times














Question No. 6 (Q6) —Numerical Summary
The Question's Phrasing:
After hearing (or reading) the detailed evaluation of the
alternatives by individual areas (i.e., cost, performance,




Distribution (Amount) Distribution (Percent)













































D.A. M.A. P.A. M.D. D.D.
Figure A-IV-2. American Responses Distribution Histogram
Table A-IV-4
Israeli Responses Distribution











Question No. 5 (Q5) —Numerical Summary
The Question's Phrasing:
There is no problem in selection of an alternative at the
milestones reviews, since the pre-DSARC process leads to
refined, clear and explicit recommendations.
Table A-IV-5
American Responses Distribution
Distribution (Anount) Distribution (Percent)
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Figure A-IV-3. American Responses Distribution Histogram
Table IV-6
Israeli Responses Distribution












' written comments disclose a new factor
which on the surface makes the selection easier, but not as a
result of objective alternatives presented or usage of effi-
cient decision-making tools. The following quotes express
these observations:
...The real alternatives generally do not appear
—
only strawmen... [H-3]
. . .By this time the deck is so stacked that the viable
alternatives either do not appear or have had a
hatchet job done on them. [H-3]
...The selection is never less than clear-cut...
the Service assures this... [H-3]
. . .The arguments and evidence are usually structured
to support the Service selection and to present the
decision in the most "clearcut" form permitted by the
facts... [H-4]
. . .By the time such reviews are held at the highest
levels, for all practical purposes the selection has
been made , and any other choice or selection is very
difficult to affect... [H-4]
Thus, even if these comments should be taken with some
reservations, they can't be ignored. The question to be asked
is how to make decision sessions more effective and system
presentation more objective. This question is addressed in the
body of the thesis, at least as far as decision-making tech-
niques are concerned.
Another group of difficulties in decision-making is re-
vealed by Q7 (see Exhibit 4) . The answers distribution is of
the "split" type, where people either agree or disagree,
while very few are in the middle. 54% disagree with the state-
ment that "the less the selection is clear-cut, the greater




Question No. 7 (Q7) —Numerical Summary
The Question's Phrasing:
The less the selection is clear cut, the greater is the
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and recommendations." 22%— a relatively high amount for an
extreme answer—even decidedly disagree. But yet, a signifi-
cant portion, 35% think on the contrary.
It is interesting in this case to observe the differences
between high and low levels: while high levels apparently re-
ject the statement with 70% disagreeing and only 26% agree (the
remaining 4% are inbetween) , low levels agree by 51% and only
2 8% disagree. Whose observation is more accurate is hard to
tell. The Israeli rejection of the statement is more definite,
with 80% in the "disagree" category, with a similar distribu-
tion for both high and low levels. Perhaps that points out
a higher confidence in their ability to make a decision in a
difficult selection. This feeling gets support from Q9 (see
Exhibit 5) . Here 54% of the American respondents agree that
"in fact, top-level decision-makers do not select between
alternatives, rather, approve or disapprove the recommended
one." 35% objected to the Q9 statement. Furthermore, among
the high levels, the degree of agreement is even higher than
the total, with 65% that agree! On the Israeli side the dis-
agreement is obvious with 73% disagreeing. Moreover, all four
Israeli Generals decidedly disagree to the statement! The
reasons for the American observation might be one of the follow-
ing two, or both:
(1) The top level decision-makers do not have sufficient
tools, data or expertise to allow selection between alternatives
(2) As quoted from one of the respondents: "Alternatives




Question No. 9 (Q9) —Numerical Summary
The Question's Phrasing:
In fact, top level decision-makers do not select between
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Figure A-IV-5. American Responses Distribution Histogram
Table A-IV-10
Israeli Responses Distribution















perspective on the preferred one. There is virtually no
probability any other will be selected" [L-2]
.
D. EXTENT OF QUANTITATIVE MODELS USAGE IN THE PRESENT
DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
The purpose of Q2 (see Exhibit 6) was to reveal the extent
quantitative models are used to support the recommendation in
the DCP. The major observation on the responses' distribution
is the high amount of the answer "sometimes", which accounted
for 38%. The "seldom" and "usually" answers share about an
equal percentage— 30% and 27%, respectively. One can wonder
why there is any distribution at all, since the question deals
with tangible facts. The answer, of course, is that none of
the respondents have complete knowledge about all the DCP '
s
issued. Thus people just estimate. In this respect, it is
interesting to notice that perhaps the only respondent who is
connected with the DCP's on a day-to-day basis, and reviews all
DCP issues, is the only one who answers "never", with the simple
verbal explanation that a "10 page DCP is too short for this"
[L-3] . Similarly to the American answers, the Israeli response
to this question reveals a clear majority of 63% who estimate
the frequency of quantitative model use in presentations to
the Minister of Defense as occurring only "sometimes".
A similar picture is observed in the answers to Q3 (see
Exhibit 7) which asks about the frequency quantitative models
are used to support alternatives evaluation in the Milestones
review sessions (DSARC, (S)SARC). Again, there is a "middle"




Question No. 2 (Q2) —Numerical Summary
The Question's Phrasing:
Are the evaluation of alternatives and the explanation
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Figure A-IV-6. American Responses Distribution Histogram
Table A-IV-12
Israeli Responses Distribution








Question No. 3 (Q3) —Numerical Summary
The Question Phrasing:
In the milestones review sessions (DSARC, (S)SARC) —how
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Figure A-IV-7. American Responses Distribution Histogram
Table A- IV- 14
Israeli Responses Distribution







answer. But here the tendency toward low frequency is even
stronger than in Q2, since 3 3% of the answers are "seldom".
At least two commentators devaluate the models actual utility
not only because of the low frequency that they are used, but
also because: "the model is always severely limited, for exam-
ple, it might use acquisition cost as the only basis for com-
parison" [H-3] , or, "the scope of the models that usually
"support" the recommendations is limited" [H-4] . This is
strengthened by an executive who is supposed to attend all DSARC
sessions, who mentions that the only models he has seen used in
these sessions were those of the Air Force briefings, "however
the Air Force has only indicated relative comparisons (using
red, green, yellow).... This technique has met with mixed suc-
cess since sometimes it tends to hide significant issues" [L-3]
.
Another commentator views the low contribution of the quantita-
tive models not only because of their limited scope, but because
the forum is not open enough to exploit what they do offer.
That because "the review sessions are never so emotionless as
to deal with a dispassionate review of alternatives" [H-3].
A corresponding question to the Israeli AF officers, deal-
ing with sessions equivalent to the (S)SARC, reveals a much
greater extent of quantitative techniques usage. The responses
are here "usually" (82%) or "always" (9%) . Maybe this is the
reason for the confidence in their ability to select between
alternatives, not only to approve or disapprove the recommended





From the responses relating to the subject of this chapter,
several observations can be drawn:
(1) In many of the cases difficulty exists in selecting
an alternative, despite the refining process prior to top-
level decision-making.
(2) At least in some of the cases the selection seems to
be straightforward because of biased presentations made by
the Services (or other program sponsors)
.
(3) American top-level decision-makers tend to approve or
disapprove the recommended alternative rather than to decide
and select between alternatives.
(4) The usage of quantitative models or techniques to as-
sist top-level acquisition decision-making is done to a minor
extent, and the models used are of limited scope.
(5) The Israeli decision-makers tend to use, to a greater
extent, quantitative techniques, and that is expressed also
in the self-perception of their decision-making capabilities.
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A-V. Compatibility and Usefulness of Quantitative
Decision-Making Techniques
A. PURPOSE
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the respondents
perceptions about the compatibility and usefulness of quanti-
tative techniques in assisting top-level acquisition decision-
making. A special attention is paid to a MAUT (Multi-Attribute
Utility Technique, or Theory)
.
B. COMPATIBILITY OF QUANTITATIVE TECHNIQUES—A GENERAL
PERCEPTION
Q8 (see Exhibit 8) states that "in cases where the overall
preference is unclear, a quantitative model might be helpful."
One can interpret this question as relating to the model usage
as a major tool for overall evaluation of weapon systems at
any level, including the top-level, or as a mere presentation
tool before top-level decision-makers. In fact, there is a
great deal of similarity between the two. It is true, and it
actually happens, that models are used in lower levels but are
not fully presented to the top-levels, as mentioned by one
commentator:
The AFSARC does not use models for decision-making
directly. We are, however, briefed on the use of
decision aids and quantitative methods used by the
staff in developing recommendations. [H-5]
On the other hand, it is hard to imagine a model used only
as a top-level decision aid that has not been developed and
used by levels below them. Thus, Q8 refers to a quantitative
model as a decision-making aid at any level , including the top




Question No. 8 (Q8) —Numerical Summary
The Question's Phrasing:
In cases where the overall preference is unclear, a
quantitative model might be helpful.
Table A-V-l
American Responses Distribution
Distribution (Amount) Distribution (Percent)
Low High Total Low High Total
Decidedly Agree 2 - 2 14.3 — 5.4
Moderately Agree 3 9 12 21.4 39.1 32.4
Perhaps Agree 7 11 18 50.0 47.8 48.6
Moderately Disagree 2 2 4 14.3 8.7 10.8
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Figure A-V-l. American Responses Distribution Histogram
Table A-V-2
Israeli Responses Distribution












Almost 50% are doubtful, or in other words, "perhaps agree"
to the aid a quantitative technique might provide. But the
tendency is, after all, in favor of the model's usefulness,
since among those who are more determined, 38% agree with the
statement and only 14% disagree. The Israeli respondents tend,
in greater degree, toward usage of quantitative techniques as
reflected by 60% that agree to the statement and 40% tend to
disagree ("moderately disagree").
A corresponding question, Q10 (see Exhibit 9) , concentrates
more specifically on top-level decision-makers. The underlying
rationale to the question is that one might think that quanti-
tative decision-making techniques can be compatible mostly to
low-level evaluations and decisions, since the latter are,
perhaps, more technically oriented and based on measurable data
According to this line of thought, in top-level decision-making
more unmeasurable value dimensions are involved, with decisions
based mainly on subjective judgment or intuition, and therefore
do not lend themselves to quantitative decision-making tools.
This idea appears in some of the written comments to the
questionnaire. Several quotes are provided for illustration:
At the program [office] level we tend to do little
modeling outside the engineering domain, where we get
good correlation factors. Objective modeling tends
discipline but is not our normal tool in decision-
making. [L-4]
I am not favorably impressed with complex numerical
modeling as a basis for important weapon systems deci-
sions. A clear logic in our natural language is the
most important and pre-eminent need. Next, a recogni-
tion that most decisions are fundamentally subjective
since they are imbedded in a subjective set of reference




Question No. 10 (Q10) —Numerical Summary
The Question's Phrasing:
There is no use for a decision-making model to support
top level decision-makers because they base their
judgement mainly on a subjective experience, perception
and intuition which cannot be rationally "managed".
Table A-V-3
American Responses Distribution
Distribution (Amount) Distribution (Percent)
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Figure A-V-2. American Responses Distribution Histogram
Table A-V-4
Israeli Responses Distribution














The answers to Q10 are really split: 4 3% agree with the state-
ment and 51% disagree. It is interesting to note that the
person at the highest position responding to the question-
naire is on the "disagree" side, i.e., thinks that such models
do suit top-level decision-makers.
In the Israeli community the picture is completely dif-
ferent, and consistent with trends observed before. 91%,
including all four generals, disagree with the statement,
i.e., think that quantitative models are compatible with top
level decision-making.
In fact, Q10 is the key question of the whole questionnaire
and the thesis itself. No wonder that many of the respondents
added written comments with respect to this issue. Apparently,
the comments reflect various insights, which emphasize the
fact that the issue is much more complex than covered by the
questions. Here are some citations from the verbal comments:
One respondent finds the models uncapable of handling
judgment and intuition. Moreover, it can't handle some further
factors that rule the decision-making process:
The model would be totally perverted. It is not an issue
of models— it's a matter of power and emotion ! [H-3]
Other respondents who would like to see a cross-section
model are backed down by the model's limitations to handle
unlike alternatives (e.g., TOW missile vs. A-10 a/c to kill
tanks or fighter a/c vs. SAM for air-defense [H-4,L-1]).
Another respondent emphasizes:
The personnel experience and preference of senior
officials in key positions plays heavily in the
decision process .. .The skill of the program sponsor
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to communicate the value of his program has great impact
on the decision. [H-7]
Many warn that the model might be structured to support
a "prior" selected alternative [for example H-8, L-5] , or as
put in more biting words:
Use of such models is phony as a 3 dollar bill. It's
a travesty on honest quantification. Anyone who would
use such a model deserves what he gets! [H-3]
Many view models as a useful tool for decision-making
[H-9 ,L-3 ,L-l,H-l,H-4 and more], but with an emphasis on the
word "tool", i.e., the model is not the exclusive determinant
in the decision process, and its outcomes do not dictate the
decision. When used, its weakness should be recognized, and
taken into account.
C. PREFERRED QUANTITATIVE TECHNIQUE TO ASSIST ACQUISITION
DECISION MAKING
Q4 (see Exhibit 10) was posed to explore what quantitative
approach or technique was preferred by the respondents. The
question is phrased in a general sense and does not address
specific decision events, procedures or level of decision.
The response is somewhat surprising, with an apparent "one
sided" distribution of 50% favoring the MAUT approach (defined
as "scores and weights assigned to factors"), while none of
the other approaches exceeds 15% (!). Very similar situation
is revealed in the Israeli community, were 55% favor the MAUT.
Another finding is that 23% of the high-level American
respondents have never used any quantitative model in their
decision-making. 4 respondents, 3 of the low-level and 1 of




Question No. 4 (Q4) —Numerical Summary
The Question's Phrasing:
If you ever used a model for overall evaluation of
acquisition alternatives (not necessarily at mile-
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Figure A-V-3. American Responses Distribution Histogram
Table A-V-6
Israeli Responses Distribution










Since the question offered an option to write down any sort
of a model, one can think that the ignoring respondents, in
fact, belong to the "never used" category. If so
—
percentages
are obviously higher (26%)
.
D. THE COMPATIBILITY OF MAUT TO TOP-LEVEL ACQUISITION
DECISION-MAKING
Q17 (see Exhibit 11)
,
phrased in a negative way, states
that "such a model [MAUT model, R.G.] is not useful for top-
level decision-making." The answers are clearly "one-sided"
distributed. 64% are on the "disagree" side while only 14%
are on the opposite side. 22% are in the middle. This obvious
favorable attitude towards the MAUT usage for top-level decision-
making raises some wonders as compared to QlO's "split" dis-
tribution, in which 44% expressed their reservation towards
such usage. To examine this phenomenon a test for consistency
took place. The results are clear: of those who were in
favor of model usage by top-levels per Q10, 70% remained con-
sistent in their answer to Q17, 18% changed to a middle choice,
and only 12% completely changed their minds. Of those who
thought models are not compatible for top-levels in Q10, only
19% remained consistent in Q17, while 56% (!) completely changed
their minds and 25% moved to the middle choice. What caused
this inconsistency is hard to tell. Perhaps the corresponding
question's wording caused different perceptions than those
intended by the writer of the questions. But the well defined
group that shifted, while all other respondents are stable, re-




Question No. 17 (Q17) —Numerical Summary
The Question's Phrasing:




Distribution (Amount) Distribution (Percent)
Low High Total low High Total
Decidedly Agree — 3 3 13.0 8.3
Moderately Agree - 2 2 - 8.7 5.6
Perhaps Agree 4 4 8 30.8 17.4 22.2
Moderately Disagree 5 8 13 38.5 34.8 36.1
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Figure A-V-4 . American Responses Distribution Histogram
Comment: For the Israeli response see No. 1 in Table A-V-12
at the end of this chapter.
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that quantitative models might be useful for top level in the
first place, remained firm in their minds. Those who opposed
that assumption— to a great extent changed their minds. It
may be that the actual example presented in the questionnaire
in Part IV (after Q10) caused the shift of attitudes, as hinted
by one of the comments: "I think you are onto something in
Part IV" [H-l]
. On the Israeli side the consistency is much
higher. As mentioned before, only one Israeli respondent agreed
with the statement of Q10 while an overwhelming majority of
91% disagreed. The same person was the only one to agree with
the statement of Q17.
Q18 (see Exhibit 12) corresponds to Q17, except that it
narrows the scope to SecDef only. Though one could expect that
people would be very doubtful about the usefulness of the model,
at least at the SecDef level, this is not the case. The general
distribution is pretty similar to that of Q17 with 68% disagree
(i.e., do think that the model is useful also at the SecDef
level, although he deals by and large with the political as-
pects of the decision), 23% "perhaps agree", and only 9% agree.
The extent of disagreement with the statement is even greater
than in Q17 since here 37% are at the extreme answer of "decid-
edly disagree" vs. 28% in Q17 and no one selected the opposite
extreme vs. 8% in Q17. Q27 (see Exhibit 13) examines the value
of the MAUT approach for any case of multicriteria decision.
The responses are distributed according to the "middle" distri-
bution type. The greatest portion of 39% prefer the "perhaps




Question No. 18 (Q18) —Numerical Summary
The Question's Phrasing:
Such a model is useful for all levels except SecDef,






Distribution (Amount) Distribution (Percent)
Low High Total Low High Total
Decidedly Agree - - - — -
Moderately Agree - 3 3 - 13.6 8.6
Perhaps Agree 5 3 8 38.5 13.6 22.9
Moderately Disagree 3 8 11 23.0 36.4 31.4
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Figure A-V-5. American Responses Distribution Histogram
Comment: For the Israeli response see No. 2 in Table A-V-12




Question No. 27 (Q27) —Numerical Summary
The Question's Phrasing:
Such a model is a very good way to reach a decision
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Figure A-V-6. American Responses Distribution Histogram
Comment: For the Israeli response see No. 3 in Table A-V-12
at the end of this chapter.
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of those who agree with the statement that "such a model is a
very good way to reach a decision in a multicriteria case", is
much greater than that of those who disagree— 44% vs. 17%
respectively. Perhaps the large amount of reservation was
caused by the phrase "very good" in the statement, since people
usually tend not to commit themselves to superlative phrases.
Several respondents commented that they would have selected a
higher degree of agreement answer if the word "very" would have
been eliminated [for example H-7,H-10].
Q15 and Q16 (see Exhibits 14 and 15 respectively) in fact
state the same idea in opposite approaches, negative and posi-
tive. The responses are very consistent and for both questions
the distribution is of the "one sided" type. In both questions
the respondents express their belief that MAUT is useful for
acquisition related decisions. The rejection of the negative
statement of Q15 saying that "such a model is not for acquisi-
tion related decisions", is very clear— 75% disagree and only
9% agree. 16% perhaps agree. The answers to the positive
statement are a little less clear cut distribution: 50% agree
and 25% disagree. 25% are in the middle. Again it may be
that the usage of the superlative phrasing "useful in most
cases" evoked the respondents reluctance to select clearly
favorable answers. In any case, the favorable attitude toward
MAUT in assisting acquisition decision-making is clearly spelled




Question No. 15 (Q15) —Numerical Summary
The Question's Phrasing:
Such a model is not for acquisition related decisions
Table A-V-10
American Responses Distribution
Distribution {Amount) Distribution (Percent)
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Figure A-V-7. American Responses Distribution Histogram
Comment: for the Israeli responses see No. 4 in Table A-V-12




Question No. 16 (Q16) —Numerical Summary
The Question's Phrasing:
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Figure A-V-8. American Responses Distribution Histogram
Comment: for the Israeli response see No. 5 in Table A-V-12




From the exploration of the respondents attitudes toward
quantitative technique use in assisting top-level decision-
making in general, and acquisition related decisions, in
particular, several dominant trends are identified. Naturally,
these trends do not represent consensus, but in most cases in
this chapter they are clearly deduced from the answers. These
are:
(1) Quantitative techniques might help in cases of diffi-
cult selection between alternatives.
(2) The opinions are split with respect to the general use
of quantitative techniques by high level decision-makers.
(3) The MAUT (Multi-Attribute Utility Theory) is highly
preferred by the responding sample over any other quantitative
technique, for acquisition decisions.
(4) Dealing with the specific technique of Multi-Attribute
Utility, much of the reservation expressed towards general use
of quantitative models disappears and the respondents are
clearly favorable in their attitude:
(a) They think it does fit top-level decision-making,
including at the SecDef level.
(b) They think it is useful for acquisition related
decisions
.
Thus, the respondents support the questionnaire's prior assump-
tion that MAUT is the preferred approach among quantitative
techniques that might assist top-level acquisition decision-
making. [It is not to say that other approaches, some of them
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computerized (as a complex MAUT can be as well) , should not
be used at the various phases and levels of evaluation of
decision alternatives.] Thus, the prior emphasis put on
exploration of the MAUT features and implementation techniques
in the questionnaire may be considered posteriorily as an




Statements Selection By the Israeli Respondents (Selection









Such a model is not useful
for top level decision-making
Such a model is useful for
all levels except Min. of
Defense since political aspects
are not eligible for quanti-
fication 18
Q27 In spite of its weaknesses
such a model is the best
way to reach a decision in
a multicriteria case 36
Q15
Q16
Such a model is not for
acquisition related
decisions
Such a model may be useful






Advantages and Disadvantages of MAUT
A. PURPOSE
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the advantages
and disadvantages of the MAUT, as they are conceived by the
questionnaire respondents.
While the essential features of the MAUT capability in
handling complex multicriteria decisions has been explored in
the previous chapter, this chapter deals mostly with side-
effects of this technique.
B. CHARACTERISTICS, ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES
Q19 (see Exhibit 16) addresses the MAUT ' s substantial ap-
proach to base the total evaluation on aggregated independent
evaluations done through separate value-dimensions. An assump-
tion is that people might consider such an approach as improper,
preferring more sophisticated examination of interrelations
between factors. The answers distribution to the question is
pretty much "one-sided": 53% disagree with the statement
and only 21% agree. 26% perhaps agree. Thus, the respondents
do think that evaluation by separate factors is proper, although
by that answer they do not express any rejection of further
inter- factor evaluations, using other methods.
Q25 (see Exhibit 17) puts light on one of the prominent
features assumed for MAUT, of creating a common denominator
and common language of communication between the people in-
volved in the decision. In cases where "the personal experi-




Question No. 19 (Q19) —Numerical Summary
The Question's Phrasing:
Evaluation by separate factors- is not appropriate,
since the appropriate evaluation is derived from the
complex interrelations among factors.
Table A-VI-1
American Responses Distribution
Distribution (Amount) Distribution (Percent)
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Figure A-VI-1. American Responses Distribution Histogram
Comment: for the Israeli response see No. 1 in Table A-VI-10




Question No. 25 (Q25) —Numerical Summary
The Question's Phrasing:
Such a model enables better communication among
people involved in the decision-making.
Table A-VI-2
American Responses Distribution
Distribution (Amount) Distribution (Percent)
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Figure A-VI-2. American Responses Distribution Histogram
Comment: for the Israeli response see No. 2 in Table A-VI-10
at the end of this chapter.
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decision process, and the skill of the program sponsors to
communicate the value of the program has a great impact" [H-7]
,
MAUT can compensate the differences in experience and reduce
the impact of personal communication skills, by "offering an
easily comprehended standard of comparison" [H-ll] . What is
deduced from the above citations is clearly spelled out in the
answer distribution, where 64% think the MAUT model enables
better communication, and only 8% object.
Still "one-sided", although less definit, is the attitude
toward the assumption stated in Q21 (see Exhibit 18) saying
that "such a model leads people to refer to the really impor-
tant issues in the decision." 50% agree with the statement,
19% disagree and a relatively high percentage are inbetween,
accounting for 31%.
The respondents' written comments in this respect reveal
the controversy about this issue. On the one hand there are
comments such as
:
Those who have used such a model often find that it
helps them come to grips with the critical factors in
selection. [L-6]
Or,
Basically, a model is useful to force the decision-
maker to consider and weigh all the factors" [H-ll],
and
...including all relevant decision factors is the
tough part. [H-l]
Or,
Models similar to the one you described are helpful





Question No. 21 (Q21) —Numerical Summary
The Question Phrasing:
Such a model leads people to refer to the really
important issues in the decision.
Table A-VI-3
American Responses Distribution
Distribution (Amount) Distribution (Percent)
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Figure A-VI-3. American Responses Distribution Histogram
Comment: for the Israeli response see No. 3 in Table A-VI-10
at the end of this chapter.
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But on the other hand, there are those who think differently
as reflected from the following comments:
Models tend to amplify irrelevant data with respect
to relevant data. [H-6]
Or,
Model can serve to focus debate, but it could mask
items not addressed.
There are commentators who recognize MAUT * s capability to
throw light on the important issues, but warn against a
tendency to rely totally on the models results in making
the decision. Here are some examples:
Such a model would give useful insight into the choice
being made, but would never be the circumference of
insight. [H-13]
Or,
Model is simply a tool to summarize results of
evaluation. [H-14]
The conclusion drawn from this variety of responses might be
that MAUT has the potential to focus attention on the impor-
tant issue and to provide insight into alternatives if
properly used. Being aware of potential pitfalls like includ-
ing irrelevant data or excluding significant items, one can
exploit the technique's advantages. All this is true unless
the model is biased or deliberately structured to support
priorly selected alternatives. As put by one of the respondents
Model would be very useful unless the decision is
proformula. [H-2]
The question to what extent MAUT can reduce the effect of a




Another tentative feature of MAUT is in helping people
to manage their thinking and judgment in a logically organized
manner, which naturally helps the decision-making. This feature
is addressed by Q20 (see Exhibit 19) . Again, the favorable
attitude is clearly spelled out from the answers distribution:
67% agree, only 8% disagree, 25% perhaps agree. Here the
notion of judgment is emphasized. The question is to what
extent a technique which is designed to handle judgment ("what
appears to be 'quantitative 1 is in reality subjective as both
the weights and the rating are based on judgment" [L-7]),
appeals to the decision-makers who based their decisions by
and large on judgment ("In my experience—most, if not all
acquisition decisions are a matter of judgment" [H-l] ) . It
seems that the respondents had no doubts about the answer to
that question.
Q29 (see Exhibit 20) addresses a controversial issue as
observed from the answers' distribution. The question indi-
cates the possibility that the discussion would concentrate
on figures of weights and scores (also called "utility measures",
or "location measures"), which one may consider as diversion
from the essential issues under the decision. The respondents
split on this issue very sharply: 46% agree, 40% disagree
and only 14% are in the middle.
The written comments express the respondents' reservation:
While the use of a model may help to more fully evalu-
ate the differences between alternatives, I feel that
your observation that a model may shift emphasis from
significant issues to a mere discussion of weights and




Question No. 20 (Q20) —Numerical Summary
The Question's Phrasing:
The model leads people to manage their judgment in a
logical manner, which helps the decision-making.
Table A-VI-4
American Responses Distribution
Distribution (Amount) Distribution (Percent)










































D.A. M.A. P.A. M.D. D.D,
Figure A-VI-4. American Responses Distribution Histogram
Comment: For the Israeli response see No. 4 in Table A-VI-10




Question No. 29 (Q29) —Numerical Summary
The Question's Phrasing:
Such a model may shift the discussion from the




Distribution (Amount) Distribution (Percent)















































M.A. P.A. M.D. D.D.
American Responses Distribution Histogram
Comment: for the Israeli responses see No. 5 in Table A-VI-10
at the end of this chapter.
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It seems that the controversy is mostly on the word "unnecessary",
since arguments on scores and weights and the rationale behind
them can be arguments on the very essence of the decision.
So the question is about the possibility that they would be-
come "unnecessary". Just awareness can probably reduce such
occurrence.
Q22, A23 and Q24 (see Exhibits 21, 22, 23, respectively)
focus on the notion that structuring the evaluation into a
model (or a procedure) framework, and presenting it as such
to the decision-maker, may suppress his natural intuition,
bias his judgment, and bind his decision-making freedom. The
respondents explicitly reject these three potential deficien-
cies. The question statements are all positively stated, thus
disagreement means rejection. The respective distributions
for the three questions are: 72% disagree, 20% agree, 8% per-
haps agree; 80% disagree, 12% agree, 8% perhaps agree; 63%
disagree, 23% agree, 14% perhaps agree. One can notice that
the third distribution is a little less "one-sided" relative
to the other two. This is caused, perhaps, by the implications
of the use of decision tools and not because of the specific
nature of the MAUT procedure. As mentioned by one of the
respondents
:
If a decision-maker embraces a model—but then dis-
agrees with the model outcome, he may be baring his
belly to his foes. [L-5J
This feature is addressed in Q26 (see Exhibit 24) where the




Question No. 22 (Q22) —Numerical Summary
The Question's Phrasing:




Distribution (Amount) Distribution (Percent)











































D.A. M.A. P.A. M.D. D.D.
Figure A-VI-6. American Responses Distribution Histogram
Comment: for the Israeli response see No. 6 in Table A-VI-10




Question No. 23 (Q23) --Numerical Summary
The Question's Phrasing:





Distribution (Amount) Distribution (Percent)











































D.A. M.A. P.A. M.D. D.D.
Figure A-VI-7. American Responses Distribution Histogram
Comment: for the Israeli response see No. 6 in Table A-VI-10




Question No. 24 (Q24) —Numerical Summary
The Question's Phrasing:







Distribution (Amount) Distribution (Percent)









































D.A. M.A. P.A. M.D. D.D.
Figure A-VI-8. American Responses Distribution Histogram
Comment: for the Israeli response see No. 7 in Table A-VI-10




Question No. 26 (Q26) —Numerical Summary
The Question's Phrasing:
Such a model may be used as a tool to criticize the
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D.A. M.A. P.A. M.D. D.D.
Figure A-VI-9. American Responses Distribution Histogram
Comment: for the Israeli response see No




outcomes, by bodies external to the decision-making community.
In fact, it can be used by "in-house" rivals, as well.
The answers to Q26 are split. Although the majority of
5 6% do not think that such a "danger" makes the model unde-
sirable, a significant portion of 32% do think so. One of the
respondents suggests,
...that model results--if publically available—could
compromise the choice when the debate starts... the
quantitative results should be privately held. [H-ll]
But there is also the one who thinks that the "external"
control on decisions acts as an incentive for models use:
. . .With the Congressional oversight of the decision-
making process, backup of decision [by a quantitative
model, R.G.] is virtually mandatory. [L-9]
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY
The analysis of this chapter's responses reveals several
favorable side-effects of the MAUT procedure:
(1) It allows better communication and understanding among
the people involved in the decision-making.
(2) It has the potential to focus discussion on the impor-
tant issues.
(3) It assists decision-makers in putting order into their
line of thinking.
Some important cautions are raised by the commentators:
(1) Not to include irrelevant data.
(2) Not to overlook significant attributes.
(3) Not to consider the model as the whole circumference
of the decision, rather as a mere tool.
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The respondents expressed their confidence that a quantitative
technique used as a decision tool does not suppress the
decision-maker's intuition, bias his judgment, or bind his
freedom. That is because either the model does not incline
to do so, or because decision-makers are immune to such
tendencies, or both.
Finally, the respondents are aware of the case in which
the model results may be used as a tool to criticize the
decision, but the majority do not think that this should





Statements Selection By the Israeli Respondents (Selection


















Evaluation based on separate
independent factor evaluations
is improper
Such a model enables better
communication among people
involved in the decision-
making
The model makes clear what
is really important to the
decision-making
The model forces the people
involved to orderly arrange
their judgment and preferences
Such a model may shift the
discussion from the signifi-
cant issues to arguments on
weights and scores
Such a model suppresses the
natural-intuitive judgment
Such a model may somehow
bind the decision-maker's
freedom
Such a model may be used as
a tool to criticize the









A-VII. Implementation of MAUT Procedure
A. PURPOSE
The purpose of this chapter is to examine how the ques-
tionnaire respondents perceive MAUT procedure implementation,
in its use as top-level acquisition decision-making tool.
B. ANALYSIS
The first question in this chapter, Q28 (see Exhibit 25)
,
refers to the nature of the model. Having in mind methods
like "Goeller Scorecard" or the "colors method" (using red,
green and yellow to denote relative values) , the question
states that a score for each factor is sufficient and the
aggregation of utility for the overall preference should be
left for a pure judgment. The response to this statement is
clear cut. 83% disagree and only 6% agree. 11% are in the
middle. Only 1 Israeli agreed with the statement. Thus, the
preference is clear: if, at all, to use such a procedure, it
should go all the way through, including the aggregate utility
derived from the summation of the products of weight times
the associated scores, by each of the attributes.
The next two questions deal with the eligibility to change
the model's components and by that to affect its outcomes. Q13
(see Exhibit 26) puts this idea in the negative way saying
that the model must not be changed. The answer's distribution
is almost completely "uniform" with equal percentages in all
five degrees of agreement. Q14, (see Exhibit 27), whose state-




Question No. 28 (Q28) —Numerical Summary
The Question's Phrasing:
There is no need for weights and total score. A
score for each factor separately is sufficient.
The rest should be left for pure judgment.
Table A-VII-1
American Responses Distribution
Distribution (Amount) Distribution (Percent)
Low High Total Low High Total
Decidedly Agree 1 1 2 7.7 4.6 5.7
Moderately Agree - - - - - -
Perhaps Agree 2 2 4 15.4 9.1 11.4
Moderately Disagree 8 13 21 61.6 59.1 60.0









D.A. M.A. P.A. M.D. D.D.
Figure A-VII-1. American Responses Distribution Histogram
Comment: for the Israeli response see No. 1 in Table A-VII-10




Question No. 13 (Q13) —Numerical Summary
The Question's Phrasing:
The model is supposed to be objective therefore may
not be changed. (The decision-maker is not bound,
of course, by the model outcomes.)
Table A-VII-2
American Responses Distribution
Distribution (Amount) Distribution (Percent)













































D.A. M.A. P.A. M.D. D.D.
Figure A-VII-2. American Responses Distribution Histogram
Comment: for the Israeli response see No. 2 in Table A-VII-10




Question No. 14 (Q14) —Numerical Summary
The Question's Phrasing:
The model is prepared by an analytical process
through the different levels, but the decision-
maker may change weights and scores (interact with
the model) according to his judgment.
Table A-VII-3
American Responses Distribution
Distribution (Amount) Distribution (Percent)









































M.A. P.A. M.D. D.D.
American Responses Distribution Histogram
Comment: for the Israeli response see No. 3 in Table A-VII-10
at the end of this chapter.
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according to his judgment when he is presented a structured
model breaks this tie. Here the distribution is extremely
"one-sided": 76% agree with the decision-maker's freedom to
change the model. Furthermore, of these 76%, 50% decidedly
agree, an unusual amount for the extreme choice. Another issue
is how the decision-maker should actually make such changes.
No doubt, there is firm basis for one of the commentators
observation:
Usually, I do not think the decision-maker will openly
or overtly change weights and scores. To do so at
the 'end' only invites allegations of improper rigging
of selection.
Thus, the decision-maker's interaction with the model requires
delicate and wise manipulation of the decision process and
the decision group.
The following set of questions deal with techniques of
determining weights and scores or rather
—
who should deter-
mine them. Four alternatives are presented by the questions:
(1) The decision-maker himself should determine both
weights and scores.
(2) The decision-maker should determine only weights (while
scores are determined otherwise, presumably at lower levels)
.
(3) People involved (i.e., staff members, decision group
members and the like) should determine weights and scores.
(4) Group of experts should determine weights and scores.
In fact, these alternatives are not mutually exclusive and
some or all of them can be used at the same procedure through
its various chases and iterations. Moreover, there are many
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more combinations of "by whom" and "how" scores and weights
are determined than these four alternatives. The respondents
had to cope with these limitations, which resulted in a par-
tial picture. In any case, the respondents were aware that
the four alternatives might not suffice. 58% pointed at Q12
(see Exhibit 28) to the decision-maker as the one who should
determine weights and scores. Only 25% disagree, and 17% did
not have a definite opinion. About the same distribution oc-
curred in Q31 (see Exhibit 29) , suggesting that only weights
should be determined by the decision-maker: 56% agreed, 32%
disagreed and 12% were undecided ("perhaps agree"). Compared
to the high agreement about the decision-maker as being the
weights and scores determinator , it is interesting to observe
the respondents rejection of the other alternatives, namely:
the determination done through an aggregation of individual
evaluation of people involved in the decision (Q33, see Exhibit
30) , or by a group of experts (Q32, see Exhibit 31) . In the
latter case, there is a "middle" distribution with the largest
group of 32% of the answers at the "perhaps agree" row. Differ-
ent is the Israeli attitude toward the experts alternative.
64% of the Israeli's favor this alternative. It may be that
the apprehension of a biased model underlies the American reser-
vation towards any kind of aggregate opinions in structuring
the model. But perhaps the rejection is caused just by unaware-
ness of the techniques usually implemented in MAUT. And it may




Question No. 12 (Q12) —Numerical Summary
The Question's Phrasing:
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D.A. M.A. P.A. M.D. D.D.
Figure A-VII-4. American Responses Distribution Histogram
Comment: for the Israeli response see No. 4 in Table A-VII-10




Question No. 31 (Q31) —Numerical Summary
The Question's Phrasing:
The weights are the main ingredient in the model
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Question No. 33 (Q33) —Numerical Summary
The Question's Phrasing:
Weights and scores should be determined by summing
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D.A. M.A. P.A. M.D. D.D.
Figure A-VII-7. American Responses Distribution Histogram
Comment: for the Israeli response see No. 5 in Table A-VII-10




Question No. 32 (Q32) —Numerical Summary
The Question's Phrasing:
Weights and scores should be determined by a common
work of a group of experts.
Table A-VII-6
American Responses Distribution
Distribution (Amount) Distribution (Percent)











































D.A. M.A. P.A. M.D, D.D.
Figure A-VII-6. American Responses Distribution Histogram
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the author's unawareness of the MAUT techniques at the time
of the composition of the questionnaire...).
A "uniform" distribution is observed in 030 (see Exhibit
32)
,
dealinq with whether or not weiqhts and scores should be
assigned on different occasions by different people. The dis-
tribution reflects, perhaps, the variety of ways to maintain
the MAUT procedure. But perhaps it is again the lack of
experience in MAUT implementation that causes people to arbi-
trarily select their answer all-over the spectrum.
In contrast to the balanced distribution in Q30, the
preference is very clear in Qll (see Exhibit 33) —the last
one in the implementation section. 72% of the respondents
express their view that the numerical framework of the MAUT
procedure is not sufficient for decision-making. The model
presentation before the decision-maker should be supplemented
by the underlying data, rationale and methodology that brought
about the model's weighting, rating and overall preference.
Only 17% disagree with the above idea, and 11% are in the
middle.
C. ADDITIONAL PRACTICAL COMMENTS
The written comments made by the questionnaire respondents
raise some additional desirable features in the MAUT procedure
which are not covered by the questions. The following quotes
introduce these features
:
...A range of subjective values and numerical
estimates need to be presented to top decision-





Question No. 30 (Q30) —Numerical Summary
The Question's Phrasing:
Weights and scores should be assigned independently
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Distribution (Amount) Distribution (Percent)









































D.A. M.A. P.A. M.D. D.D.
Figure A-VII-8. American Responses Distribution Histogram
Comment: for the Israeli response see No. 6 in Table A-VII-10




Question No. 11 (Qll) --Numerical Summary
The Question's Phrasing:
Such a model may be used only if supplemented by
representation of the detailed data for each topic.
Table A-VII-9
American Responses Distribution
Distribution (Amount) Distribution (Percent)










































D.A. M.A. P.A. M.D, D.D.
Figure A-VII-9. American Responses Distribution Histogram
Comment: for the Israeli response see No. 7 in Table A-VII-10




The model can be improved by specifying at the outset
that the scores must exceed some threshold value for
selected 'critical' factor. [H-4]
Go-No-Go factors should be identified at early
stages, especially those perceived by the decision-
maker, which usually tend to be revealed only at
the end. [L-10]
The model should be expanded to include probabilities
since most of the decisions deal with the future
where evaluations are mere estimates .. .Also constraints
should be included in the model. [L-ll]
Two main requirements are raised by the above comments:
(1) Uncertainties and risks should be treated by the model,
and clearly presented to the decision-maker.
(2) The model should maintain thresholds (or constraints)
for the critical factors. Another set of comments relates to
the "relationship" between the model and the decision-maker.
The following quotes might illustrate:
The model, i.e., the structured decision process is
a useful tool, but it must be acceptable to final
decision-makers, and emphatically not plugged into
a computer or be defined by 'experts'— specifically
weights and scores. [H-l]
I have found that judgement of experienced members
of the decision-group ("intuition") is a dominant
factor. Analysis and models are steered by comments
of these participants. "Good" decision-making is
enhanced by bringing them in early, so that data base
etc., is organized to their "taste". [H-15]
The conclusion is that the decision-maker should be consulted
at an early stage of the evaluation procedure structuring to
ensure his acceptance of this procedure. Furthermore, he should
affect the important details of the procedure according to his
experience, intuition and preferences.
Another requirement is the model simplicity. It should
be easy to present in a decision session, easy to grasp by
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decision-makers whose expertise is not necessarily in the very
details of the alternatives presented or in sophisticated
modeling procedures. Models that "hide" their procedures
within a computer or can be understood only by the experts
who built them have little value for top-level decision-makers,
if any.
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY
After a reasonable rounding of some vague answering trends,
the following conclusions reflect the general preferences of
the respondents:
(1) The model is subject to change by the decision-maker.
The latter should implement such changes in a way that would
be acceptable as a proper procedure.
(2) The decision-maker is preferred as the authority to
determine weights and scores. There are reservations to
parameters determination being done by people involved in the
decision, or by a group of experts.
(3) A presentation of the MAUT procedure should be supple-
mented by the data, rationale and methodology which underly
the numerical results.
Some additional requirements are raised through the verbal
comments to the questions:
(1) The model should handle uncertainties, and risks should
be clearly demonstrated to the decision-maker.
(2) The model should maintain threshold for critical factors
(3) The procedure (model) should be accepted by the decision-
maker and the acceptance cleared at an early stage.
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(4) Decision-makers should be consulted on the procedure
structuring at its initial phases.
(5) Simplicity is a paramount feature of such procedure
or model.
In general it must be said that the MAUT actual implementation
in the acquisition decision-making warrants a more thorough
discussion than allowed by the questionnaire, or suggested by
the answers and the written comments. This is done in detail




Statements Selection by the Israeli Respondents
(Selection is identical to agreement with the statement)
No. Corresponds The Statement Selected Selected
to "American" by by
Question # (Amount) (Percent)
Q28
Q13
The model is too elaborate.
Scores only are sufficient.
The rest should be left to
pure judgment.
The model is supposed to be
objective therefore may not
be changed. (The decision-




Scores and weight would be
determined in the process
prior to the decision. The
decision-maker may change







Q33 Weights and scores should
be determined by independent
evaluations of people involved
in the decision. 4 36
Q32
Qll
Weights and scores should
be determined by a group
of experts.
Such a model should be







A-VIII. Relative Importance of Value-Dimension Categories
A. PURPOSE
The purpose of this section is to examine whether or not
some systematic characteristics are observed in the relative
importance weight assigned to three value-dimension categories
(Direct, Socio-economic, Political) by the questionnaire's
respondents
.
This examination should assist in defining initial steps
in MAUT procedure structuring for top-level acquisition deci-




The analysis of the above mentioned subject is based on
the data collected in Part II of the questionnaire. In Part
II the respondents were asked to evaluate the relative impor-
tance of three main value dimension categories—Direct, i.e.,
factors that affect directly the military forces, Socio-economic,
i.e., factors that have an impact on the national social and
economic areas, and political, i.e., the external and internal
political aspects of the decision. This evaluation is done for
several decision levels separately. Each respondent was asked
to refer to two cases. In fact, some respondents did not fill
in this part at all. Some referred to one case only, and some
With this respect, DSARC and (S)SARC have been considered
as decision bodies although formally they have recommending
authority only. The underlying assumption was that in consoli-
dating their recommendations these bodies should reach, in a
sense, some sort of decision.
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referred only to those levels in which they felt sufficiently
knowledgeable to make the evaluation. Probably in quite a
few cases the respondent referred to the same system (they
were not asked to note the specific system's name) . To examine
what bias this might cause, two cases, in which system identi-
fication has been noted by some of the respondents, were
checked--one American case and one Israeli case. In both
cases, individuals that referred to the same weapon system,
evaluated the relative importance of the categories completely
differently from each other.
For each column, i.e., for each category at each level a
simple average of weights through all cases (systems) is
calculated. The absolute numerical value of these averages,
which is exhibited in Tables A-VTII-1 and A-VIII-2 has no
practical meaning since it can't be used "as is" in a MAUT
procedure evaluation for any specific system. This is obvious
because any specific decision has its 'specific' weighting
and no "general (average) weighting" can replace it (unless
they are coincidentally identical) . But the relative dimen-
sions of the averages do reveal some interesting relations
between categories and between levels.
C. CATEGORIES WEIGHTING CHARACTERISTICS
Although the absolute values of the weights in a corres-
ponding category and level are to a great extent divergent
(e.g., the weight of "direct" category at SecDef level for one
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Average Importance Weights (Expressed in percentage)
,
Assigned to Three Categories (Direct, Socio-Economic,
Political) In Three Decision Levels, as Observed
in 16 Cases by the Israeli Respondents
Min. of Def
.
General HQs IAF HQs
Dir SE Pol Dir SE Pol Dir SE Pol
Average 33.7 36 29.7 53.6 38.2 8.2 66.5 22 11.5
Standard
Deviation
23.2 16.4 29.9 31.4 33.4 12.5 29.3 27.6 17.1
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"rules" (or characteristics) within the weighting of each
single system, which are common to almost 100% of the cases
in the sample. Thus the average weights also relate to each
other according to these same rules, which are surprisingly
corresponding to what was expected by pure common sense. The
categories weighting characteristics of the American community
can be summarized as follows:
(1) In general, the higher the decision level is, the greater
is the combined weight of the political and socio-economic
categories, relative to the direct category.
(2) The recommending bodies, i.e./ the DSARC and (S)SARC
tend to be more "direct" category-oriented than their decision-
making superiors, i.e., SecDef and (S)Sec, respectively. (In
some cases they are equally "direct" category-oriented but
almost never less than their superiors.
(3) For the American decision-makers the socio-economic
category weights less than the political category, and its
relative weight values are very low (10% and less) for almost
all cases considered, as well as on the average.
The categories weighting characteristics for the Israeli
community can be summarized as follows:
(1) Like in the American community, the higher the decision
level is, the greater is the combined weight of socio-economic
and political categories relative to the direct category.
(2) Different from the American community, the socio-economic
category tends to weigh more than the political one.
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(3) Through all levels the relative weight of the "direct"
category is smaller, and that of the combined socio-economic
and political categories is bigger, than for the corresponding
levels in the American community.
A general rule is that emphasis on specific category is
kept through all levels. For example, if a system has unusually
high political weight of 75% at SecDef level, it has also an
unusually high weight of 60% at the DSARC, 70% at (S)Sec,
and 60% at (S)SARC levels.
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY
The categories weighting analysis reveals several rules
of behavior, as discussed in this chapter. This may have
an impact on the MAUT value tree structuring and on reducing
the amount of sensitivity analysis required. This is discussed





The purpose of this chapter is to attempt the structuring of
an initial 'value tree1', compatible for some acquisition "general






Part VI of the questionnaire suggested a list of 19 value
dimensions. The respondents were asked to rate each dimension
by a score on a 0-4 scale, according to its impact on a
specific system decision. The purpose for the rating was
to identify such dimensions that have repeating or 1 scores,
in order to consider their elimination from the list. The
possibility of finding relative weights according to the attri-
butes rating was abandoned since the rating dealt with differ-
ent systems and different life cycle phases, and any aggregate
rating weight would have been meaningless.
Another purpose of the attributes list question was to
stimulate comments about the various attributes. Finally,
the respondents were asked to suggest additional attributes
which they thought warranted inclusion in the list.
C. CONCLUSIONS
The value dimensions rating did not identify any dimension
that should be eliminated. Except for several question marks,
there were no written comments on the listed attributes. This
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does not mean that the list can be structured as is into a
MAUT value tree. It requires quite a few changes and adjust-
ments, as discussed in the body of this thesis.
Finally, Part VI of the questionnaire provided a list of
additional value dimensions, as suggested by the respondents.























Producibility (production base, production readiness)
Competition (Second Source)
Mobilization capability







Innovation degree (a new system, an improved system,
new features)
Meeting threat over long run
Contribution to general technological advance
"''The list includes the additional value dimension only,
as defined by the respondents.
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Processing these value dimensions together with the pre-
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